The Bounds of Experience: Representationalism and the Laws of Appearance
Journal of Consciousness Studies · 01.02.2025 · 32 (1) · 107-131
DOI: 10.53765/20512201.32.1.107 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Journal of Consciousness Studies, erschienen am 01.02.2025. Verfasst von Christopher F. Masciari. Die Arbeit nennt 14 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Here I defend representationalism against an important objection: the laws of appearance. The problem is that the laws seem necessary, but representationalist explanations of the laws give us no reason to think that they are. In the first part, I argue that the laws only seem necessary but are not. I argue that the laws seem necessary because we cannot imagine violations of them, and we cannot explain this inability. Since we have an explanation of why the laws seem necessary, we have no reason to posit a modal fact. In the second part, I argue that even if one establishes the metaphysical necessity of the laws by restricting them to normal humans, representationalism is not undermined either since the metaphysical necessity of the laws will be explained by contingent facts about normal human vision.
Zitieren
APA
Masciari, C. F. (2025). The Bounds of Experience: Representationalism and the Laws of Appearance. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 32(1), 107-131. https://doi.org/10.53765/20512201.32.1.107
Vancouver
Masciari CF. The Bounds of Experience: Representationalism and the Laws of Appearance. Journal of Consciousness Studies. 2025;32(1):107-131. doi:10.53765/20512201.32.1.107
BibTeX
@article{Masciari2025,
author = {Masciari, Christopher F.},
title = {The Bounds of Experience: Representationalism and the Laws of Appearance},
journal = {Journal of Consciousness Studies},
year = {2025},
volume = {32},
number = {1},
pages = {107--131},
doi = {10.53765/20512201.32.1.107}
}
EUVIMED