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Deleting Life Online after Death

Ümit Kennedy

M/C Journal · 18.06.2026 · 29 (3)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3281 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 18.06.2026. Verfasst von Ümit Kennedy. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

When a person dies, they will leave behind a significant digital archive of their life. Their social media posts alone—on sites like Facebook, Instagram and TikTok—constitute a mediated record of the person’s life. This archive of life is not static or stationary, nor is it secure or safe, as we assume records and archives to be. What happens to a person’s digital archive of life after they die is usually determined by their family. The loved ones left behind become the caretakers and curators of the archive. The act of caretaking can be fraught, leading some to consider deleting the record rather than maintaining it. This article explores what it means to delete a person’s digital archive after death. Drawing on a published autoethnographic study documenting a mother and daughter’s care for their husband and father’s life after his death (Kennedy and Hibbert), this article examines ethical questions surrounding the ownership of digital remains and the act of erasing them. It uses scholarship on automedia to understand the significance of life online as artifacts that contain the essence and relational tendrils of the person. It uses scholarship on networked publics to explore the relational significance of life online, and the tensions that can result from “context dominance" online. It then draws on thanatechnology scholarship to explore digital im/mortality, the act of deletion, and the consequent experience of a second death. Life Online as Life Though we may think of digital remains, like social media posts, as artifacts akin to the physical belongings of the deceased, like photographs, letters, and hard drives, automedia scholars conceptualise life online differently. In their introduction to their issue of M/C Journal on 'automediality', Ümit Kennedy and Emma Maguire introduce automedia as a way to understand “the range of media forms and technologies through which people engage in digital, visual, filmic, performative, textual, and transmediated forms of documenting, constructing and presenting the self”. Introduced to expand our understanding of how the self is constructed through media, automedia does not consider media as merely tools for presenting the self (Smith and Watson, Reading 168). Rather, automedia acknowledges how the self is formed through mediation. Automedia, therefore, demands that we do not consider acts of mediating the self, like social media posts, as products, but rather as “subjects in motion” (Kennedy and Maguire). As Kennedy writes, on social media sites, there is no product, there is no complete narrative that captures the subject. The subject is always developing, always in motion, always in the ‘process of doing’ (Rak 156), of being and becoming. It is a ‘moving target’ as Smith and Watson suggest (“Virtually” 71). And therefore, automediality, as Rak suggests, is the process of living: living in relationship with media. (Kennedy and Maguire) If we understand posting on social media as a process of being and becoming, where the self is formed in relationship with the media—including platform, technology, and the many others that participate in the social network (Kennedy)—it forces us to reconsider “life online as life” (Rak 156). If we consider life online as life, how do we approach this life after a person dies? Gillian Whitlock and Anna Poletti suggest that social networking sites “function as a kind of digital scrapbook where video, text, image, and sound files are embedded into the page or linked, and where the disparate array of texts and references function as the individual’s online ‘presence’” (xv). For the family left behind, the desire to preserve life and preserve the deceased person’s presence can be great, and the act of deleting life unthinkable, especially if the person was intentional about leaving something of themselves behind online. The Conscious Act of Remaining for Others The motion or process of life online is driven by connection with others. The premise of social media or social network sites (these terms are interchangeable) is social connection. Life online—what we post, when, where and with whom—is driven by relationships. As Helen Garner observes, “how inextricably we are intertwined! We form each other. We form ourselves in response to each other” (42). Relationships continue the motion of being and becoming online in life, in death, and after life. Relationships can also motivate the dying to consciously leave something behind. In her article about dying, Astrid Joutseno writes, “I imagine death as leaving, after which an archive becomes a presence” (92). “It is an active exit, constructing an entry” (92). “I pass on a thread with which to weave the now and connect what is to come. … I am filled with a desire to remain beyond death. I yearn for connection to others” (84). In this way, posting online can be an act of resistance. As Kennedy and Hibbert explore, an act of resisting objectification. As Joutseno investigates, a “hopeful resistance against annihilation” (81). Like all that remains, however, the maintenance and care of the presence left behind is entrusted to the family, who must decide what to do with it. Context Collapse versus Context Dominance In their autoethnographic account of caring for their husband and father during and after death, Kennedy and Hibbert discuss the challenges that arise when managing the various communities that a person belongs to. They wished to respect the many connections and relationships that made up their loved one’s life, but they found it challenging to navigate who he was to others versus who he was to them. Alice Marwick and Nicole Ellison explore a common phenomenon in online mourning where multiple groups and communities belonging to the deceased converge, and conflicting or competing versions / identities of the deceased emerge and cause tension. They call this “context collapse” (Marwick and Ellison; see also Marwick and boyd). In their research, Marwick and Ellison found that these tensions are usually resolved by a social hierarchy that empowers family and close friends to dictate the deceased person’s defining public-facing identity online. Kennedy and Hibbert describe a different experience, however. Rather than a context collapse, Kennedy and Hibbert experienced what they describe as “context dominance”. For us, rather than context collapse (where multiple identities converge and compete), we experienced a sort of context dominance. [His] vocational identity was the dominant public-facing identity, and the communities and contexts associated with his vocation were the dominant voices online … . Context collapse may have been more balanced and refreshing for us, his family, as we could have mourned the whole person, rather than being restricted [to one version of him]. (Kennedy and Hibbert 6) For Kennedy and Hibbert, the central question as they cared for their loved one’s life online after death was who owns the life. They write, since [his] death we have found ourselves asking who he belongs to. Who do his videos belong to? Who were they for? Have they served their purpose? Who should decide? The answer is, of course, that he belongs to multiple groups, multiple contexts, multiple communities and networks. (Kennedy and Hibbert 8-9) Who Owns Life Online? In law, many Western jurisdictions are yet to address who owns digital remains (Harbinja; Morse and Birnhack, “The Posthuman”), and especially digital assets with no economic value such as social media accounts (Edwards and Harbinja). Families have a preeminent right to determine what happens to the deceased person’s assets and affairs, but this is complicated online (Georges; Marwick and Ellison). The law does not necessarily recognise social media profiles as an individual’s property (Harbinja). Furthermore, digital remains can be easily downloaded, copied, and distributed against the family’s wishes, and many jurisdictions do not protect post-mortem privacy (Harbinja; Birnhack and Morse). Families are left to manage access to, and ownership of, digital remains with little guidance or direction. As Elaine Kasket writes, there is no training, rulebook, or code of ethics for managing digital remains (“Social” 28). In her research exploring bereavement, Debra Bassett found control over digital remains directly impacted whether the bereaved experienced comfort or distress from a deceased person’s digital endurance (“Ctrl+Alt+Delete”, The). Kennedy and Hibbert echo this finding. I didn’t want other people to have pictures of [him] outside of my control. I didn’t want strangers gazing at him. (I’m not sure why. [He] wouldn’t care). I think I want to control the story of his life and not have other people write or portray it. I still feel he is ‘ours’ not other people’s. I guess it’s reasonable, in that [he] gave me full access to all his accounts and trusted me to manage them after his death and, I think, he would have cared about how I feel about things. (Kennedy and Hibbert 9) Though control is an important feeling in the process of managing digital remains, the reality is not so simple. When families decide what to do with the life left behind online, they must grapple with what it means to lose control of the deceased person’s life online, and whose needs to prioritise in their decision-making about this (Bassett, “Profit” 85). Deleting Life; Second Death In their research exploring digital remains, Tal Morse and Michael Birnhack (“The Posthuman”) found that most people choose to maintain the deceased person’s online preferences, including their privacy settings, after their death, enacting what they call the continuity principle of digital remains. However, for some, preservation and lack of control are too distressing. As Patrick Stokes writes, “there is always a cost associated with preservation, which may simply outweigh the duty to preserve” (244). For Kennedy and Hibbert, there came a point where the cost became too great. Kennedy and Hibbert discuss the YouTube videos their loved one left behind in the final months of their life. The videos were intended for a specific audience and gave intimate updates relating to the deceased person’s battle with cancer. In one of these videos, the description reads: “it seems like I am in the last few months of my life. I have very advanced cancer. Here is a third update” (Kennedy and Hibbert 6), and in the final video, uploaded a month before they died, they shared, hello everybody, I just wanted to give you an update … and wanted to let you know … I can feel my body going downhill. I’ve had a big increase in breathlessness over the last 10 days or so. (Kennedy and Hibbert 6) When contemplating what to do with these precious remains, and whether to keep them online for others to continue to consume, Kennedy and Hibbert write, the videos are distressing because they show his physical deterioration … . [We] would prefer the world to remember him in his more healthy, physical appearance … although many have told [us] how much those videos meant to them. (7) Patrick Stokes explores the ethical status of digital remains, such as social media accounts and our moral duty towards them. He writes, “is the deletion of a person’s social media presence in fact a form of second dying: a destruction of the person as a phenomenally-present object of moral duty? If so, are we obliged to preserve these artefacts?” (238). Kennedy and Hibbert respond to this question, explaining that deleting digital remains can feel like the destruction of the person “as the material (media) is often how we interact with the memory of the person” (8). However, there are instances where preserving a person’s digital remains requires handing over their account to the platform, such as in the case of Facebook memorialisation. In this case, the account is preserved, but ownership and control are transferred to an unknown entity. Kennedy and Hibbert found that some digital remains were easier to contemplate deleting than others. For example, when considering whether to delete or memorialise their loved one’s Facebook account, they wrote: we chose to delete [his] Facebook because handing over control of his digital remains and his post-mortem privacy to a profit-driven technology company who have their own interests seemed deeply wrong. While posthuman persistence (Kasket 2019) or a lingering social ‘presence’ after death is enabled by—and indeed inevitable because of—the communication technologies available to us (Walter 2015), memorialised profile pages seem unnaturally static and fixated on the person’s death, rather than the person. And our orientation is to preserve the person. (Kennedy and Hibbert 10) Ultimately, Kennedy and Hibbert made the decision, five years after their loved one’s death, to delete all his online digital remains and store them safely offline. This was an attempt to preserve his personhood and control access to his remains. However, they found that the act of deleting did not always achieve this. Though their contemplation of erasing their loved one’s digital remains felt like a second death, they found that their loved one’s online presence persisted, like a glitch or ghost in the machine, popping up at unexpected times despite being deleted. They write, the permanence of these traces of [him] are both comforting and distressing (especially when the technology cannot differentiate between a person who is alive and dead). These remnants, traces, connections, remind us of his presence (or the presence he once had). Perhaps this digital glitch (for lack of a better word) is the truest expression of a presence left behind, and a reminder, that [his] life will never truly be erased (despite our best efforts to control it online). (Kennedy and Hibbert 10) Digital Im/Mortality The rise of phenomena like internet ghosts (Cann), digital zombies (Bassett, “Rev”), and restless dead (Nansen et al.) can be comforting for some and deeply disturbing for others. These phenomena demonstrate a lack of control over the deceased person’s life online and a morphing into something else entirely. Perhaps Patricia Lange’s exploration of the “posthuman” is most fitting here, where the person is embodied by the machine and becomes something else. For the more concrete examples of glitches, like Kennedy and Hibbert experienced, bereavement scholars have found that these unexpected encounters can be distressing (Brubaker et al.) and unwanted (Pennington). This is especially the case when the technology cannot tell the difference between a person who is alive and a person who is dead and does not indicate that the person is dead when they pop up online (Bollmer). While all these concepts suggest persistence, there is also a very real anxiety that rapidly changing technology can lead to loss. We have been led to believe that the Internet is forever. Thanatechnology—a term coined by Carla Sofka referring to any technology used to deal with death and dying—has introduced concepts like digital immortality, digital afterlife, digital legacy and so on (see Digital Afterlife, edited by Savid-Baden and Mason-Robbie; see also Recuber; Kasket, All the Ghosts; Bassett, The Creation). Though these concepts reinforce the notion that digital technology resists forgetting (Stokes; Mayer-Schönberger; Floridi), more recently, thanatechnology scholars are demonstrating that this notion is outdated (Kasket, “Social”; Bassett, “Profit”). Online is not forever (Kasket, “Social”). The rapidly changing nature of our technology-dependent lives—through software updates, device upgrades, storage incompatibilities—risk accidentally losing the digital remains of the deceased (Bassett, “Profit”, “Ctrl+Alt+Delete”; Sofka). The potential to lose access to a deceased person’s digital remains is a great source of anxiety for the bereaved (Bassett, “Profit”, “Ctrl+Alt+Delete”). Managing life online after death and navigating the relational and ethical questions that surround digital remains, and their preservation, are only complicated by the rise of generative Artificial Intelligence (AI). The thought of digital zombies, as Debra Basset explores (“Rev”), is haunting. The idea that AI could upload a person’s life online, embody and extend it, is comforting for some, and sickening for others. To lose control of a person’s life online in this way is to stretch the question of ownership beyond the limits of this article. However, this is a question worth asking and exploring next. If automedia is a process of living and doing and being and becoming, if AI continues this process, are they continuing life? What is life online in this new digital era? References Bassett, Debra. The Creation and Inheritance of Digital Afterlives: You Only Live Twice. Springer, 2022. ———. “Ctrl+Alt+Delete: The Changing Landscape of The Uncanny Valley and The Fear of Second Loss.” Current Psychology 40.2 (2021): 813-21. . ———. “Rev. of Who Wants to Live Forever? Living, Dying and Grieving in Our Digital Society.” Social Sciences 4.4 (2015): 1127-39. ———. “Profit and Loss: The Mortality of the Digital Immortality Platforms.” Digital Afterlife. Eds. Maggi Savin-Baden and Victoria Mason-Robbie. CRC Press, 2020. 75-88. Birnhack, Michael, and Tal Morse. “Digital Remains: Property or Privacy?” International Journal of Law and Information Technology 30.3 (2022): 280-301. . 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Zitieren

APA

Kennedy, Ü. (2026). Deleting Life Online after Death. M/C Journal, 29(3). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3281

Vancouver

Kennedy Ü. Deleting Life Online after Death. M/C Journal. 2026;29(3). doi:10.5204/mcj.3281

BibTeX
@article{Kennedy2026,
  author = {Kennedy, Ümit},
  title = {Deleting Life Online after Death},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3281}
}
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