EUVIMEDEUVIMED entdecken
Open Access · CC BY-NC 4.0

Independent Director Dissent and Large Shareholder Tunneling

Zixuan Yang

International Journal of World Economic Research · 08.06.2026 · 2 (1) · 64-75

DOI: 10.54097/3cxtq478 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift International Journal of World Economic Research, online erschienen am 08.06.2026. Verfasst von Zixuan Yang. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

In recent years, with tightening capital market regulations and ongoing optimizations in corporate governance structures, the monitoring role of independent directors has garnered increasing attention. Using data from A-share listed firms in China from 2007 to 2024, this study examines the impact of independent director dissent on large shareholder tunneling behavior. The findings indicate that independent director dissent significantly curbs tunneling activities, a conclusion that remains robust after a battery of rigorous tests. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the inhibitory effect is more pronounced in firms characterized by "excessive board appointments" and when dissent pertains specifically to "connected transactions." Mechanism analysis suggests that such dissent activates external governance mechanisms by triggering negative media coverage and enhancing information transparency, thereby amplifying market monitoring pressure to constrain tunneling. These results align with the governance logic that independent directors utilize signaling to activate external oversight and raise the costs of expropriation. This paper offers significant implications for refining the independent director system, preventing large shareholder entrenchment, and strengthening the protection of minority investors.

Zitieren

APA

Yang, Z. (2026). Independent Director Dissent and Large Shareholder Tunneling. International Journal of World Economic Research, 2(1), 64-75. https://doi.org/10.54097/3cxtq478

Vancouver

Yang Z. Independent Director Dissent and Large Shareholder Tunneling. International Journal of World Economic Research. 2026;2(1):64-75. doi:10.54097/3cxtq478

BibTeX
@article{Yang2026,
  author = {Yang, Zixuan},
  title = {Independent Director Dissent and Large Shareholder Tunneling},
  journal = {International Journal of World Economic Research},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {2},
  number = {1},
  pages = {64--75},
  doi = {10.54097/3cxtq478}
}
Kostenlos starten →