Ageing with a Vengeance
M/C Journal · 18.06.2026 · 29 (3)
DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3279 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 18.06.2026. Verfasst von Dorothea Rebecca Schönsee. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Promise of the Kernel: Digital Immortality and Its Discontents Vernor Vinge’s 1981 novel True Names is widely recognised as a foundational text for computer scientists experimenting with digital cash (Abbate; Anderson; May; Brunton). Computer scientists, cypherpunks, and extropians admired the idea of a pseudonymous encryption that reaches beyond death. When, in the closing scene, Vinge’s heroine—going by the online pseudonym Erythrina (real name Debbie Charteris)—uploads her mind into a cryptographic kernel, she leaves her ageing, frail body behind as the price of digital eternity. By imagining post-biological continuity, the novella portrays the founding myth of a new “society of minds” in a coming digital age, where “each mind evolves its own internal universe” (Minsky 31). Mortality becomes the final frontier to be conquered to achieve unrestrained techno-libertarian freedom. It thus poses the last restriction to mind-connectivity. Vinge articulates transhuman dreams of digital immortality, anticipating death tech and platform-mediated afterlives. Digital immortality here does not refer to biological longevity or physical immortality. Rather, it denotes the persistence of identity data—or the consciousness—through cryptographic protocols, platform archives, or AI resurrection. Vinge’s fantasy encodes a gendered logic of abandonment. Erythrina secures the computational infrastructure for pseudonymous exchange beyond death. She prefigures a digital economy that trades physical decay for cryptographic permanence. Yet, her transition into the “slow-moving guardian angel” (Vinge 127) of AI futurity evades the core questions of that transformation: what is the true cost of immortal, cryptographically secured pseudonymity? Whose body is left behind? What is lost when digital immortality discards mourning? Existing scholarship has largely focussed on the impact of True Names on cryptocurrencies (Brunton), surveillance (Anderson), and digital privacy (Abbate), or on friendship in a technological age (Motai 110–11). What has so far remained unexamined is the gendered political economy of abandoning the frail body and the refusal to mourn that body for a celebration of an architecture of technological obfuscation that forms a technical blueprint for post-national networks. This fantasy re-emerges in Legacy Russell’s Glitch Feminism (2020), which both advances and intervenes in cyberpunk’s vision of digital exits from this world. The manifesto offers both a more contemporary corrective and a complicating perspective on digital immortality. Russell suggests that those left behind or marginalised can reclaim new positions through the opacity of the glitch. Her theoretical framework operates in productive tension with Vinge’s vision. On the one hand, it corrects cyberpunk’s faith in cryptographic transparency by centring opacity as a strategy of resistance for marginalised bodies. On the other hand, its call to “usurp the bod. Become your avatar. Be the glitch” (153, 159) risks reproducing the very fantasy of abandoning the ageing body expressed in Vinge. She reframes the idea of true nyms or pseudonymity as a way to resist racial capitalism. The glitch—as a tactical means of withdrawal and remixing, as a new form of opacity—shares a structural logic of idealistic exit with Vinge’s discarding of the ageing body for a future that escapes ageing. This idealistic overlap may be surprising, given that Russell’s idea of avatars directly contests cyberpunk’s faith in cryptographic transparency and cyberlibertarian ethos. My central thesis is that when cypherpunk and cyberfeminism meet, the ageing, gendered body becomes the excluded condition of digital immortality. Mourning that exclusion becomes paramount to assessing the true cost of True Names. The cost of building reputational capital through verified, encrypted pseudonymous identities (May 66–7), by shunning one’s true name and creating a persistent pseudonym, erects a new frontier behind which lies the promise of a new post-truth reality—that is, digital immortality. Mourning, thus, also sharpens ethical debates about what is lost when we proclaim digital immortality. Specifically, I argue that digital eternity imperils what gives human life meaning—namely, dying, mourning, and bodily vulnerabilities. The analysis, therefore, intervenes in debates about the political and geographic economy of digital death by demonstrating how the techno-libertarian fantasy of pseudonymous immortality is structurally dependent on the gendered ghosting of the ageing body. This analysis responds to the urgent commodification of digital afterlives by the sale of death-tokens from AI griefbots (Jimenez-Alonso and de Luna) to memorial NFTS and the indeterminacy this entails (Kozlosvki et al.). These recent developments raise questions about who bears the cost of techno-utopian futures, who controls access, but most importantly, what furthers a discourse of erasing the past for a digital future? In what follows, I proceed in three moves. I begin with a close reading of the bodily extraction logic in True Names. I then provide a comparative analysis with Russell’s Glitch Feminism, reading her politics of remixing and ghosting as both an intervention and a limit to techno-utopianism. Finally, I conclude by reframing mourning as a critical archive against the datafication of death, synthesising the implications of mourning and digital afterlives. When digital immortality is purchased through cryptographic transcendence, who gets left behind? How does abandoning the ageing body reshape our capacity to mourn? The Price of the Kernel: Bodily Extraction and Gendered Sacrifice in Vernor Vinge’s True Names The cost of entry to Vinge’s digital afterlife is best understood through Erythrina’s escape from biological death and the ghosting of the ageing body. The story follows a small group of hackers on the gamescape of the “Other Plane” fighting an AI gone rogue. They all use made-up names, and their lives depend on no one ever finding out their “true name”. All is well when their online identities become their “true identities” (see further May, 38, 44), because their battle between good and evil—against the Mailman monster—has been won. A new age is set in motion when Erythrina confesses that she decided to gradually transfer her own mind into the abandoned kernel the Mailman left behind, rebooting the metaverse in her mirror self: “my kernel is out there in the System. … The kernel is growing into a true Erythrina, who is also truly me. When this body dies, I will still be, and you can still talk to me” (127). In other words: Instead of the Mailman taking over the world, delineated “like the monsters of fiction doing what he had been designed to do” (126), Ery herself evolves to secure a new futurity. The Mailman, which turns out to be a forgotten NSA programme, threatens to return. The narrator notes, “it could have been the Mailman. Thank God, it was Ery instead” (127). The ending clearly reframes Debbie’s eventual physical death not as a tragedy but as a solution and necessary sacrifice for mind-expansion and eternal friendship in the metaverse. Accordingly, the narrator, Roger Pollack (Mr. Slippery), pictures Debbie/Ery continuing to exist in cyberspace for “millennia” (128) to oversee a future digital infrastructure, a growing organism in cyberspace, even after her physical body dies. This vision of transhuman persistence is embedded in broader cypherpunk dreams, which included “send[ing] money into the future … to cryonic folks who want to arrange for their own revival/reanimation at some time in the future”, as May described his vision of “Time Release Crypto” in 1993 (qtd. in Brunton 34). Originating in discussions on cryptography, surveillance, and artificial intelligence, the cypherpunk movement, which assembled hackers and computer scientists, not only promoted “crypto anarchy” but also discussed the transhumanist imaginary. The term “cypherpunk”, combining “cipher” for encryption and “cyberpunk”, was coined by Jude Milhon (aka “St. Jude”), a female hacker and founding member at early group meetings to explore non-linear decentralised processes. Within their “different version of the marketplace” rooted in Vinge’s novella (Brunton 79), Ery becomes a portal for assimilating the self into a purified digital system, paving the way for alternate systems of cryptocurrencies as modes of communication. The 1984 illustrated edition of True Names reinforces this reading visually: Bob Walters depicts Erythrina as a cosmic star lady (27). Her celestial, ageless figure floats in deep space; her lower body is dissolving, and her head is surrounded by a corona of electricity. This iconography evokes the “star money” fairy tale, in which a poor girl’s virtue is rewarded with stars falling from heaven, which then turn into gold. Ery becomes the allegorical face of cryptocurrency itself, in which privacy and value are secured by enacting “the power to selectively reveal oneself to the world” (Hughes). Ery’s costume “shimmering, now revealing, now obscuring” (Vinge 28) literalises this cryptographic logic of true nyms and encrypted privacy. In the end, Walters depicts how the ageing face of Debbie (Vinge 115) has vanished, and we as readers only see her ageing hand reaching out (117), an index to the new divinity emerging in Vinge’s (and the illustrator’s) vision, connected through a star, which could also signify a digital coin as a means of linguistic connection. In this narrative, True Names portrays an economic exchange in which Debbie’s body is objectified and discarded for a new, glorified vision. Digital identity thus becomes the value of reputational exchange, prefiguring the reputational capital and persistent digital identities that would later animate cryptocurrencies. This exchange raises the question of who can afford access to eternity within encrypted systems. The cost of true names turns out to be the dispersal of the ageing (female) body, which becomes a somatic sacrifice at the disposal of platforms in a new technological age. True Names thus encodes death as a digital longevity project that treats the female body as infrastructure for a fantasy of techno-libertarian escape. While cypherpunks imagined cryptographic pseudonyms as a tool for financial sovereignty and as resistance against surveillance capitalism, the same technical infrastructure that enables anonymous transactions also underwrites platform-mediated afterlives, shifting economic fantasies of digital disruption to posthumous persistence. Liberty, in the novella, depends on discarding the ageing (female) body. It is a sacrifice disguised as a rite of passage. Such a vision also implies that the ageing body no longer needs to be governed through institutions. Instead, it lives off an immaterial longevity code. This framework suspends institutions and, with it, the idea of democracy. May concedes, “crypto anarchy basically undermines democracy” (74). This thought is deeply intertwined with digital immortality, or as Haldeman asks, “who could a transhuman vote for? Would a transhuman bother to vote?” (174). Cryptographic protocols framed as AI ascension establish a pseudo-divine, perhaps auratic state: not votes, but technology determines a new form of freedom. It poses an ambivalent prospect, as Hillis, the inventor and computer scientist of early AI models, notes when he pictures the future depicted in True Names hesitantly as a “brave new world, in which I will be a small part of a symbiotic organism that I can barely comprehend” (32), and which might adopt its own “anarchic” rules. Cypherpunk’s vision of digital afterlife, where the mystique of the ethereal figure is set up to guard the future digital sanctuary, comes at the political cost of democratic institutions. The future is marked by an “absence of government” that enables “uncoerced economic transactions” (May 70). Ery herself concedes that she might become “everything you and the Limey were afraid of” (Vinge 127)—namely, a world of digital abstractions. Code purifies the body, which is transfigured into a connected mind built on a new vision of power structures governed by energy exchange. Ery offers her magic colours, her signature “excess of red” (118), her identity as “Red Witch” (28), as a vein for a future digital infrastructure to mine. She thus becomes what her name signifies, namely Erythrina, or a “coral tree” of future paradise. Power, then, is with those who control energy, rather than with those who uphold democratic principles. Vinge’s narrative reveals that the Other Plane is aimed at bringing natural processes like entropy and ageing under the control of the gendered economy of a digital afterlife. Code offers an imminent transcendence, which celebrates the strength of technology over the sensuality of formlessness. The shimmering costume— “now revealing, now obscuring” (28)—literalises this cryptographic logic while the physical body becomes a ghost. Pitching the Remix: Opacity and the Glitched Body in Legacy Russell’s Glitch Feminism as Intervention and Limit In True Names Ery’s “fine-boned, almost Asian” face, her hair “unique to some North American black” (31), merely describes her second persona, which is not reflected in the illustrations by Walters, leaving her avatar largely untheorised within the text’s discourse on digital geographies and gender. This is where Russell’s Glitch Feminism: A Manifesto and the idea of “wandering in-between” as “dangerous data” to “reconstitute reality” (75) become an important and timely intervention in cypherpunk’s libertarian discourse. Russell offers a queer, Black feminist response to cypherpunks’ fantasies and their demands for ultimate transparency and legible identities. Russell’s framework provides a critical vocabulary intercepting and drawing on Afrofuturism and anti-colonialism, and the notion that escaping the past is impossible when the body itself becomes an archive of trauma: if the vision of true names presents a dream of encrypted privacy fuelling techno-utopian conquest, where are the fault-lines that Russell’s correction imposes on the conquest of the cyberpunk frontier? The commodification of dreams of immortality and their potential future tokenisation prompt an ethical discourse on emerging notions of ghosting and hauntology, which brings literary analysis into dialogue with sociological perspectives on the impact of fiction in view of new forms of digital media. By reclaiming the glitch—that is, a tactical embrace of digital error—Russell’s strategy for emancipation highlights a dimension of access that Vinge and the earlier cyberpunk visions leave unexamined: the racialised, gendered, and classed body. Russell locates radical potential for the disruption of power structures in error and the glitch. Against the ideal of transparency, Russell advances opacity as a mode of resistance. She leans into Glissant’s argument that opacity can turn into a key tool to mirror, as well as an unexplored, insistent presence against Western capitalist demands for full transparency (Glissant 111; Russell 46). Central to Russell’s approach is her tactic of “ghosting” (61–9) as a strategic refusal of digital transparency and withdrawal from normative forms of visibility. Glitching thus becomes a political and artistic practice that allows marginalised subjects to evade the demand for legibility within dominant systems of power. “Glitch ghosts” protect marginalised bodies from surveillance and extraction while aiming to “decolonise bots” (Florence Okoye qtd. in Russell 75). Russell proposes that the “skin of cyberidentity is uniquely queer” (108). Through artistic practices of glitching, ghosting, and remixing, Russell envisions the body as becoming mutable, unstable, and “ineffable” (60), thereby opening possibilities for resisting commodification of binary visions of gender and identity by blurring performances of gender in a “remix” and a new sound beyond visual cultures. Interestingly, the proposal to use true pseudonyms to glitch away into bodies that “take on a distributed nature, fluidly occupying many beings, many places, all at once” (Russell 46) is reminiscent of Vinge’s concept of True Names. However, unlike the cypherpunk dream of untraceable names in a new community of connected minds (May 62–6), Russell imagines her remix as creating a “generative void” (68) or a sanctuary of opacity. Nevertheless, Russell’s manifesto harbours limitations. Critics note that her text “seems to suppose an able-bodied and independent subject” (Jerreat-Poole 4). In projecting the trajectory towards “dissolving ourselves” (Russell 68) for an ideal future, its idealistic premise evades the “materiality of social inequalities (Hurley 461). While Russell powerfully reclaims the glitch against racial capitalism, the ageing body in all its messiness and vulnerability is left largely unresolved, as are any metaphysical notions of the soul, aura, emanation, or emotional and cosmic responses to other messy bodies and/or other forms of life. Mourning the Body: Reading Russell with and against Vinge In upholding the fantasy of flight and escape from this life, Russell’s vision has structural analogies with Vinge. Despite positioning the glitch as a strategic tool to undermine capitalism, Russell’s emphasis on the need to “ghost on the gendered body” and “accelerate toward its end” (10) is not unlike Vinge’s fantasy of immortality, despite redirecting the flight of exit towards anti-capitalist ends. This marks a decisive divergence from libertarian ethos. Russell’s concept thus retains a structural affinity with the logic of escape that animates cyberculture and Vinge’s novella. Both seem to reverse what are “true names” to include true digital identities that reach beyond this world, as when Roger tells Debbie, “I know who you truly are. Both of us are so much more than we could ever be here” (121). Vinge equates digital continuity with authenticity. As Ery becomes a portal for assimilating the self into a purified digital system, she forges out an “expansive landscape of the self” (Pesce 228) which seems to re-emerge in Russell’s concept of cosmic architectures and “cosmic selves” (47). Like Vinge’s vision of the angelic figure of Ery reaching the deepness of space, the glitched persona in Russell becomes a tool for reimagining the body as an extended cosmic architectural structure, “a cosmic corporeality” (69). In contrast to Vinge, however, this strategy of emancipation is achieved through “opacity” rather than by recreating a new virtual community based on cryptography and trustless systems. While Russell’s focus on queerness and opacity aims to protect voices from being erased, her theory also produces a tension around loss and mourning that is structurally similar to Vinge’s vision. This tension points to a deeper absence of mourning itself. The manifesto’s celebration of error further illustrates this contradiction. Russell calls for the deliberate introduction of malfunction into technological systems and describes failure itself as a radical act (141). The consequences of failure, however, remain largely unexplored. What, for example, becomes of the failed machine, the dross and waste, once it has malfunctioned? For all its power to seek an escape from the capital structures of this world, the glitch leaves the frail body in all its imperfection largely unresolved. In reimagining the politics of visibility through error and glitch, Russell’s manifesto draws on the limits of Vinge’s vision of transparency through space. Her manifesto does not, however, answer the question of what happens to those who refuse to disappear, to the bodily presence that cannot—or refuses—to be ghosted. Digital transcendence irreversibly entails a loss of mourning as a fundamental human capacity that no glitch can truly recover. Abandonments of Mourning, Melancholy, and the Digital Afterlife While Vinge’s crypto-anarchist dream and Russell’s disruptive glitch politics diverge sharply in political commitment, both devote comparatively little attention to the broken beauty of disorder and decay. They elide the aesthetic value of melancholy, mourning, and grief. Both texts seem to promote the eternal child, “us all being ageing children” (121), as Debbie tells Roger at the end of True Names, or Russell’s “wild forms”, free-floating particles that “deconstruct and dematerialize the idea of the body as we move through time and space, as wild forms building toward even wilder futures” (60). This shared orientation towards escape has significant consequences. What appears to be a refusal of commodification has returned today alongside art historical spaces in highly commodified forms, where mourning is replaced by shallow elation and tokenised memory. Contemporary death-tech industries have since made this extraction of meaning routine, claiming to sell mourning in digital items. They turn the dead into what Öhman and Floridi call “informational human bodies” (655) to be managed and monetised. This leads to an “alteration of this body, which in turn is a result of politico-economic interests” (655) that becomes part of a Digital Afterlife Industry. Death is then parsed into a “regime of information flux conducive to their interests” (Anderson 14) and surmounted in code. The price of digital bodies in the sanctuary spaces of digital immortality thus risks becoming a totalitarian dream of technocratic dominance and purity. Mourning and memory then become objects of tokenisation and thus subject to datafication and commodification. This shows how the shared inability to mourn the non-replicable body has become politically urgent in a society that abandons the emotional attention to physical loss, religious experiences of mysticism, as well as the cultural tradition of melancholy as a means to “worry us out of worry” (Grovier). Celebrating digital youth created through financial cryptography jettisons the philosophical and artistic discourse of melancholy as moment of self-reflection, contemplation, and collective care. The dreams of digital immortality create the risk of erasing death as a meaningful part of human life. This path potentially creates an economic geography, the frontier of which is not yet known and remains dangerously uncharted. It is a shadow country of morbid structures, where the political stakes are written in code but accessed and paid for in flesh—and potentially human dignity. Mourning, by contrast, demands that we stay with the entropy of the bodies. This includes acknowledging that the physical body offers a living repository of memory, identity, and grief carried in tissue and non-transferable to code or avatar. Conclusion: Recovering Privacy through an Archive of Loss and the Ethics of Digital Mortality Reading Russell’s Glitch Feminism with and against Vinge exposes the limitations of cyberpunk’s vision of digital immortality. Notably, it responds to critical calls to examine the political economy of digital death. It also shows how the promise of digital immortality is purchased through the extraction and abandonment of the gendered body at the cost of losing an archive of mourning and the opportunity to explore the wounded or damaged body and the abject. The comparison reveals that the true cost of digital immortality continues to be as much political as it is cultural. True Names establishes a gendered economy of persistence that is grounded in the extraction and abandonment of embodied life and intimate privacies. This returns today as an unassimilated remainder of mourning and loss. Russell’s glitch feminism offers a vital intervention by centring racialised and marginalised bodies through concepts of opacity, ghosting, and encryption. Her framework to “dematerialize—to once more abstract—the body and transcend its limitations” (42) inadvertently echoes, however, the same structural flight from material frailty expressed by Vinge. Together, both texts expose the tension carried in the promise of a cryptographic immortality that cannot be reverse-engineered through the glitch. In the wake of transhumanism, contemporary death-tech must therefore reckon not only with data ethics but with a sensual archive of ageing. The abandonment of the body in a digital age makes the preservation of cultural archives, both the archive of the body and of textual presence in writing, more urgent. To preserve intimacies and true privacies beyond any digital afterlife, we must value mourning as a critical archive of what persists beyond the kernel. It is a rite of passage, not an obstacle to transcendence. Registers of an embodied past become forms of disruption to techno-utopian narratives. They are key to acknowledging the value of ageing as entangled with mourning, melancholy, and the contemplation of bodily presences—and their vulnerabilities. The embodied past offers an archive of criticality that elucidates the economic infrastructures emerging through the visual culture of a digital afterlife. Only by creating and cultivating spaces of both opacity and transparency, revealing and hiding—like Ery’s costume—can we imagine more embodied forms of reconnection between this world of physical reality and those beyond it. Protecting vulnerable spaces where ageing and grief remain uncommodified is not merely an aesthetic choice, then, but an ethical imperative against techno-libertarian megalomania. In recovering the archive of loss, we may also recover a more human relationship with mortality itself. Vinge and Russell, in their different productive tensions, both evade the ageing body, the former through cryptographic transcendence, the latter through the disruptive glitch. Both authors remind us that we need to return to innovation through more oscillating forms of privacy, whether through fiction or visual arts. Yet only by learning to truly see the ageing body, rather than ghosting it in the name of digital immortality, can we prevent “true names” from returning with a vengeance to all that makes up our cultural discourses on media and visuality. In this way, we can reclaim melancholy as an art of mediation. Acknowledgments This research was funded in whole by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under Grant number Project 36602-G, [Grant-DOI 10.55776/P36602]. For open access purposes, the author has applied a CC BY public copyright license to any author accepted manuscript version arising from this submission. References Abbate, Janet. “True Risks? The Pleasures and Perils of Cyberspace.” Science Fiction and Computing: Essays on Interlinked Domains. Eds. David L. Ferro and Eric G. Swedin. Jefferson: McFarland, 2011. 189–204. Anderson, Patrick D. “Of Cypherpunks and Sousveillance.” Surveillance & Society 20.1 (2022): 1–17. ‹https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v20i1.14322›. Brunton, Finn. Digital Cash. 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APA
Schönsee, D. R. (2026). Ageing with a Vengeance. M/C Journal, 29(3). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3279
Vancouver
Schönsee DR. Ageing with a Vengeance. M/C Journal. 2026;29(3). doi:10.5204/mcj.3279
BibTeX
@article{Schnsee2026,
author = {Schönsee, Dorothea Rebecca},
title = {Ageing with a Vengeance},
journal = {M/C Journal},
year = {2026},
volume = {29},
number = {3},
doi = {10.5204/mcj.3279}
}
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