Moral Status of Animals: Arguments From Having a Soul Revisited
Journal of Animal Ethics · 2022
DOI: 10.5406/21601267.12.1.02 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Animal Ethics, 2022. Verfasst von Stefan Sencerz. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 2-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 43 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this article, I consider a number of arguments that assume that beings who have immortal souls occupy a special position in the sphere of moral concern. First, I place these arguments in their historical and cultural contexts. Next, I formulate several conditions of adequacy that all such arguments must satisfy. Subsequently, I distinguish two different general kinds of such arguments: Inclusionary arguments attempt to use the immortality of soul as a criterion for either including someone into a sphere of morality while excluding others or, at least, for elevating someone's position within this sphere. Modifying arguments attempt to strengthen or weaken moral considerations that already apply to a being included into the sphere of morality. I argue that, although some modifying arguments may fulfill all conditions of adequacy, they have very little practical importance.
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APA
Sencerz, S. (2022). Moral Status of Animals: Arguments From Having a Soul Revisited. Journal of Animal Ethics. https://doi.org/10.5406/21601267.12.1.02
Vancouver
Sencerz S. Moral Status of Animals: Arguments From Having a Soul Revisited. Journal of Animal Ethics. 2022. doi:10.5406/21601267.12.1.02
BibTeX
@article{Sencerz2022,
author = {Sencerz, Stefan},
title = {Moral Status of Animals: Arguments From Having a Soul Revisited},
journal = {Journal of Animal Ethics},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.5406/21601267.12.1.02}
}
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