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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

How Political Journalists Found—and Lost—a Home on Twitter

Elizabeth Dubois

M/C Journal · 21.04.2026 · 29 (2)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3252 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 21.04.2026. Verfasst von Elizabeth Dubois. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Introduction

In 2008, working as a communications assistant for a Canadian Member of Parliament, I persuaded her to let me create her Twitter account. She was among the first politicians in Canada to have an account, but Twitter as a space for political communication grew quickly. Journalists, politicians, activists, and politically engaged citizens gathered in a shared, fast-moving stream. Twitter felt direct and unusually flat: elected officials replied to reporters in public; journalists sourced stories from activists; members of the public voiced concerns to politicians in real time. Twitter appeared to offer a new kind of communicative commons. After 20 years of Twitter, in 2026 the role and utility of Twitter in political communication has shifted substantially. Initially, Twitter evolved from an experimental microblogging service into a core infrastructure for journalism and political communication. Journalists began using Twitter to gauge public opinion, find stories people cared about, identify and verify sources, cultivate communities of readers, and circulate their work in real time (Canter; Heravi and Harrower; Mourão and Molyneux). Meanwhile political campaigners started integrating Twitter into their communications and media management strategies (Conway et al.). Twitter began as an experimental site but soon was embedded in professional routines and journalistic infrastructure. Of course, this infrastructure was never neutral. It is a for-profit platform trying to expand in a platform economy and relying on an advertising-based business model. The model incentivised engagement maximisation, which in turn shaped design choices and governance priorities (Gillespie, Custodians 41; Gillespie, Platforms 348; van Dijck et al.). Eventually, the same features that facilitated openness and virality also enabled harassment, coordinated disinformation, bot amplification, and hostility on Twitter. The platform’s transition to X under Elon Musk intensified these dynamics. Quickly content moderation systems put in place to limit the spread of harmful content were dismantled. Concurrently verification was monetised, which shifted authority cues and power balances on the platform. The professional utility of Twitter for many has come into question: with an exodus of users, Twitter as a pulse of the people, a wide array of sources, or a committed community lost its value at the same time as frequency of harassment, lack of authority checks, and presence of disinformation or other influence campaigns increased (Claesson 2618). Drawing on critical political economy perspectives, this article reflects not just on 20 years of Twitter, but also on how journalism relies on infrastructures it does not own and cannot govern. By tracing Twitter’s rise and decline as a political journalistic habitat, this article argues that its instability is not a fluke but instead a feature of the platform’s design. A feature that puts journalists and political journalism at risk. Why Political Journalists Were on Twitter When Twitter was first introduced, journalists experimented cautiously, using it as a tool to distribute stories but also to connect with others. Journalists adapted to the norms of Twitter, while carrying over journalistic norms (Holton et al. 23). Over time Twitter was normalised into reporting routines such as sourcing, tracking events, monitoring beats, and as a news wire (Chadwick; Dagoula; Mourão and Molyneux). Workflows in newsrooms were adapted to incorporate social media, which reinforced Twitter’s role in daily reporting (Usher 22). Journalists might monitor hashtags and trending topics, identify newsworthy events as they happen, and infer public sentiment all in real time, which they could then quickly respond to on the platform and build into their news production process off platform. Shaping both professional processes and visibility of information, Twitter allowed for a state of constant awareness and potential for interaction, which then positioned the platform as an infrastructural layer for journalism. Indeed, Twitter did not simply function as a dissemination tool for political journalists, it became something akin to a digital press gallery or commons, some describing it as a public sphere (Bouvier and Rosenbaum 2). An online space where journalists could track potential stories and public sentiment in real time. A space where they could have quick access to politicians and other political elites, find sources, and build relationships. A space Hermida (660) explains was emblematic of “ambient journalism”, characterised by a real-time and constant stream of information from a networked set of actors which helped reporters to maintain continuous awareness of unfolding events, elite statements, and peer commentary. As Twitter became a popular tool for political communication, Twitter chatter sometimes served an intermedia agenda-setting role, influencing the ways legacy media covered things like breaking news events (Su and Borah). Journalists also began to treat tweets as primary sources, embedding tweets by political elites into news coverage (Broersma and Graham 447) or tracking particular hashtags and ad hoc publics that emerged (Bruns and Burgess 1). With this use, Twitter served to collapse space between journalists, other political actors, and members of the engaged public, creating a shared and constantly updating flow of information. In concert, Twitter could be used to identify, join, and build community and belonging. Twitter became one of the more important platforms for political journalists (Parmelee 292) and was used for source development through relationship management and community construction (López-Rabadán and Mellado), though in many cases journalists interact primarily with other journalists and political elite (Mourão and Molyneux 256). In what Chadwick calls a hybrid space where journalists, politicians, other political elites and the public all have similar technical ability to create content, journalists developed ways of increasing their own visibility, authority, and brand. Journalists used Twitter to cultivate visibility and signal expertise as they engaged online, mixing news production and news marketing (Vos and Tandoc Jr. 952). Twitter became a site for brand construction for journalists, distinct from the brand of a media outlet (Ottovordemgentschenfelde 65). Sometimes in conflict with traditional newsroom practices, journalists offered personal insights and context about how stories developed, and at times used humour, becoming more publicly accessible and participating in conversation (Molyneux & Mourão; Mourão et al.; Mourão). Ultimately Twitter offered a space for professional performance and began to feel non-optional, especially for less established journalists looking to make a name for themselves (Jukes). These new professional opportunities were also met with volatility in the form of uneven access and uneven amplification. Just because Twitter collapses space between actors does not mean everyone is given equal access or voice. Studies show that how much a journalist’s content is seen and shared depends on things like their existing audience, network ties, and the way platforms’ algorithms rank the content (Molyneux & Holton; Nielsen & Ganter). Further, while Twitter fostered new forms of professional belonging, it was also experienced unevenly. For example, Black Twitter at times served as a vibrant community with journalists and users constructing powerful counternarratives, but in doing so they were exposed to intensified harassment and surveillance (Clark). Despite these limits, Twitter served as an essential space for many political journalists, at least within the US and EU where most studies of political communication on Twitter were conducted (Naranjo-Vinueza et al.). But Twitter is privately governed, often opaque, and like other platforms which structure the visibility of information and accessibility of participation is not neutral (Gillespie, Platforms 358). The journalistic infrastructure that was built up on Twitter was always embedded within a profit-driven platform economy. Profit-Driven Tensions As Twitter’s advertising-based business model prioritised engagement maximisation, the platform became increasingly shaped by harassment, political bots, and disinformation. Reflecting notions of platform capitalism (Srincek), Twitter’s algorithms prioritised content that others would engage with so that their attention and/or data could be sold. To provoke interaction, Twitter’s algorithms generally favour sensational and emotional content, which can be polarising (Milli et al. 1). The nature of Twitter’s business model created tensions between the professional utility of the space and exposure to platform-driven volatility that journalists had to contend with. Creating commercially governed spaces, platforms structure participation through their design and choices (Gillespie; van Dijck et al.). Within advertising-based systems, clicks, replies, retweets, and time on the platform become central measures of value, shaping what is visible and what kinds of content and interaction are incentivised. For example, to increase engagement and relevance, around 2016 Twitter switched its main feed from ordering content chronologically to ordering it according to rank based on engagement, shifting how visibility played out and incentivising the creation of content that would garner engagement. This not only shifted how journalists produced their own content on the platform, but also the wider conditions in which journalists were operating, and in turn deepened journalists’ dependence on Twitter’s commercial infrastructure (Ferrer-Conill & Tandoc Jr. 439; Nielsen & Ganter). As engagement metrics ruled and Twitter’s user base grew, potentially problematic content expanded. The remainder of this section considers three types of problematic content which journalists face on Twitter: harassment, political bots / artificial amplification, and disinformation. Online harassment of journalists has been a problem on Twitter for many years (Lewis et al.), disproportionately impacting on women and racialised reporters (Usher et al.). In some cases, influence operations strategically attack journalists in order to contribute to the undermining of democracy (InternetLab et al.). This harassment can make the journalists’ work environment unsafe, can have a chilling effect, and can undermine credibility for journalists (Kumar et al.). The problem is, harassment often generates engagement. Outrage and pile-ons fuel replies, retweets, and quote tweets (Brady et al. 1; Chan 146), and in turn Twitter’s prioritisation algorithm can amplify harassment and feed new forms such as doxxing. Content moderation systems put in place in part as a counterweight which can limit harassment, hate, and other problematic content were developed in complex and opaque ways, shifting over time (Dubois & Reepschlager). In this context the digital press gallery journalists joined on Twitter was often hostile, requiring time to manage as well as emotional labour, and at times leading to self-censorship or leaving Twitter (Lewis et al. 1048). This highlights both social and professional risks of working in highly public and commercially governed environments. As Twitter’s popularity grew, people began developing political bots and modes of artificial amplification to try and game the algorithms to amplify or dampen different messages, simulate grassroots support or outrage, and manipulate trending topics or gain journalists’ attention (Howard & Woolley). Using automated accounts called bots, troll farms, and other techniques to make it seem like actual people were engaging in a particular way, political actors strategically exploited Twitter’s affordances (Woolley 90). While journalists often used Twitter as something of a real-time barometer, bots and related approaches distorted the instrument, undermining a key way Twitter served as journalistic infrastructure. Notably, Twitter was not incentivised to remove bots and fake accounts in many cases because they increased user statistics, which was good for business (Wischnewski et al.). Similarly, disinformation became a challenge on Twitter that forced journalists to re-evaluate and adjust the ways Twitter was used in their work. From the outset many journalists had concerns about the speed at which unverified information from a wide range of people could travel on Twitter (Hermida 664). Beyond the concern of anyone having the opportunity to share content in nearly the same way journalists do on Twitter, false and misleading content is often designed specifically to provoke emotional reactions and generate engagement, spreading quickly online. This would frequently prompt journalistic coverage of online trends and events as well as fact-checking, but paradoxically that coverage would often amplify those false stories (Phillips 12). In Twitter’s business model the online space is most often optimised for virality and not veracity, but particularly following the 2016 US election, fact-checking initiatives and other responses to disinformation did start to develop (Olan et al. 447). Some aspects of disinformation management were built into Twitter, such as the “Headlines don’t tell the full story. Want to read this before retweeting?” prompts (Binder), while others were layered atop, such as journalists creating tweet threads to debunk stories in real-time (Parks 1165), or fact-checking organisations which worked off-platform but then fed content back into the ecosystem (Ananny 355-6). Together these patterns created new labour for journalists and made the credibility of sources harder to assess. Ultimately, the same engagement-optimised features that enabled openness, rapid reporting, and public engagement made the platform vulnerable to manipulation, enabling harassment, bots, and disinformation. Despite the instability and risks, many journalists kept using the platform because it had become professionally indispensable. Twitter’s real-time and continuous stream of information and connection to a network of actors and community in a single space allowed journalists to maintain a professional identity and conduct their work in ways that often felt essential or at least inescapable (Claesson 2618-9). Consequently, they developed ways to minimise risk, such as engaging only with certain accounts or relying on curated lists (Lewis et al. 1061). Twitter’s value seemingly outweighed its volatility. Twitter, at times, tried to balance its engagement optimisation business model with community standards and content moderation that minimised certain harms, but it was done unevenly and opaquely (Dubois & Reepschlager; de Keulenaar et al. 276). Over time, tensions between the platform’s utility and instability became apparent, but journalists found ways to make it work. But these tensions intensified and those imperfect guardrails failed, or were simply removed, when Twitter became X. From Twitter to X In part motivated by a perception that content moderation practices were biased against conservatives (Rohlinger et al.), Elon Musk took over Twitter in 2022, renaming it X in July 2023. Quickly things at the company changed: much of the Trust and Safety team was let go and content moderation practices were dismantled and made more opaque (Paul et al. 532). In place of traditional content moderation, “Community Notes” were introduced, where a wisdom-of-the-crowds approach to fact-checking was implemented, notably facing substantial critique about effectiveness (Matamoros-Fernández & Jude 1991). Next, the blue check mark signifying verification status was monetised, meaning that anyone willing to pay the price tag could become verified, thus undermining a core credibility cue previously built into the system (Clasesson 2618). During Musk’s public appearances, on Twitter/X’s own policy pages, and in content posted by Musk and others on the platform, a major policy shift towards free speech above all else became the main talking point. Together these changes drastically shifted people’s experiences using the platform, and triggered many to leave or use the platform less (Claesson 2616). For journalists the implications were substantial. The platform became increasingly hostile, journalists were targeted, and disinformation became rampant (Barberá). There was public decline in trust in content found on the platform (Mont’Alverne et al. 6), and journalists no longer enjoyed the same benefits of visibility or credibility. Journalists’ use in turn shifted: while many still felt they needed to maintain their accounts for professional purposes, their daily use changed and many exhibited a variety of avoidance behaviours (Claesson 2608; Ng and Ray). Some journalists migrated to other platforms, but migration is often a slow process and does not necessarily involve exiting X altogether (Ng and Ray).

Conclusion

The case of Twitter, now X, use by journalists and within political communication more broadly reveals the fragility of public communication built on private, profit-driven platforms. While Twitter was valuable in many ways for political journalists, it came with risks and challenges which ultimately have been exacerbated to the point that many journalists no longer use the platform, or at least their use is drastically different today than it was five, ten, or twenty years ago. From experimentation to normalisation to avoidance, Twitter’s impacts on, and uses for, political journalism are drastically different today. Twitter became a go-to space for journalists because it offered access to political elites and publics, opportunities for visibility, and community. But that home was built to optimise engagement, not democratic communication, and so journalists faced volatility and hostility, driven by the very design choices that initially made Twitter useful. Describing After Twitter, Tkacz and Gehl explain how the space left behind as Twitter became X is now fragmented, filled with a variety of platforms each doing something slightly different, and notably marked by political drivers: something the authors call “platform polities” (4). While Twitter may have been a home to political journalists for a time, After Twitter journalists are faced with a fragmented environment while still feeling the pressures of personal branding and visibility maintenance that developed on Twitter. This must be understood in a wider context where the business model of journalism is in crisis and creator economies have emerged, both meaningfully impacting on how journalists show up online (Salamon et al.). Serving as “newsfluencers”, journalists and other news content creators adopt entrepreneurial approaches, acting as their own news outlet and relying on influencer tactics where they maintain an online persona across multiple platforms, and often rely on subscriber-based business models to try and generate income (Hurcombe). For example, switching from Twitter to the subscriber-based newsletter tool Substack has allowed some journalists to avoid the negative implications of social media such as increased demands of visibility and increased harassment, which disproportionately impacts on journalists of colour (Hewa and Cohen). But to be successful on Substack still requires enough popularity and visibility beyond the platform to attract subscribers in the first place. Journalists have not escaped dependence on profit-driven platforms, it has just been re-distributed. This re-distribution impacts not only on journalists navigating precarious career paths, but on democratic communication more broadly too. Journalists remain beholden to platforms optimised for engagement, this time likely with fewer opportunities for cross-pollination across communities now that they are more fragmented across platforms, resembling a commons less and less (Tkacz & Gehl). At the same time, access to quality information and exposure to varied perspectives may become more challenging for some members of the public compared to others. This can exacerbate social, political, and economic divides when that quality information is paywalled and hosted on platforms which distinguish themselves based on their political values, as Tkacz and Gehl describe. The question is not whether journalists will find a new online home, but rather whether the next home – or fragmented collection of rooms – can together escape the paradox that made Twitter both indispensable and fragile. 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Zitieren

APA

Dubois, E. (2026). How Political Journalists Found—and Lost—a Home on Twitter. M/C Journal, 29(2). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3252

Vancouver

Dubois E. How Political Journalists Found—and Lost—a Home on Twitter. M/C Journal. 2026;29(2). doi:10.5204/mcj.3252

BibTeX
@article{Dubois2026,
  author = {Dubois, Elizabeth},
  title = {How Political Journalists Found—and Lost—a Home on Twitter},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3252}
}
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