La teoría de juegos aplicada en los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas en México
Economicus Journal of Business and Economics Insights · 01.07.2026 · 3 (2) · 66-84
DOI: 10.54167/ejbei.v3i2.2339 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Economicus Journal of Business and Economics Insights, online erschienen am 01.07.2026. Verfasst von Carlos Heriberto Flores-Orona und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 26 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Corruption is one of the main obstacles to the efficiency of public service, especially in Mexico, where it is manifested in the day‑to‑day conduct of public officials. This paper applies inspection theory, derived from game theory, to analyze the incentives and strategies that influence the truthfulness of declarations of assets and interests (DPI). Here we construct a game in which the public official decides between declaring truthfully (p) or falsifying (1 - p) their DPI. This choice derives from their actions or possible strategies, that is, whether the public official decides to file their DPI correctly or to falsify it. Once the official has submitted the declaration, the auditing body or institution observes it and decides whether to audit the declaration. Finally, the conditions under which a public official would choose to lie are examined, and it is concluded that it is necessary to strengthen the sanctioning regime to improve transparency and accountability mechanisms and, thereby, the effectiveness of the National Anti‑Corruption System in Mexico. The model is calibrated with statistical data taken from the National Census of the Federal Government (CNGF) that support the theoretical proposal.
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APA
Flores-Orona, C. H., Carrillo-Viramontes, J. A., & Vázquez-Guzmán, D. (2026). La teoría de juegos aplicada en los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas en México. Economicus Journal of Business and Economics Insights, 3(2), 66-84. https://doi.org/10.54167/ejbei.v3i2.2339
Vancouver
Flores-Orona CH, Carrillo-Viramontes JA, Vázquez-Guzmán D. La teoría de juegos aplicada en los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas en México. Economicus Journal of Business and Economics Insights. 2026;3(2):66-84. doi:10.54167/ejbei.v3i2.2339
BibTeX
@article{FloresOrona2026,
author = {Flores-Orona, Carlos Heriberto and Carrillo-Viramontes, José Antonio and Vázquez-Guzmán, David},
title = {La teoría de juegos aplicada en los mecanismos de rendición de cuentas en México},
journal = {Economicus Journal of Business and Economics Insights},
year = {2026},
volume = {3},
number = {2},
pages = {66--84},
doi = {10.54167/ejbei.v3i2.2339}
}
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