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Open Access · CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

The Death of Twitter and the Decline of Public Debate Online

Axel Bruns

M/C Journal · 22.04.2026 · 29 (2)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3247 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 22.04.2026. Verfasst von Axel Bruns. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Introduction Twitter launched on 21 March 2006 to a largely uncaring public. It remained mostly unknown to all but a self-selecting group of technorati for the following years, until it was plucked from obscurity by the endorsement of U.S. television host Oprah Winfrey. Then at the height of her influence, she famously posted her first, all-caps tweet “HI TWITTERS. THANK YOU FOR A WARM WELCOME. FEELING REALLY 21st CENTURY.” live from her television show on 17 April 2009, with Twitter CEO Ev Williams watching on. The effect was immediate: account sign-ups to the platform spiked, and the Twitter userbase grew rapidly from then on. Although attracting more than 320 million monthly active users during its heyday (Molina), Twitter was never a mass participation platform comparable to Facebook, Weibo, or Instagram. Instead, what distinguished it from its competition was both the particularly influential clientele of local, domestic, and international actors that it was able to attract (e.g. Ausserhofer & Maireder), and the way in which its flat and open platform affordances and network structure at least appeared to (and in some cases genuinely did) enable direct interaction between these elite accounts and the larger mass of ordinary users. While never consciously designed for this purpose (cf. Burgess & Baym), once it was fully established, Twitter provided direct access to the posts of a collection of celebrities, politicians, journalists, business leaders, experts, activists, government and non-government institutions, and corporations that was often nearly complete in many of the regions in which the platform was being used. This also led to it becoming a platform of critical importance for sharing, discussing, and otherwise engaging with news and current events. The substantial changes to Twitter as a company and platform since its takeover by Elon Musk on 27 October 2022 have meant that that platform has died, however. Even the name Twitter itself no longer exists, following its rebrand as ‘X’. This article explores how these changes have affected opportunities for constructive, prosocial online public debate, and examines the extent to which new social platforms are able to fill the space now vacated by Twitter. News, Public Debate, and Prosocial Activism on Twitter The use of Twitter for engagement with news and current events has perhaps been highlighted most prominently in early scholarly analyses of the platform: such work addressed, for example, the role of Twitter in crisis communication during natural disasters and political events (Hughes & Palen), or more generally described the platform as an ‘ambient news’ network (Hermida). Again, the flat and open structure of the platform – where the vast majority of accounts and their posts were publicly accessible by default; and where users could freely follow and tweet at almost any other account, without a need to be accepted as a follower or ‘friend’ (Gruzd et al.) – played a critical role in facilitating such uses, as did the rapidly growing use of hashtags as a user-generated means of coordinating feeds of posts relating to a given topic. Hashtags proved especially critical, indeed, to the bottom-up surfacing of information without the (initial) involvement of major institutional accounts. They enabled key voices to be “crowdsourced to prominence through the pluralizing practices of retweeting, mentioning, and other addressivity markers” by the platform’s ordinary users, as Meraz & Papacharissi have put it (158). In spite of these important uses, Twitter was always more than ‘only’ a news network, however, as Burgess & Baym have documented. Beyond their uses in breaking news (and sometimes overlapping with such uses), for instance, hashtags have always also been crucial to connecting communities – from small and localised interest and identity groups to major, global, prosocial activism like #metoo and #blacklivesmatter (e.g. Jackson & Foucault Welles). In doing so, well beyond their roles in the context of acute events, they also served a purpose in facilitating the longer-term tracking of issues and events. This is demonstrated for example by the six-year campaign in Australia for a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the federal government’s illegal #Robodebt scheme (Dehghan & Bruns). The platform facilitated what Bennett & Segerberg have described as “connective action”, enabling the ad hoc organisation of hashtag followers into crowds with a notable impact on public debate (though not necessarily public policy) related to the issues that such connective action addressed. Through such efforts, as well as more day-to-day thematic attention and networking between accounts focussing on related issues, Twitter also enabled the emergence of a new class of expert voices, community leaders, and issue influencers. This use of social media to build and exert influence was certainly not limited to Twitter alone (Abidin), and of course also produced a substantial amount of ill-informed charlatans opining on topics well outside their area of expertise. But yet again the very public and open nature of communication on Twitter often also served to flush out such misinformation, as genuine experts responded to and debunked misguided views – at least as long as the operators of the Twitter platform also played their part by acting on reports of influence operations and egregious mis- and disinformation sharing. Genuine experts and community leaders found an audience on Twitter, then, especially also because its flat and open structure enabled the rapid horizontal dissemination of their posts not only through hashtagging, but (arguably more importantly) also with the help of retweets (Hemsley). Retweeting distributed other accounts’ tweets to the retweeting user’s network of followers, even if they were not themselves following the retweeted user or any hashtags included in that users’ tweets (cf. Bruns & Moe). This substantially aided the serendipitous discovery of emerging, novel, and unexpected topics and events, and was itself amplified further by the Twitter platform’s identification of current ‘trending topics’, globally or in a user’s geographic region. In a refrain that is recurring throughout Twitter’s history (also cf. Burgess & Baym), Twitter as a platform worked best when its systems responded to the interests and practices of its userbase. Such serendipitous, playful, and social – indeed, joyful – uses of the platform were often overshadowed by the considerable media and scholarly interest in Twitter’s more serious news and business uses. Yet the evidence suggests that social, phatic uses (from simply hanging out online together to mostly good-natured shitposting) accounted for the majority of Twitter activity on any given day (Bruns & Moon). For all the cultural cachet that the hashtag has gained as a media object well beyond Twitter itself, hashtagged tweets were always only a minor subset of all tweets, for instance, and the vast majority of ordinary users did not engage with the platform predominantly for professional purposes. As David Roth put it in one of the many eulogies for the Twitter that was which have been written since the Musk takeover, then, for all the overwrought ways in which Twitter has been described—[Tucker] Carlson called it “the place where our national conversation incubates and develops”…—the comparison that always made the most sense was too small-bore for the big-thinking types. I’ve always thought of Twitter as a house party that I could visit or leave at my leisure. Different things were happening in different rooms, some of them for me and some of them very much not. Over time I learned how to find the scenes and conversations I liked, and came to recognize the people I saw in those rooms as friends. (The owners were of course not around.) This is a fine thing for a website to be, I think. This seems to encapsulate well the general sense of loss that many long-term Twitter users have experienced since the inexorable decline of the platform set in after Elon Musk bought it – yet (like other memories of adolescent house parties) it also creates an image of an antediluvian golden age that likely never existed as such. The Writing on the Wall The sober truth is that Twitter was never well-managed. The owners were indeed never around, or, even if they were, usually failed to show unwanted intruders the door. During its early days, this inattention was perhaps masked by an overall sense of excitement and enthusiasm for this new platform, and by the way management seemed to both take on new ideas (search functions, hashtags, etc.) and open the platform’s technical infrastructure to developers, businesses, and researchers to build third-party tools and extensions and to better understand how people were using the platform (Burgess & Bruns). As Ash notes, even Twitter’s 2013 statement to the US Securities and Exchange Commission in preparation for its public listing on the stock exchange still makes the commitment that the mission we serve as Twitter, Inc. is to give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly without barriers. Our business and revenue will always follow that mission in ways to improve – and not detract from – a free and global conversation. (Twitter, Inc.) This commitment waned considerably as Twitter’s management, in search of a longer-term business plan, began to crack down on third-party uses of its data, and sought to monetise such data for themselves – not least also in response to shareholder pressure to perform financially. By 2015, “no longer is Twitter speaking to barriers of freedom, but rather, they focus on generating revenue. A marked shift in rhetoric is now made visible” in its quarterly earnings reports (Ash), especially as Twitter’s development slowed while the company invested in ill-fated ventures like video platforms Vine and Periscope that sought to expand to new userbases rather than serve existing users (cf. Scolari). Poorly thought-through and widely opposed decisions such as the redesign of the ‘star’ button (as a form of bookmarking tweets) to a ‘heart’, implying emotional attachment (Bucher & Helmond), and stubborn inaction in the face of user demand – exemplified most obviously by the company’s notorious refusal to introduce any, even limited, functionality to edit tweets after posting (Martineau) – were signs of further trouble to come. Some such trouble also originated externally, not least in the growth in coordinated influence operations designed to affect public opinion for instance in the 2016 Brexit referendum and U.S. presidential election (Bastos; Golovchenko et al.), and the rapid rise in abuse and hate speech especially in the wake of Donald Trump’s election. Not only did Twitter management appear to do too little, too late: some of its inaction seemed to stem from a misguided, pseudo-libertarian valuation of unconstrained ‘free speech’ above all else, and/or a concern for the business and political implications of acting more forcefully against mis- and disinformation, abuse, hate speech, and other obvious ills. Twitter’s status as Trump’s favourite platform was good for business and brand recognition in the short term, in other words, no matter the long-term damage that platforming Trump and other high-volume sources of blatant disinformation and hate speech might also cause for both company and community. It is notable in this context that, but for a handful of high-profile and at times poorly handled collaborations (cf. Liao), Twitter largely also failed to engage with the substantial volume of leading scholarship on prosocial as well as problematic user practices that its earlier, more permissive collaboration settings had encouraged. Especially after 2016, substantial computational social science scholarship addressed the challenges of identifying and combatting mis- and disinformation operations (e.g. Kim et al.; Starbird et al.) and other forms of what Facebook came to call ‘coordinated inauthentic behaviour’ (Gleicher), while other researchers dissected the company’s use of appeals to ‘free speech’ as a justification for its continued platforming of outright fascists (Konikoff), yet Twitter’s leadership largely ignored any of this work. It also actively frustrated its user community’s attempts to rekindle the DIY spirit of the platform’s early days and develop communal approaches to combatting problematic actors, for instance by creating collaborative blocklists (Geiger). It was only towards the end of this late period in Twitter’s pre-Musk trajectory that the company appeared to rethink its relationship especially with researchers (and it is possible that this volte face was prompted to some extent by the coming Digital Services Act in the European Union, with its requirements for Very Large Online Platforms to provide better data access to researchers). In 2021, Twitter introduced a powerful new Application Programming Interface specifically dedicated to research purposes (Perez, “Twitter”), as well as a no-code Tweet Downloader functionality that would provide datasets directly in human-readable file formats without the need for any programming. These genuinely useful facilities would soon be dismantled again, however, as Twitter’s fortunes changed irrevocably following its acquisition by Elon Musk in 2022 (Stokel-Walker). Their brief flourishing serves as a reminder of a better path not taken. The Decline of Online Public Debate Open, prosocial, constructive public debate flourished briefly in online spaces such as Twitter during the first half of the 2010s. This substantially aided phenomena such as the Arab Spring, Me Too, and Black Lives Matter, as well as countless smaller and more localised societal movements. Those last two examples also point to the fact that these developments were never truly global, however: they occurred predominantly in the democratic countries of the Global North, while similar developments elsewhere were often snuffed out by more repressive regimes, at times even with the help of Twitter and other platforms that acquiesced all too easily to the take-down demands made by such governments. Available space in this article does not permit a full discussion of Twitter’s use across the diverse political contexts of the Majority World. Twitter was used to pursue social change, protest government oppression, and organise resistance against authoritarian regimes in a broad range of contexts: for instance, activism in Indonesia towards the criminalisation of sexual violence (Azmi); resistance against government repression of public debate in Saudi Arabia (Uniacke); diasporic opposition against autocratic leaders in Russia and Iran (Dehghan and Glazunova). The temporary success of protest campaigns and movements, from the Arab Spring onwards, in attracting a global audience to their cause was aided not least by the deployment of singular hashtags to bundle and amplify critical information and calls to action – but it increasingly also produced a two-fold backlash from contrarian actors. On the one hand, it indicated a pressing need to develop effective countermeasures against the influence of such campaigns, while on the other, it pointed to the potential of instrumentalising these same processes in support of far more reactionary and disruptive purposes. While earlier examples can readily be identified, too, the second half of the 2010s is widely seen as the period during which these efforts produced their first major harvest. Much as earlier prosocial campaigns had attracted and enrolled a public yearning for change, now domestic influence campaigns in the United States, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere – potentially assisted by the Russian ‘Internet Research Agency’ troll farm (Bail et al.) and other foreign actors – engaged the partisan supporters of reactionary and populist causes in what Starbird et al. came to call “participatory disinformation”. Through a mixture of genuine influencers, inauthentic accounts, and bots, they gave ordinary partisans licence to push false narratives that supported their own side and distracted or denigrated their opponents. If nothing else, the sheer volume of content produced by such efforts – whether by the Russian ‘Internet Research Agency’, the Saudi regime’s ‘troll army’ (Benner et al.), or Indonesian political parties’ extensive cohorts of ‘buzzers’ (Burgess & Souisa) – was often already sufficient to overwhelm any meaningful discussion that might otherwise have occurred in the communicative spaces Twitter provided. Public debate ahead of the Brexit referendum and the first election of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency in 2016 was undermined in this way, and similar patterns of disinformation, division, and decoherence are observable for most major public debates – in the Global North and the Majority World – since then, especially perhaps for debates about climate action and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (Graham & FitzGerald, “Exploring”). This backlash against the potential prosocial uses of Twitter and other social media platforms for genuine public debate amongst a set of actors well beyond the elite that populate the “virtual stage of mediated communication” provided by the classic Habermasian public sphere (Habermas) was entirely foreseeable, perhaps. It represents only the latest, social media-enhanced iteration of the “fear, uncertainty, and doubt” playbook supposedly first used by IBM to denigrate its competitors in the 1970s – an approach which by now is so well established it has even earnt a standing acronym in marketing research: FUD (Pfaffenberger). Its major innovation is simply to capitalise on the very affordances of social media platforms such as Twitter to institute a participatory FUD campaign, where the polarising and divisive messages produced by authentic and inauthentic influencers are now willingly spread online by partisans themselves. Indeed, in doing so, it revives the classic Soviet communication strategy of agit-prop – agitation and propagation – for a new communicative environment (Svegaard). Yet foreseeable or not, this instrumentalisation of platform affordances against societal cohesion turned out to be difficult to defend against – especially also because the extreme ‘free speech’ positions embraced by Twitter and other platform operators. Their resistance against well-intentioned regulatory interventions by democratic government authorities, their belligerence towards independent, critical, public-interest research, and their dismissal of their own user communities’ requests for more proactive interventions against disruptive and inauthentic accounts shut off many of the possible avenues that could have been taken in the fight against those reactionary groups which sought to undermine meaningful online public debate. Notoriously, for instance, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey reluctantly sanctioned the take-down of Donald Trump’s account only after the latter had encouraged the violent insurrection against the legitimate U.S. election certification process on 6 January 2021 (Paul, “Twitter”). Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that such naïve inaction materially aided these disruptive actors’ efforts to undermine online public debate and further damage societal cohesion. Platforms and platform regulators failed, and still fail, to adequately protect the public from those who seek to disinform and divide for base political reasons. It is bitterly ironic in this context both that Twitter’s failure to act against those who sought to undermine it – and here, especially against inauthentic bot accounts – in turn also became a key issue in Elon Musk’s efforts to acquire the platform (Milmo), and that Musk’s own dismantling of any even rudimentary defences against coordinated inauthentic intrusions has subsequently led to the rebranded X becoming overwhelmed with newly created bot accounts (Graham & FitzGerald, Bots). Online Public Debate beyond Twitter Such growing dysfunction in online public debate is not, and never was, limited to Twitter alone, of course. Meta and Alphabet (as owners of platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and YouTube) have been similarly culpable for their negligence in protecting their users from abuse and disinformation, and for their opposition to legitimate democratic governments’ regulatory initiatives requiring them to do so. However, Twitter’s unique – flat and open – structure of public communication has meant that it came to occupy a special place in the social media ecology, even in spite of its considerably smaller userbase. When news broke of natural disasters, political scandals, violent conflicts, scientific breakthroughs, celebrity deaths, or other major developments, people flocked to Twitter and not those other platforms. When campaigns sought public visibility, community involvement, and crowdsourced amplification, they did so on Twitter. When citizens tried to get journalists to pay attention to emerging issues, convince corporations to improve their practices, or encourage politicians to change their views, they addressed them on Twitter. This positioning is still well removed from Twitter’s occasional self-aggrandisement as “the digital town square” (Burgess), but it does mark Twitter as a distinct place where public debate was likely to take place in a way that it could not on platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp (because debate there is not predominantly public), nor on YouTube or TikTok (because their affordances privilege the posting of public content rather than extensive and ongoing debate). Town square or not, Twitter’s pre-Musk management allowed this public space to atrophy through its pursuit of profit over community, and its inattention to the growing encroachment of disruptive and divisive forces. Its various platform interventions, often strongly opposed by the user community, represent what Cory Doctorow has described as the “enshittification” of a platform for commercial gain. For instance, Twitter’s 2016 transition from a simply chronological to an algorithmically curated default activity feed – which was subsequently found to privilege right-wing politics (Huszár et al.) – maximised content visibility for major accounts over ambient awareness of updates from those accounts users had chosen to follow and interact with. This constitutes a clear turn away from the mission “to give everyone the power to create and share ideas and information instantly without barriers” (Twitter, Inc.). Under Elon Musk, as enshittification turned into enxittification and X transformed altogether into a fascist hangout, the speed of decline increased substantially. The algorithm was tweaked further, not least to promote Musk’s own tweets regardless of whether users were following him or not (Paul, “Elon Musk”). Status as a major, verified account with Twitter’s previously prestigious ‘blue tick’ was now for sale for as low as US$8 (Mogyoros). And far-right accounts exploiting these new realities to push disinformation and abusive content were even rewarded with a share of X’s (dwindling) advertising revenue (Lorenz). In response, a growing number of alternative platform options have sought to position themselves as more or less seamless replacements. These include Mastodon, with its decentralised and federated network of bespoke instances that are each able to set their own community standards and rules; Threads, adopting Mastodon technology for a Twitter-style platform under the auspices of Meta (and with the corporate baggage that this entails); and Bluesky, another federatable but to date more centralised platform whose corporate structure is intended to prevent a Musk-style take-over by hostile and autocratic techbros. This effort to replace Twitter with something else that looks and feels almost exactly like Twitter, just without the stench of Musk, both demonstrates the extent to which ‘old’ Twitter in its style, functionality, and affordances for public debate had captured the attention of social media users, and betrays a lack of imagination about what better alternatives could look like. As Christianna Silva wrote in a perceptive Mashable article, “the same type of guy keeps making the same social media platforms and I am tired” (Silva) – a sentiment that, given Twitter founder Jack Dorsey’s early involvement in Bluesky, could even be shortened to ‘the same guy keeps making the same platform’. If, as she suggests, “the solution to Twitter's downfall isn’t five Twitter clones”, but something new that genuinely improves on the user experience of Twitter and comparable platforms, what might this entail? This question assumes, first, that in spite of the move towards richer and more immersive multimedia formats (with platforms like Instagram and TikTok) there remains a demand and purpose for text-centric social media platforms like Twitter. In addition, other distinct aspects of Twitter – such as the flat, open, and not necessarily reciprocal nature of its network, which enables a considerably greater presence of weak-tie connections – also contribute to its unique user experience, and encourage the platform’s use for predominantly public connection and discussion, including but not limited to journalistic purposes. These should also be retained. Indeed, it is notable that these features are amongst those most faithfully replicated by Mastodon, Threads, or Bluesky; the emergence of third-party tools to transfer users’ established Twitter networks of followers and followees to these new spaces clearly also speaks to a continuing user interest in such aspects. A text-centric, weak-tie, predominantly public platform still fills a unique niche in the social media ecosystem that has been vacated with the death of Twitter, then. Any new platforms seeking to replace Twitter will be subject to the same attempts to disrupt and suppress genuine public debate that old Twitter was, however; they must be better prepared for this. This is unlikely for Threads, which is compromised by parent company Meta’s inconstant and politically expedient commitment to protecting users from abuse and disinformation. It is complicated for Mastodon, where such efforts are at the discretion of each instance operator, most of whom are amateur enthusiasts with strictly limited resources. And it is already proving controversial for Bluesky, whose approach to platform moderation is as yet not fully formed (Perez, “Bluesky”). These new platforms’ inability to address questions of community standards and moderation as an integral part of the platform design is perhaps unsurprising given the long history of insufficient content moderation policies on mainstream social media platforms. But it also constitutes a significant missed opportunity. Any platform that commits to effective and consistent moderation and embeds this deeply into its operations may well find this to be a significant selling point for prospective new users seeking to escape the meltdown of meaningful public debate on Twitter and elsewhere. Indeed, what the early years of Twitter showed most clearly is that the platform was most successful when it worked closely with its users, when it listened to their needs and wishes, when it incorporated user innovations like retweets, hashtags, and search functions into the platform infrastructure proper, and when it enabled third-party developers to build powerful new functionality around that infrastructure by providing a well-documented Application Programming Interface (API). Emerging platforms show at least some signs that they have learnt from this. So far, Bluesky’s own API is powerful and wide open to potential users. Mastodon’s federated structure might be understood as a distributed experiment to explore a variety of approaches to working with users, some of which will succeed while others will fail. Both operate on shared and extensible protocol frameworks for building social media platforms that encourage third-party experimentation. Any such openness may also be targeted by reactionary groups seeking to undermine the potential prosocial uses of these platforms, however, and the central challenge to the platform operators will be how to prepare for and respond to such attempts when (not if) they are made. Will they naïvely take the same laissez-faire, ‘free speech absolutist’ approach as their predecessors, even as large parts of the user community itself encourage them to crack down on abuse? Will they continue to platform disinformation, abuse, and hate because real action against prominent problematic accounts might result in political or commercial consequences? Alternatively, can they develop policies that balance free speech and freedom from harmful speech, and implement them fairly and consistently? Can they find ways to genuinely engage and consult their communities in decisions that affect the running of the platform? A Difficult Path Ahead The historical trajectory of Twitter over these past twenty years, and of social media and their predecessor channels over an even longer period, has made it abundantly clear that any prosocial public debate that is genuinely open to more than the entrenched elites of the Habermasian public sphere will be targeted by those who seek to defend their own public influence and agenda-setting power from being scrutinised and diluted, and instrumentalised by those who see an opportunity to misdirect and derail public discourse for their own benefit. For now, this has severely curtailed the genuine potential that spaces for online public debate like Twitter once showed (even in spite of their now obvious flaws). This decline has occurred at a time when traditional arenas for public debate – such as commercial and public-service mainstream media channels – are themselves severely threatened by failing business models, corporate hollowing-out, journalistic self-censorship, and political obstruction. In combination, the struggles of both social and mainstream media have aided the current global democratic backsliding towards autocracy. And yet, all hope is not lost. From Belarus to Brazil, from the United States to Hungary, clearly communities and societies around the world continue to resist the autocratic transformation of once democratic systems, and in doing so also continue to experiment with new forms and platforms for public communication and debate. As Twitter, now X, fades into irrelevance as a far-right fringe platform overrun by AI slop and performative Musk worship, the social media landscape is more diverse and fragmented than it has been for many years. 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APA

Bruns, A. (2026). The Death of Twitter and the Decline of Public Debate Online. M/C Journal, 29(2). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3247

Vancouver

Bruns A. The Death of Twitter and the Decline of Public Debate Online. M/C Journal. 2026;29(2). doi:10.5204/mcj.3247

BibTeX
@article{Bruns2026,
  author = {Bruns, Axel},
  title = {The Death of Twitter and the Decline of Public Debate Online},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3247}
}
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