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A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief

Andrej Jovićević

Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium · 01.12.2024 · 188-195

DOI: 10.53437/vwtz6412 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, online erschienen am 01.12.2024. Verfasst von Andrej Jovićević. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Recent work in epistemology defends the unorthodox theses that belief is (1) an evidentially weak, and (2) question-sensitive attitude, and (3) that forming beliefs is sometimes a matter of guessing. What motivates these theses are examples of rationally permissible belief-ascriptions that exhibit these traits. The main aim of this paper is to outline a semantic account of categorical and conditional belief-ascriptions that captures the motivating data. We then survey some consequences of the proposed semantics, particularly with respect to the question of whether closure under rules of inference is rationally required for weak, question-sensitive belief.

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APA

Jovićević, A. (2024). A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 188-195. https://doi.org/10.53437/vwtz6412

Vancouver

Jovićević A. A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium. 2024:188-195. doi:10.53437/vwtz6412

BibTeX
@article{Jovievi2024,
  author = {Jovićević, Andrej},
  title = {A Semantics for Weak, Question-Sensitive Belief},
  journal = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium},
  year = {2024},
  pages = {188--195},
  doi = {10.53437/vwtz6412}
}
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