Crossref
It Pays to Refuse: How Refusing to Disclose Salary History Benefits Job Candidates
Academy of Management Proceedings · 2026-07 · 2026 (1)
DOI: 10.5465/amproc.2026.256bp ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Academy of Management Proceedings, 2026-07. Verfasst von Laura Adler und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.
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APA
Adler, L., & Dinh, M. (2026). It Pays to Refuse: How Refusing to Disclose Salary History Benefits Job Candidates. Academy of Management Proceedings, 2026(1). https://doi.org/10.5465/amproc.2026.256bp
Vancouver
Adler L, Dinh M. It Pays to Refuse: How Refusing to Disclose Salary History Benefits Job Candidates. Academy of Management Proceedings. 2026;2026(1). doi:10.5465/amproc.2026.256bp
BibTeX
@article{Adler2026,
author = {Adler, Laura and Dinh, Mai},
title = {It Pays to Refuse: How Refusing to Disclose Salary History Benefits Job Candidates},
journal = {Academy of Management Proceedings},
year = {2026},
volume = {2026},
number = {1},
doi = {10.5465/amproc.2026.256bp}
}
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