Existence in Meinongianism and Necessitism: A Merely Verbal Dispute
Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) · 2026
DOI: 10.5209/resf.101106 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revista de Filosofía (Madrid), 2026. Verfasst von Violeta Conde Borrego. Die Arbeit nennt 20 Literaturangaben.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
On the one hand, according to Meinongianism, there are two types of objects: those that exist and those that do not (which subsist). Moreover, among the objects that subsist, there is a special class of entities that are ‘beyond being’ (Nichtsein), such as impossible objects and fictional objects. On the other hand, according to necessitism, there are two types of objects: those that S-exist and those that L-exist. Furthermore, there is a third category of objects that do not L-exist, as their intended terms fail to refer—such as impossible objects and fictional objects.In this discussion, I will argue that the dispute between the Meinongianist and the Necessitist regarding the significance of existence is merely verbal and that both frameworks ultimately endorse a three-category ontology.
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APA
Borrego, V. C. (2026). Existence in Meinongianism and Necessitism: A Merely Verbal Dispute. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid). https://doi.org/10.5209/resf.101106
Vancouver
Borrego VC. Existence in Meinongianism and Necessitism: A Merely Verbal Dispute. Revista de Filosofía (Madrid). 2026. doi:10.5209/resf.101106
BibTeX
@article{Borrego2026,
author = {Borrego, Violeta Conde},
title = {Existence in Meinongianism and Necessitism: A Merely Verbal Dispute},
journal = {Revista de Filosofía (Madrid)},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.5209/resf.101106}
}
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