The evaluation game: strategic interactions in higher education
PROJEÇÃO E DOCÊNCIA · 22.05.2026 · 17 (2) · e2797
DOI: 10.54899/rpd.v17n2-2797 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift PROJEÇÃO E DOCÊNCIA, online erschienen am 22.05.2026. Verfasst von Julio Cesar de Aguiar.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study develops a game-theoretic model to analyze strategic interactions between university instructors and students regarding grading practices and teaching evaluations. Using a simultaneous-move game framework with general payoff parameters, we derive algebraically the conditions under which a unique Nash equilibrium emerges: students choosing not to study while instructors adopt lenient grading. Formally, we demonstrate that this equilibrium exists if and only if (i) instructors value positive evaluations, (ii) negative evaluations impose costs, and (iii) studying is costly for students. Sensitivity analysis confirms robustness across parameter variations, with the equilibrium breaking down only under empirically implausible boundary conditions. The model incorporates intrinsic motivation, showing that high intrinsic benefits can shift the equilibrium toward studying. This is the first formal game-theoretic framework for instructor-student evaluation dynamics, providing theoretical foundations for understanding grade inflation as an equilibrium phenomenon. Policy implications are derived directly from the model's strategic structure, including interventions targeting evaluation timing, faculty job security, and curriculum design.
Zitieren
APA
Aguiar, J. C. D. (2026). The evaluation game: strategic interactions in higher education. PROJEÇÃO E DOCÊNCIA, 17(2), e2797. https://doi.org/10.54899/rpd.v17n2-2797
Vancouver
Aguiar JCD. The evaluation game: strategic interactions in higher education. PROJEÇÃO E DOCÊNCIA. 2026;17(2):e2797. doi:10.54899/rpd.v17n2-2797
BibTeX
@article{Aguiar2026,
author = {Aguiar, Julio Cesar de},
title = {The evaluation game: strategic interactions in higher education},
journal = {PROJEÇÃO E DOCÊNCIA},
year = {2026},
volume = {17},
number = {2},
pages = {e2797},
doi = {10.54899/rpd.v17n2-2797}
}
EUVIMED