Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals
Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium · 05.02.2025 · 115-124
DOI: 10.53437/tk35fq83 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, online erschienen am 05.02.2025. Verfasst von Justin Bledin. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, I consider a variant of the ancient Idle Argument involving so-called “unconditionals” with interrogative wh-antecedents. This new Idle Argument provides an ideal setting for probing the logic of these close relatives of if-conditionals, which has been comparatively underexplored. In the course of refuting the argument, I argue that contrary to received wisdom, many wh-conditionals are not properly speaking ‘unconditional’ in that they do not entail their main clauses, yet modus ponens remains valid for this class of expressions. I make these lessons formally precise in a semantic system that integrates recent decision-theoretic approaches to deliberative modals with ideas from inquisitive semantics. My larger aim is to challenge standard truth preservation views of logic and deductive argumentation.
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APA
Bledin, J. (2025). Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 115-124. https://doi.org/10.53437/tk35fq83
Vancouver
Bledin J. Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium. 2025:115-124. doi:10.53437/tk35fq83
BibTeX
@article{Bledin2025,
author = {Bledin, Justin},
title = {Fatalism and the Logic of Unconditionals},
journal = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium},
year = {2025},
pages = {115--124},
doi = {10.53437/tk35fq83}
}
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