Generic Explanations for Generics
Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium · 01.12.2024 · 291-297
DOI: 10.53437/z7h19v66 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, online erschienen am 01.12.2024. Verfasst von Tom Ralston. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
It is widely accepted that generics express law-like generalisations, on the basis of evidence that their truth does not depend only on how things are in the actual world at one moment in time. In this paper, I propose a temporal truthmaker semantics for generics and argue that this theory can account for the intuition that generics express law-like generalisations. The law-likeness of generics therefore does not motivate the introduction of either the unarticulated constituent ‘GEN’ or a domain of abstract kinds. Instead, it can be explained by the nature of the states which make generics true, which may be either generic facts about a category, or particular facts about the instances of a category.
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APA
Ralston, T. (2024). Generic Explanations for Generics. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 291-297. https://doi.org/10.53437/z7h19v66
Vancouver
Ralston T. Generic Explanations for Generics. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium. 2024:291-297. doi:10.53437/z7h19v66
BibTeX
@article{Ralston2024,
author = {Ralston, Tom},
title = {Generic Explanations for Generics},
journal = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium},
year = {2024},
pages = {291--297},
doi = {10.53437/z7h19v66}
}
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