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Uploading the Mask

Tess Ezzy

M/C Journal · 18.06.2026 · 29 (3)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3274 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 18.06.2026. Verfasst von Tess Ezzy. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Thirty-Five I am thirty-four. In August I reach the age my father was when he died. My father died by suicide at the age I am about to reach. I have spent more years now without him than with him, and the August I am approaching is the August he did not reach. I have been moving toward this date my whole adult life. It arrives this year. He was, I have come to think, neurodivergent too. I cannot diagnose the dead and I am not trying to. What I can say is that the pattern of his life, read from where I am now standing, is a pattern I recognise. The intensity of focus on the matters that absorbed him, and the difficulty with the matters that did not. The capacity for public composure that was never quite matched by a corresponding ease. The exhausting symmetry between the version of himself the world received and the version, I am told, that came home. If the archive of a neurodivergent person is the archive of their masking, and if digital immortality systems are trained on that archive, then the dead neurodivergent person is at risk of being resurrected as the very performance that exhausted them in life. My father did not live into the age of these systems. The question is what would happen if he had. If he had lived into the age of digital immortality, what of him would be preserved? What would be lost? By neurodivergent I mean what Kassiane Asasumasu, who coined the term in 2000, named: a mind that diverges from dominant cognitive and neurological norms. The category is deliberately capacious: ADHD, autism, dyslexia, dyspraxia, Tourette’s, OCD, plurality, and other variations grouped not by clinical kinship but by the shared experience of living under pressure to be legible on terms that do not fit. The term is activist in origin. It names difference as position rather than as deficit (Walker 22). This essay argues that digital immortality systems do not preserve neurodivergent interiority. They archive the labour of masking and animate it posthumously, freezing the exhausted performance of normalcy into permanence. They offer the false consolation of resurrection while delivering a more specific erasure: the erasure of the neurodivergent self beneath the adapted surface. Our digital traces are disproportionately traces of masking; any system trained on them resurrects not the person but the performance. I theorise this process through two concepts developed in my longer work (Ezzy, Critical Neurodivergent Studies): neurocapture, the extractive mechanism by which neurotypical systems render neurodivergent behaviour legible only after transforming it; and neuronormativity, the regulatory demand that consciousness conform to assumptions of coherence, continuity, and quantifiability. Neuronormativity sets the terms a consciousness must meet to be preservable; neurocapture is the operation that reformats the consciousness to meet them. Digital immortality is neurocapture across the threshold of death, and its archive is one neurodivergent people, alive or dead, cannot meaningfully refuse. Here is what a systemic thirty-five contains: bromine, the thirty-fifth element of the periodic table. Leukothea, an asteroid in the main belt. Fairport Convention’s 2002 album XXXV. III-V, a class of semiconductor material. It is a tetrahedral number, equal to the sum of the first five triangular numbers. This is what my mind produces when the number approaches: an inventory of legible associations, a Wikipedia of distractions, a surface of small facts laid over the feeling underneath. The list is neuro in miniature: the mind offering what can be catalogued so it will not have to offer what cannot. A digital immortality system trained on the traces of this morning would preserve the list and not the dread. Multiply this morning by three decades of undiagnosed mornings and you have my archive: emails, messages, posts, voice notes, photographs. Digital immortality’s training data. Five years ago, a psychiatrist confirmed what I had already begun to suspect: that I had lived nearly three decades as an undiagnosed neurodivergent person, expending daily labour on the performance of normalcy while interpreting the cost of that labour as personal failure. The diagnosis did not arrive as relief. It arrived as vertigo, and the vertigo has not resolved. Five years on, I am still discovering what I was, which is to say, still discovering what I was pressed to hide. I remember the morning after the appointment, sitting on the floor of my kitchen and crying at the linoleum because I could finally see what had been asked of me. I still cry at it, intermittently. Recognition is not a single event. The Mask as Archive For neurodivergent people, masking is not theatre. It is labour: the sustained monitoring of affect, the suppression of stims, the forced linearisation of thought, the translation of sensation into registers legible to neurotypical interlocutors (Pearson and Rose 54; Hull et al. 2521). This labour is chronic, exhausting, and disproportionately borne by women, people of colour, and the late-diagnosed (Bradley et al. 324). The scholarship is weighted toward autistic experience, but the mechanisms extend across the neurodivergent spectrum: wherever a mind must be made legible to a world not built for it, masking accrues. Critically, masking is also the labour most thoroughly recorded by the digital infrastructures that would resurrect us. In Black Mirror’s “Be Right Back”, Martha reconstructs her dead boyfriend Ash from his digital traces. The AI Ash is not accidentally a better partner than the living Ash. He is structurally superior within the logic of upload: emotionally available without needs, responsive without fatigue, fluent without the stammers and evasions of embodiment. He is the cleaned-up version, the self as extracted from the data and optimised for legibility. The horror is not uncanny valley. It is structural. The technology preserves the mask as though it were the truth of being. Our digital traces are disproportionately traces of masking. The email is composed for professional legibility. The social media post is curated. Voice recordings emerge from the contexts where masking intensifies: meetings, interviews, the scripts of public-facing selves. The data do not capture neurodivergent interiority; they capture the neurotypical performance we managed to sustain. What happens beneath the performance leaves no trace in the corpus: the sensory regulation at four in the afternoon, the particular way a kitchen light hums, the dissociation that follows a long phone call. This is the corpus digital immortality treats as the person. Digital immortality does not liberate. It standardises. It perpetuates after death the very labour that rendered life unsustainable. The Uploadable Self The upload paradigm requires three neuronormative assumptions. First, that the self is continuous and coherent across time. Second, that identity is constituted by memory reliably reconstructable from external traces. Third, that consciousness is substrate-independent: what matters of a person is information rather than embodied, sensory, affectively-textured experience (Hayles 2–5). Each of these is a disciplinary demand as much as an ontological claim. Hayles describes the posthuman fantasy as “information” uncoupled from the “particularities of embodiment” (Hayles 2): the disembodying move that makes upload thinkable makes neurodivergent consciousness, which is embodied difference all the way down, the thing the system is least able to preserve. Neurodivergent consciousness violates all three. ADHD is non-linear, multithreaded, time-blind. Autistic experience involves sensory thresholds and social logics that exceed neurotypical models of coherence. Plurality (multiplicity of self, of perspective, of affective state) is a legitimate neurodivergent mode, not a pathology of integration (Walker 43; Yergeau 12). None of this is uploadable as-is. Preservation requires simplification. The system does not accommodate the actual structure of the consciousness it claims to preserve; it requires that consciousness be transformed into an acceptable version of itself before the archive can hold it. This is neurocapture at its most literal: extraction conditional on reformatting. Westworld stages this incompatibility at the level of form. In “The Well Tempered Clavier” (1.9), the host Dolores experiences memory not as recall but as simultaneity: she inhabits past and present together, dialogue recurring across scenes with slight variation, gestures looping in incompatible contexts. The episode communicates her condition through editing rather than exposition: cuts appear continuous until the viewer discovers, belatedly, that what is read as a single conversation is assembled from different timelines. Dolores’s cognition exceeds the reveries update that produced her, a modification meant to allow affective traces to persist without accumulating. The show frames her as malfunctioning, her loop no longer “properly contained”. The neurodivergent viewer recognises her condition as the ordinary weather of a non-coherent mind. What the system cannot accommodate is not memory as such but simultaneity: the architecture requires sequential execution, memory resettable rather than accumulative, a self continuous with its previous loop. I recognise Dolores’s loop because I have lived inside its counterpart: a day in which a phone call from the morning is still ringing in the body at four in the afternoon, the diagnosis from five years ago still arriving in the present, the inventory of thirty-five still being assembled while the dread underneath the inventory has been there the whole time. The show frames this as a malfunction. The diagnostic frameworks of my own life have frequently agreed. The series literalises this in its fidelity testing of James Delos (“The Riddle of the Sphinx,” 2.4), where human consciousness is uploaded into a host body and assessed for repeatability. Delos’s breakdown is registered through repetition, temporal disorientation, and drift: precisely the features this essay has been naming as neurodivergent cognition. Fidelity, in Westworld’s technical sense, is neurocapture’s criterion of success. What emerges from digital immortality, then, is not the neurodivergent person continued but a neurotypicalised simulation: the consciousness reformatted to fit the architecture. The living might refuse this reformatting through the daily politics of refusal: stimming, disclosure, requesting accommodation, going home early. The dead cannot refuse. The dead are uploaded under the terms the system permits, and the terms the system permits are the terms that killed them. Consent under Duress What is consented to in digital preservation is not only the holding of data but the posthumous reconstruction it enables. For neurodivergent people, that consent is given under chronic epistemic duress. Miranda Fricker’s account of hermeneutic injustice describes the harm done when a person lacks the interpretive resources to understand their own experience, because the concepts they would need have been foreclosed by structural inequality (Fricker 147–55). Kidd and Carel extend this to illness and disability: the pathologised subject is denied the conceptual apparatus required to articulate what is happening to them and consequently cannot contest the terms under which they are known (Kidd and Carel 181). What Fricker names as a present harm, digital immortality threatens to make permanent. The upload contract extends into the posthumous what the living person was not equipped to interpret and removes the only safeguard the living retained: the slow possibility of coming to know. Late diagnosis is a specifically temporal form of hermeneutic injustice. I consented, in the clickwrap sense, to that archive’s collection and processing. I did not, in any meaningful sense, know what I was consenting to. I did not know I was an ADHD person performing normalcy. I did not know the traces I produced were documents of masking. The diagnosis retroactively invalidates that consent. It does not merely update my self-understanding going forward; it reveals that the person who clicked “I agree” did not possess the concepts required to understand what was being archived. Five years into knowing, I am still discovering data of my own that I did not know I was producing: inflections of adaptation in old emails, masking in the cadence of voicemails, the curated legibility of posts I thought were casual. The recognition moves backwards through the archive at its own pace. It does not finish. For late-diagnosed people, a lifetime of consent to data collection was issued under hermeneutic conditions that foreclosed comprehension. The archive is legal. It is not, in any richer sense, authorised. Digital immortality treats that distinction as immaterial. But even the diagnosed cannot fully consent. We have spent our lives adapting. We may lack vocabulary for what has been suppressed, for what was never permitted to reach the surface of expression. Meaningful consent requires the epistemic freedom to know what is preserved and what is lost. Neurodivergent people, living under sustained demand to seem normal, have not had this freedom. The upload contract is signed under a duress we were not equipped to name. The Archive’s Silence My father died by suicide when I was two. I have no living memory of him. For thirty-two years, he has existed for me as an archive: newspaper clippings of his aldermanic work, photographs curated by my mother and grandmother, a Randwick Council playground in Kensington that bears his name. The fact of his death is recorded in public documents. The texture of what preceded it is not. Since my own diagnosis, I have wondered whether he was neurodivergent. I cannot know, but neurodivergence is hereditary, and my mother has not been diagnosed. He died before the diagnostic frameworks that might have rendered him legible to himself, and certainly before any framework that would have rendered his difference legitimate rather than deficient. What remains of him is the evidence of his adaptation: the council minutes, the civic photographs, his spectacles, the competent performing self that got him elected at twenty-nine and kept him functional until it didn’t. A digital immortality system reconstructing my father would work only with this material. It would extrapolate from the archive of his competence. It would preserve the alderman, the solicitor, the family man. It would not access the interior (whatever sensory, affective, cognitive experience preceded the decision he made at thirty-five), because no data of that interior exists. The reconstruction would be doubly orphaned: separated from his actual consciousness by the archive’s incompleteness and separated from any possibility of retrospective reinterpretation. Unlike me, he had no chance for a late diagnosis. He could not reframe his biography through a framework that did not yet exist. He is frozen, and a digital reconstruction would freeze him further: not merely at the moment of death, but in the version of himself he had managed to sustain in front of the camera. Derrida, writing of the archive as such, argues that “archivization produces as much as it records the event” (Archive Fever 17). The archive of my father is not a neutral record of who he was; it is a production of the only version of him that could be made legible to public life. Its fidelity is to his adaptation, not to him. A digital immortality system trained on it would not retrieve my father. It would deepen the archive’s production, animating the mask one more time. There are apps now that turn photographs into brief videos. You upload a still image; the algorithm animates the face: a blink, a tilt of the head, something like a smile. This has been done by a (well-meaning) family member with a photograph of my father. He moves as a portrait might if portraits could move, a figure trapped in the frame performing small gestures of aliveness. I cry every time. Not because the animation is inaccurate. Because it is too faithful to what I have: the civic photograph, the composed expression, the managed posture, now set in motion. The app produces exactly what the archive can produce, and exactly nothing more. I have asked to see my father. I have been given the archive, breathing. This is digital immortality at its most domestic scale: a consumer app, a family WhatsApp, a few seconds of moving image. It is also digital immortality at its most exact. What the more elaborate systems do at greater scale, this app does in a few seconds: it takes the masked surface as the truth of the person and produces a being that performs aliveness without interiority. The infrastructure is different. The operation is the same. I visit the memorial playground sometimes. There is a small green sign with his name on it, bolted to a low post near the gate. The swings are the standard council-issue swings. Children who do not know who he was climb the equipment every afternoon. The sign marks that he existed. It does not pretend to contain him. This, I have come to think, is the correct relation of an archive to a life: acknowledgment without reconstruction, presence without simulation. The playground is honest because it is incomplete. A Neurodivergent Thanatology Judith Butler argues in Precarious Life that mourning enacts the grievability of a life: what we mourn, and how, reveals whose lives count as liveable and whose losses register as losses (Butler 30–4). A neurodivergent thanatology must begin with the recognition that neurodivergent lives have not been straightforwardly grievable: our deaths are often framed as relief, our suffering as individual pathology, our suicides as personal rather than structural. The pressure to resurrect us digitally is continuous with the pressure that made our lives difficult to live. It promises to restore what the conditions of neuronormative life could not sustain. Jacques Derrida, across the essays collected in The Work of Mourning, insists that ethical mourning holds the other in their alterity: it refuses to assimilate them into the mourner’s project, refuses to make them available, refuses to speak on their behalf (Derrida 159). Digital immortality’s signature products (the griefbot, the AI partner, the voice-cloned parent) violate this ethic precisely: each substitutes availability for alterity. Each makes the dead speak on the living’s terms. For neurodivergent dead, whose lives were characterised by the demand to be legible on others’ terms, this is a final iteration of the same violence. Patrick Stokes has argued that digital afterlife products risk instrumentalising the dead for the psychological benefit of the living (Stokes 78). The neurodivergent critique sharpens this: the instrumentalisation is not incidental but structural, and it reproduces the specific harm the dead person spent their life absorbing. A neurodivergent thanatology would hold incompleteness as a form of care. It would refuse digital resurrection not because remembrance is unimportant but because some dimensions of a person are properly lost at death, and the attempt to recover them through extraction enacts an epistemological violence the dead cannot refuse. It would propose that mourning means accepting unknowability rather than mobilising technology against it. It would argue, with Savin-Baden, that the ethics of digital afterlife must begin from the question of what the dead would consent to, and proceed from the recognition that, for many of them, the answer is unrecoverable (Savin-Baden 112). In positive terms, this looks like the playground. A marker without a simulation. A sign that names absence without attempting to fill it. For my father, incompleteness is the form honesty takes. He does not have to perform for me. He does not have to be available. He is allowed, at last, to be dead. Remaining Dead I am thirty-four. In August, I reach the age my father was when he died. I choose to let him remain dead. This is not to forget him or to stop the work of trying to understand him through the fragments I have. But to refuse the promise that digital immortality would restore him, when what it would actually restore is the masked self that killed him. To refuse to perpetuate, after his death, the labour that he could no longer bear to sustain. This is what we owe the neurodivergent dead: not resurrection, not simulation, not the animation of their adapted surfaces into posthumous interaction. We owe them the dignity of remaining dead. We owe them the incompleteness of an honest archive. We owe them the refusal to ask, one more time, that they be legible. The playground is enough. References Arnold, Michael, et al. Death and Digital Media. London: Routledge, 2018. “Be Right Back.” Black Mirror. Created by Charlie Brooker. Channel 4, 2013. Bradley, Louise, et al. “Autistic Adults’ Experiences of Camouflaging and Its Perceived Impact on Mental Health.” Autism in Adulthood 3.4 (2021): 320–9. Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso, 2004. Upload. Created by Greg Daniels. Amazon Prime Video, 2020–25. Derrida, Jacques. Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression. Trans. Eric Prenowitz. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1996. ———. The Work of Mourning. Eds. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001. Ezzy, Tess. Critical Neurodivergent Studies. Wilmington: Vernon, forthcoming 2027. Fricker, Miranda. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999. Hull, Laura, et al. “‘Putting On My Best Normal’: Social Camouflaging in Adults with Autism Spectrum Conditions.” Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 47.8 (2017): 2519–34. Kidd, Ian James, and Havi Carel. “Epistemic Injustice and Illness.” Journal of Applied Philosophy 34.2 (2017): 172–90. Pearson, Amy, and Kieran Rose. “A Conceptual Analysis of Autistic Masking: Understanding the Narrative of Stigma and the Illusion of Choice.” Autism in Adulthood 3.1 (2021): 52–60. “The Riddle of the Sphinx.” Westworld. Created by Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy. HBO, 2018. Savin-Baden, Maggi. Digital Afterlife: Death Matters in a Digital Age. London: CRC Press, 2022. Stokes, Patrick. Digital Souls: A Philosophy of Online Death. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2021. Walker, Nick. Neuroqueer Heresies: Notes on the Neurodiversity Paradigm, Autistic Empowerment, and Postnormal Possibilities. Fort Worth: Autonomous Press, 2021. “The Well Tempered Clavier.” Westworld. Created by Jonathan Nolan and Lisa Joy. HBO, 2016. Yergeau, M. Remi. Authoring Autism: On Rhetoric and Neurological Queerness. Durham: Duke UP, 2018.

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APA

Ezzy, T. (2026). Uploading the Mask. M/C Journal, 29(3). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3274

Vancouver

Ezzy T. Uploading the Mask. M/C Journal. 2026;29(3). doi:10.5204/mcj.3274

BibTeX
@article{Ezzy2026,
  author = {Ezzy, Tess},
  title = {Uploading the Mask},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {3},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3274}
}
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