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Incentives for Levying Countervailing Duties on Foreign Competitive Goods

Yu-Ter Wang

Modern Economy and Management · 2023

DOI: 10.53964/mem.2023012 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Modern Economy and Management, 2023. Verfasst von Yu-Ter Wang.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Objective

The relationships between firm profits, foreign export subsidy, and countervailing duties (CVDs) have not been discussed sufficiently in the existing related literature. The purpose of the present study is to analyze the effects of CVDs and formulate policy advice regarding CVDs to fill this knowledge gap.

Methods

A game theoretic model with oligopolistic market structure is adopted.

Results

The proposed model indicates that when a foreign country provides an export subsidy to a foreign final good, a domestic country has an incentive to levy a CVD whose value exceeds that of the foreign export subsidy on the foreign final good because domestic intermediate- and final-good firms might benefit from the CVD.

Conclusions

A CVD whose value equals that of a foreign export subsidy is enough to counter the subsidy’s negative effects on the profits made by domestic intermediate- and final-good firms.

Zitieren

APA

Wang, Y. (2023). Incentives for Levying Countervailing Duties on Foreign Competitive Goods. Modern Economy and Management. https://doi.org/10.53964/mem.2023012

Vancouver

Wang Y. Incentives for Levying Countervailing Duties on Foreign Competitive Goods. Modern Economy and Management. 2023. doi:10.53964/mem.2023012

BibTeX
@article{Wang2023,
  author = {Wang, Yu-Ter},
  title = {Incentives for Levying Countervailing Duties on Foreign Competitive Goods},
  journal = {Modern Economy and Management},
  year = {2023},
  doi = {10.53964/mem.2023012}
}
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