Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Wormhole Attack on RPL across Diverse IoT Network Environments
UMYU Scientifica · 30.06.2026 · 5 (2) · 400-407
DOI: 10.56919/usci.2652.036 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift UMYU Scientifica, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Emmanuel Abimbola Olowookere und 6 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 7 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL) is a foundational IPv6 routing standard for IoT deployments, yet it remains vulnerable to wormhole attacks that exploit its rank-based topology construction. Despite growing awareness of this threat, systematic empirical data on how tunnel multiplicity, tunnel behaviour, and attacker count jointly affect network-layer performance metrics have been lacking. This study addresses that gap through a replicatable SimPy-based simulation framework that (i) embeds an arbitrary number of wormhole pairs in an RPL Destination-Oriented Directed Acyclic Graph (DODAG), (ii) models two tunnel behaviours—shortcut (forwarding) and blackhole (dropping)—and (iii) records six performance metrics: Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), average end-to-end delay, hop count, control packet overhead, energy consumption, and throughput. Experiments were conducted across five independent simulation runs per condition using orthogonal topology and traffic random seeds, with attacker counts of 4, 8, and 12 nodes. Statistical rigour was ensured through mean ± standard deviation reporting and one-way ANOVA across attacker levels. In shortcut mode, ANOVA revealed significant effects of attacker count on PDR (p = 0.037), delay (p = 0.012), hop count (p = 0.011), and throughput (p = 0.037). Blackhole mode results were more variable across seeds, reflecting topology-dependent susceptibility. Shortcut tunnels consistently improved apparent routing efficiency—PDR = 0.60–0.76 and throughput 205–260 b/s—while concealing their potential for disruption, making them particularly difficult to detect. These findings quantify the dual nature of wormhole attacks and motivate trust-zone placement and lightweight consistency checks as countermeasures before scaling RPL deployments beyond modest node counts.
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APA
Olowookere, E. A., Isah, A. A., Ademilua, D. A., Areghan, E., Aliyu, Y. M., Adebola, N., & Ali, F. G. (2026). Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Wormhole Attack on RPL across Diverse IoT Network Environments. UMYU Scientifica, 5(2), 400-407. https://doi.org/10.56919/usci.2652.036
Vancouver
Olowookere EA, Isah AA, Ademilua DA, Areghan E, Aliyu YM, Adebola N, et al. Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Wormhole Attack on RPL across Diverse IoT Network Environments. UMYU Scientifica. 2026;5(2):400-407. doi:10.56919/usci.2652.036
BibTeX
@article{Olowookere2026,
author = {Olowookere, Emmanuel Abimbola and Isah, Adamu Abubakar and Ademilua, David Adetunji and Areghan, Edoise and Aliyu, Yahaya Mafindi and Adebola, Nabeela and Ali, Faisal Garba},
title = {Comprehensive Performance Evaluation of Wormhole Attack on RPL across Diverse IoT Network Environments},
journal = {UMYU Scientifica},
year = {2026},
volume = {5},
number = {2},
pages = {400--407},
doi = {10.56919/usci.2652.036}
}
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