Crossref
How Compensation Committees Shape Performance Share Awards to Executives: Insights from Agency and Managerial Power Theories
Bankers, Markets & Investors · 28.04.2026 · N° 183 (4) · 44-52
DOI: 10.54695/bmi.183.0044 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Bankers, Markets & Investors, erschienen am 28.04.2026. Verfasst von Évelyne Poincelot. Die Arbeit nennt 34 Literaturangaben.
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APA
Poincelot, É. (2026). How Compensation Committees Shape Performance Share Awards to Executives: Insights from Agency and Managerial Power Theories. Bankers, Markets & Investors, N° 183(4), 44-52. https://doi.org/10.54695/bmi.183.0044
Vancouver
Poincelot É. How Compensation Committees Shape Performance Share Awards to Executives: Insights from Agency and Managerial Power Theories. Bankers, Markets & Investors. 2026;N° 183(4):44-52. doi:10.54695/bmi.183.0044
BibTeX
@article{Poincelot2026,
author = {Poincelot, Évelyne},
title = {How Compensation Committees Shape Performance Share Awards to Executives: Insights from Agency and Managerial Power Theories},
journal = {Bankers, Markets & Investors},
year = {2026},
volume = {N° 183},
number = {4},
pages = {44--52},
doi = {10.54695/bmi.183.0044}
}
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