Adam Smith’s Humean Critique in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Sympathy as the natural principle of moral judgment
Journal of Scottish Thought · 03.11.2026 · 15 (1)
DOI: 10.57132/jst.490 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Scottish Thought, online erschienen am 03.11.2026. Verfasst von Hiroyuki Ota. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper argues that Smith’s criticism of Hume, especially that developed in Part IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can be read as Smith applying the specific view of human nature presented in Hume’s epistemology. That view is argued as a Hume’s framework that (a) recognises multiple mental processes influencing judgment and (b) determines a natural one among them that has a dominant and prevailing impact on the human mind. In this paper, I argue that, drawing on this framework, Smith criticises Hume for failing to accurately understand the natural principle of moral judgment. Among the studies on Smith’s intellectual link to Hume, which tend to focus on moral concepts, highlighting Smith’s debts to Hume’s epistemology offers a new perspective on the subject. In light of the analysis of the connection between Smith and Hume, this paper has important implications, providing an alternative understanding of one of the most controversial passages in The Theory of Moral Sentiments—the sentinel example.
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APA
Ota, H. (2026). Adam Smith’s Humean Critique in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Sympathy as the natural principle of moral judgment. Journal of Scottish Thought, 15(1). https://doi.org/10.57132/jst.490
Vancouver
Ota H. Adam Smith’s Humean Critique in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Sympathy as the natural principle of moral judgment. Journal of Scottish Thought. 2026;15(1). doi:10.57132/jst.490
BibTeX
@article{Ota2026,
author = {Ota, Hiroyuki},
title = {Adam Smith’s Humean Critique in The Theory of Moral Sentiments: Sympathy as the natural principle of moral judgment},
journal = {Journal of Scottish Thought},
year = {2026},
volume = {15},
number = {1},
doi = {10.57132/jst.490}
}
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