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MODELING TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO TAX GAME PARAMETERS

Yurii Myskin, Volodymyr Kraevskyi, Oleksandr Hulianskyi, Sergii Lekar, Olga Ivanyshyna, Oksana Myskina

Financial and credit activity problems of theory and practice · 30.06.2026 · 3 (68) · 207-234

DOI: 10.55643/fcaptp.3.68.2026.5223 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Financial and credit activity problems of theory and practice, online erschienen am 30.06.2026. Verfasst von Yurii Myskin und 5 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 30 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The article presents the results of an experimental study of the effects of audit probability, penalty levels, and moral-ethical motivation on taxpayers’ behavior regarding the fulfillment of tax obligations. The aim of the study is to analyze the behavioral responses of participants in a laboratory experiment to changes in the parameters of a tax game that models different regimes of monitoring, sanctions, and prosocial framing.The research methodology is based on the principles of experimental economics and econometric modeling. Participants made decisions regarding tax compliance or tax evasion under various combinations of monitoring intensity and penalty severity, while the relationship between economic and behavioral factors and the choice of tax behavior strategies was analyzed using a binary choice logit model. A distinctive feature of the study is the implementation of two consecutive games: a control game, in which the collected funds had no social significance, and a morally oriented game, in which tax payments within the experiment were associated with a prosocial purpose for the use of funds, thereby creating a charitable framing effect. This approach made it possible to assess the potential influence of moral-ethical incentives on participants’ financial behavior, although the obtained results may also partially reflect learning and adaptation effects.The results indicate a predominantly adaptive and context-dependent nature of participants’ decisions: the level of tax evasion increases under conditions of low audit probability and moderate penalties and decreases under stricter enforcement conditions. Behavioral differences were also identified between the control game and the game incorporating prosocial framing. The findings suggest that moral-ethical framing may affect different aspects of tax behavior in different ways. The impact of moral framing proved to be more pronounced at the level of the frequency of behavioral choices than at the level of the intensity of tax evasion.The main theoretical conclusion is that tax behavior is shaped by the interaction of economic incentives, moral-ethical factors, and adaptive behavioral mechanisms. The findings indicate the potential role of behavioral factors in tax decision-making under laboratory experimental conditions; however, the limited sample size does not allow the results to be directly extrapolated to the broader population of taxpayers.

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APA

Myskin, Y., Kraevskyi, V., Hulianskyi, O., Lekar, S., Ivanyshyna, O., & Myskina, O. (2026). MODELING TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO TAX GAME PARAMETERS. Financial and credit activity problems of theory and practice, 3(68), 207-234. https://doi.org/10.55643/fcaptp.3.68.2026.5223

Vancouver

Myskin Y, Kraevskyi V, Hulianskyi O, Lekar S, Ivanyshyna O, Myskina O. MODELING TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO TAX GAME PARAMETERS. Financial and credit activity problems of theory and practice. 2026;3(68):207-234. doi:10.55643/fcaptp.3.68.2026.5223

BibTeX
@article{Myskin2026,
  author = {Myskin, Yurii and Kraevskyi, Volodymyr and Hulianskyi, Oleksandr and Lekar, Sergii and Ivanyshyna, Olga and Myskina, Oksana},
  title = {MODELING TAXPAYER BEHAVIOR: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO TAX GAME PARAMETERS},
  journal = {Financial and credit activity problems of theory and practice},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {3},
  number = {68},
  pages = {207--234},
  doi = {10.55643/fcaptp.3.68.2026.5223}
}
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