AI and the Stored Communications Act
Science and Technology Law Review · 30.10.2026
DOI: 10.52214/fwc43172 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Science and Technology Law Review, online erschienen am 30.10.2026. Verfasst von Mackenzie Berwick. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Author: Mackenzie Berwick '28 | Editor: Austin Goetz Background The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712, generally requires the government to obtain legal process, such as a warrant, court order, or subpoena, from an Electronic Communication Service (“ECS”) or a Remote Computing Service (“RCS”) provider to compel disclosure of stored communications, depending on the type of information sought and applicable statutory requirements. Congress has long considered whether to amend the Act as “courts have struggled to apply the SCA in an evolving technological landscape.” Jimmy Balser, Overview of Governmental Action Under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), Cong. Rsch. Serv., LSB10801 (Aug. 3, 2022); United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (The intersection of these two statutes “is a complex, often convoluted, area of the law.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 17-2 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018) (Justice Anthony Kennedy called the SCA a “difficult statute.”). Changing times and emerging technology have only muddied the waters. Orin Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 373, 375 (2014) (“[S]ervice providers now routinely store everything, and they can turn over everything to law enforcement,” compared to the limited data stored by providers in the 1980s). An ECS must provide users with “the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15). An electronic communication is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). Distinguishing ECS and RCS providers presents a unique challenge. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed that an ECS can provide temporary or backup storage without qualifying it as an RCS and that “Congress contemplated this exact [multifunctional issue].” Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 900–03 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that a pager service provider that transmitted text messages could qualify as an ECS provider under the Act). AI and the SCA Analyzing a 2025 warrant for OpenAI, senior writer at Forbes Thomas Brewster reported “the first known federal search warrant asking OpenAI for user data.” The warrant’s accompanying affidavit was inconclusive on whether the government considered OpenAI to be an ECS provider or an RCS provider, revealing only that “OpenAI [is] subject to the SCA, and that the government thinks ChatGPT’s prompts and responses are contents of electronic communications in electronic storage.” Riana Pfefferkorn, “Eight (or so) Questions to Ask About the ChatGPT Warrant,” Ctr. for Internet and Soc’y at Stanford L. Sch. (Oct. 24, 2025), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2025/10/eight-or-so-questions-to-ask-about-the-chatgpt-warrant/. This development opens a new set of questions: Do AI companies fall under the SCA? As ECS providers? RCS providers? Or perhaps both? In a recent piece on the SCA from Lawfare, digital surveillance experts Rick Salgado and Stephanie Pell argue that the legislative history of the Act supports treating AI companies as RCSs at minimum, likely also meaning they qualify as ECSs. They argue that “a search query or prompt to be processed by an AI service for text or image generation” qualifies as the contents of an electronic communication in and of itself. Stephanie Pell & Richard Salgado, Installing a Content Patch in the Stored Communications Act, Lawfare (Mar. 6, 2026), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/installing-a-content-patch-in-the-stored-communications-act. The authors analyze the Act’s legislative history to determine that the term “electronic communication” does not require the “involvement of some ‘other’ from whom it is sent or to whom it is conveyed.” Id. Salgado and Pell offer a substantial argument that AI platforms qualify as ECS providers, but the question of whether the processing of a user’s prompt satisfies the SCA without a conventional third-party communicator remains open. As the center of emerging technology litigation, the Ninth Circuit is the most likely ground on which this question will be adjudicated. There, courts read “electronic communication” broadly, but have limited ECS provider status to services that enable user-to-user communication. The SCA in the Ninth Circuit The computer systems of an email provider, a bulletin board system, and an internet service provider are uncontroversial examples of ECSs within the Ninth Circuit. In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004) (an email service provider is an ECS provider). Courts outside of California have also found direct messaging between users on a publicly accessible platform to be dispositive in assigning ECS status. In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Priv. Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that an ECS is a “service that provides users with capacity to transmit electronic communications.”). Judges in the Northern and Central districts of California have looked to whether a company facilitates communication between parties when assigning ECS status. In 2010, when faced with a new technology at the time, a judge in the Central District interpreted posting on a public wall or leaving a comment as an electronic communication, making the social media platform on which that action took place an ECS provider. Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 981–82 & n.35 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (social media sites are designed to “[enable] communication . . . either one-to-one by private messaging or with a large group of friends.”). The next year, a judge in the Northern District qualified Facebook as an ECS under similar reasoning, holding that a platform facilitating the user‑to‑advertiser transmission fell within the statute. In re Facebook Priv. Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 713 (N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 572 F. App’x 494 (9th Cir. 2014) (when a user clicks on an ad, “that click constitutes an electronic communication.”). A federal court then extended this thinking in 2018 by concluding that a Facebook “like” constituted communication under the SCA. Rainsy v. Facebook, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1101, 1114–15 (N.D. Cal. 2018). In 2023, the Northern District expanded single “click” thinking to cover the transmission of completed online forms relying on referrer URLs. Katz-Lacabe v. Oracle Am., Inc., 668 F.Supp.3d 928, 945 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2023) (holding that transmissions containing “data entered by the user into forms” on referrer URLs constitute electronic communications). Soon after, device identifiers and signaling information were counted as electronic communications as well. Rodriguez v. Brushfire Recs., 2025 WL 3692144, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2025) (the “HTTP requests, URLs visited, and other metadata” exchanged between a user and a website are electronic communications). Courts have been more cautious about which services count as those made available by providers, and one decision points the other way. In re Google Assistant Priv. Litig., 457 F. Supp. 3d 797, 818 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that when the Google Assistant “translates a user’s verbal command (e.g., ‘Hey Google, what is the weather forecast?’) into electronic signals and then transmits those signals to the recipient, the relevant Google server,” the Google Assistant is “providing an electronic communication service.”).1 Other jurisdictions appear aligned, though case law on this particular matter is less developed. In 2006, the Southern District of New York held that creating an electronic bulletin board brought the hosting platform within the SCA. Kaufman v. Nest Seekers, LLC, 2006 WL 2807177, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2006) (an electronic bulletin board is an ECS). More recently, the District Court for the District of Columbia held that “Uber’s service has features that would appear to satisfy the broad definitions of the types of providers covered by the SCA” on the basis that “allowing Uber users the ability to send and receive electronic communications regarding ride requests and acceptances” and “supporting the processing of transactions using personal information the company retains in storage” qualify the platform as an ECS provider. In re United States for an Order Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) for Order Precluding Notice of Grand Jury Subpoena, 2017 WL 3278929, at *4 (D.D.C. July 7, 2017). The next year, the same court held that Airbnb was also an ECS provider, again treating the ability to send and receive electronic communications as dispositive. In re United States for an Ord. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b), 289 F. Supp. 3d 201, 209–10 (D.D.C. 2018) (affirming Airbnb is an ECS provider based on users’ ability to send and receive electronic communications). California has long been the battleground for emerging and dynamic questions like these. While Salgado and Pell’s theory may persist elsewhere, a true assessment of its feasibility requires placing it into the context of the courts most likely to litigate it. Analysis Though these holdings represent an expansion of what kind of technology constitutes an “electronic communication,” the courts have not been equally permissive in expanding ECS providers beyond traditional communication between more than one party. Courts in the Ninth Circuit distinguish platforms that merely receive communications from customers from platforms that facilitate communications between users. Crowley v. Cybersource Corp. rejected the argument that Amazon was an ECS simply because customers sent emails to Amazon. 166 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1270 (N.D. Cal. 2001). The court explained that receiving emails from customers does not make Amazon a communications provider, noting that equating a user with a provider would ignore the statute’s distinct treatment of each category. Id. at 1270 (“The Court. . . rejects the argument that, just because Amazon receives e-mails, it provides an electronic communication service.”). Courts have repeatedly emphasized that simply enabling or transmitting data does not transform a service into an ECS. For example, assigning user IDs does not qualify (Low v. LinkedIn, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1023 & n.1 (N.D. Cal. 2012)), uploading and downloading documents that users later retrieve does not constitute direct electronic communication (Casillas v. Cypress Ins. Co., 770 F. App’x 329, 330–31 (9th Cir. 2019)), and services used merely to effectuate payments do not qualify because they do not allow users to send or receive electronic communications (Wesch v. Yodlee, Inc., 2021 WL 1399291, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2021)). This reasoning has been echoed outside of the Ninth Circuit as well. See United States v. Steiger, 318 F.3d 1039, 1049 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that a home computer connected to the Internet is not an ECS); see also In re Michaels Stores Pin Pad Litigation, 830 F. Supp. 2d 518, 524 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that providing PIN pads that transmit payment information is insufficient). These cases address who qualifies as a provider, not whether § 2510(12) requires a recipient, and none holds that a second party is necessary. The question in the Ninth Circuit is therefore whether a service whose function is to receive a user’s prompt and provide an output “provides users the ability to send or receive” electronic communications, as Google Assistant suggested, or merely receives them, like Amazon in Crowley. Perhaps a query or prompt processed by an AI service could indeed qualify as an electronic communication, but whether the platform itself is an ECS provider remains an open question, especially in the Ninth Circuit. Conclusion Two recent decisions raise the stakes. In Chatrie v. United States, 609 U.S. 605 (2026), the Supreme Court held that obtaining stored location history from a company is a Fourth Amendment search, limiting the third-party doctrine. Then, in United States v. Heppner, No. 25 Cr. 503 (JSR) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2026), Judge Rakoff held that a defendant’s chats with an AI chatbot were not privileged. Neither decides the SCA question at hand. Yet, together with warrants like the 2025 warrant to OpenAI which failed to classify the platform as either an ECS or RCS provider, these cases may mark the beginning of adjudication on this issue. With broader government efforts to investigate AI-related harms, the complications presented by the wealth of potential nonprivileged information contained in records held by AI platforms may force this question into the light. To determine how the SCA applies to AI, courts must first determine what AI is for purposes of existing law. In the Ninth Circuit, that question may be harder to answer than it appears. --- Note: While Judge Freeman let this disclosure theory survive pleading, whether synthetic AI speech is a human voice remains unanswered. Applying Pell and Salgado’s theory to AI platforms that facilitate verbal communication (like speaking into ChatGPT or Claude’s applications) may still prevail under the interpretation of this statute.
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APA
Berwick, M. (2026). AI and the Stored Communications Act. Science and Technology Law Review. https://doi.org/10.52214/fwc43172
Vancouver
Berwick M. AI and the Stored Communications Act. Science and Technology Law Review. 2026. doi:10.52214/fwc43172
BibTeX
@article{Berwick2026,
author = {Berwick, Mackenzie},
title = {AI and the Stored Communications Act},
journal = {Science and Technology Law Review},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.52214/fwc43172}
}
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