Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science
Croatian journal of philosophy · 2022
DOI: 10.52685/cjp.22.64.2 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Croatian journal of philosophy, 2022. Verfasst von Joby Verghese.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel (2010, 2016) is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin (1983). There are at least two consequences of this criterion; (i) it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and (ii) it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority of truth or lexical priority of evidence. This paper attempts to show a few inadequacies of this assumption. The paper also demonstrates why epistemic priority over non-epistemic values is a problematic stance and how constraining the role of non-epistemic values as ‘tiebreakers’ may undermine the diverse aims of science.
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APA
Verghese, J. (2022). Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science. Croatian journal of philosophy. https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.22.64.2
Vancouver
Verghese J. Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science. Croatian journal of philosophy. 2022. doi:10.52685/cjp.22.64.2
BibTeX
@article{Verghese2022,
author = {Verghese, Joby},
title = {Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science},
journal = {Croatian journal of philosophy},
year = {2022},
doi = {10.52685/cjp.22.64.2}
}
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