Afghanistan: A failed Grand Strategy
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies · 25.04.2023 · 22 (3)
DOI: 10.55016/v3h5vh96 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, online erschienen am 25.04.2023. Verfasst von Nicos Panayiotides.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The aim of this article is to evaluate prolonged American intervention in Afghanistan. In this regard, we want to examine whether American intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and especially American prolonged involvement in the Asian country was aligned with the American national interest. We will also seek to answer to a series of questions: Were there any alternatives for earlier withdrawal of the American troops? Did the prolonged occupation of Afghanistan ameliorate the international situation regarding terrorism? Is transnational terrorism threat reviving again due to the new data that are unfolding because of American withdrawal-and other aligned NATO troops- and the new peculiar status-quo established there? We will seek to answer and shed light to the aforementioned questions with the help of international relations’ theory and strategic studies.
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APA
Panayiotides, N. (2023). Afghanistan: A failed Grand Strategy. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 22(3). https://doi.org/10.55016/v3h5vh96
Vancouver
Panayiotides N. Afghanistan: A failed Grand Strategy. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. 2023;22(3). doi:10.55016/v3h5vh96
BibTeX
@article{Panayiotides2023,
author = {Panayiotides, Nicos},
title = {Afghanistan: A failed Grand Strategy},
journal = {Journal of Military and Strategic Studies},
year = {2023},
volume = {22},
number = {3},
doi = {10.55016/v3h5vh96}
}
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