EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Crossref

Political Economy of Takeover Regulation in India: How Good is India’s Mandatory Bid Rule?

Nemika Jha

National Law School Business Law Review · 2024

DOI: 10.55496/irxp9496 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift National Law School Business Law Review, 2024. Verfasst von Nemika Jha.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The political economy/interest group theory has emerged as a powerful framework for understanding the differences between takeover regulation in advanced economies like the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.). However, what is largely missing is whether the theory can be extended outside of the U.S. and the U.K., particularly to explain the motivations behind (and the impact of) transplanting takeover law principles from the U.S. and/or the U.K. to other jurisdictions. This article contributes to the ongoing discourse by testing the applicability of the interest group theory offered by Armour and Skeel to explain India’s transplant of U.K.’s mandatory bid rule (MBR) in its regulatory framework governing takeovers. In concluding that the Armour and Skeel theory does not fully explain India’s transplant experiment, this article not only underscores how transplanting takeover law concepts from a country of origin that is fundamentally different from the host country may result in wholly different outcomes, it also constructs a theoretical framework to demonstrate why and how the Indian version of the MBR has resulted in the reverse outcome of entrenching incumbents and shielding them from the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control. Lastly, it goes on to propose the several ways in which the existing formulation of the MBR could be improved by drawing on the experience of jurisdictions that have similarly experimented with the concept.

Zitieren

APA

Jha, N. (2024). Political Economy of Takeover Regulation in India: How Good is India’s Mandatory Bid Rule?. National Law School Business Law Review. https://doi.org/10.55496/irxp9496

Vancouver

Jha N. Political Economy of Takeover Regulation in India: How Good is India’s Mandatory Bid Rule?. National Law School Business Law Review. 2024. doi:10.55496/irxp9496

BibTeX
@article{Jha2024,
  author = {Jha, Nemika},
  title = {Political Economy of Takeover Regulation in India: How Good is India’s Mandatory Bid Rule?},
  journal = {National Law School Business Law Review},
  year = {2024},
  doi = {10.55496/irxp9496}
}
Kostenlos starten →