Ability Modals as Causal Modals
Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium · 21.01.2025 · 274-281
DOI: 10.53437/hx0a4x12 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, online erschienen am 21.01.2025. Verfasst von Paolo Santorio. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Can and be able to can be used to describe what is possible in light of a subjects abilities. These modals give rise to several logical anomalies, which have led to analyses that stray far from standard Kratzer-style treatments (see [2], [10], [19] a.o.). I suggest that the source of the anomalies is a presupposition sitting on top of a standard existential semantics. The resulting account is both more conservative and more successful at accommodating the data than the alternatives. The presupposition of S can/is able to A states (roughly) that a state of S is causally sufficient for A. Interestingly, this account diverges from many existing account in that it does not invoke a notion of agency.
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APA
Santorio, P. (2025). Ability Modals as Causal Modals. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium, 274-281. https://doi.org/10.53437/hx0a4x12
Vancouver
Santorio P. Ability Modals as Causal Modals. Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium. 2025:274-281. doi:10.53437/hx0a4x12
BibTeX
@article{Santorio2025,
author = {Santorio, Paolo},
title = {Ability Modals as Causal Modals},
journal = {Proceedings of the Amsterdam Colloquium},
year = {2025},
pages = {274--281},
doi = {10.53437/hx0a4x12}
}
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