The Survival Threshold of Pay-at-Harvest Insurance: Strategic Default and Institutional Enforcement
Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management · 31.12.2025 · 12 (4) · 291-305
DOI: 10.56578/jcgirm120405 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management, online erschienen am 31.12.2025. Verfasst von Qi Cheng.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Pay-at-harvest agricultural insurance has been proposed as a promising mechanism for expanding risk protection among liquidity-constrained smallholder farmers by postponing premium payments until harvest. However, the long-term viability of pay-at-harvest insurance under unconstrained market conditions remains insufficiently understood. Using experimental evidence from Kenya, an unconstrained endogenous default rate of 54.11% was identified, with default behavior being primarily driven by rational intertemporal arbitrage rather than by ex-ante adverse selection. To evaluate the implications of this behavioral friction for market sustainability, the observed default behavior was incorporated into an infinite-horizon dynamic game and a state-dependent actuarial framework. The analysis demonstrates that absorption of the baseline default rate would require an actuarially fair premium surcharge of approximately 85.16%, thereby generating severe adverse selection pressures. A closed-form survival threshold was subsequently derived, revealing that actuarial sustainability can be maintained only when the endogenous default rate is suppressed below 5.60%. To identify mechanisms capable of achieving this threshold, an ex-ante institutional design framework was calibrated using features commonly observed in rural China’s agricultural market architecture. It is shown that overlapping closed-loop enforcement mechanisms—including contract-farming relationships, financial cross-default arrangements, and algorithmic credit monitoring systems—can operate as intertemporal commitment devices that substantially increase the shadow cost of strategic default. Under plausible parameterizations, these institutional arrangements are predicted to compress the equilibrium default rate to approximately 5.00%, thereby satisfying the actuarial survival condition. The results indicate that financial innovation in agricultural risk management must be accompanied by commensurate enforcement capacity if durable and scalable insurance markets are to be achieved.
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APA
Cheng, Q. (2025). The Survival Threshold of Pay-at-Harvest Insurance: Strategic Default and Institutional Enforcement. Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management, 12(4), 291-305. https://doi.org/10.56578/jcgirm120405
Vancouver
Cheng Q. The Survival Threshold of Pay-at-Harvest Insurance: Strategic Default and Institutional Enforcement. Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management. 2025;12(4):291-305. doi:10.56578/jcgirm120405
BibTeX
@article{Cheng2025,
author = {Cheng, Qi},
title = {The Survival Threshold of Pay-at-Harvest Insurance: Strategic Default and Institutional Enforcement},
journal = {Journal of Corporate Governance, Insurance, and Risk Management},
year = {2025},
volume = {12},
number = {4},
pages = {291--305},
doi = {10.56578/jcgirm120405}
}
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