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What the Rise and Fall of Twitter Revealed about Collective Behaviour in Natural Hazards Disaster Response

Leysia Palen

M/C Journal · 21.04.2026 · 29 (2)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3246 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 21.04.2026. Verfasst von Leysia Palen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref). Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Introduction The golden age of social media revealed a great deal about the socio-behavioural phenomena of online activity during disaster events arising from natural hazards. The period from 2007 to 2012, when Twitter was new, provided insight into how members of the public—the informal response—naturally and collectively behaved when online social convergence was possible (Palen and Liu). For example, the now-pervasive “hashtag” was a user-driven invention made during the widespread 2007 Southern California Wildfires to enable the quick filtering of Twitter posts (Bruns and Burgess; Shklovski et al.). The practice stuck, and not only became built into Twitter’s features: it is now encoded across all forms of social media. Before problematic levels of disinforming behaviour plagued social media (Calo et al.), and before owner-executives monetised their platforms in ways that demoted time-sensitive information (Doctorow), social media spaces revealed the naturally-occurring socio-behavioural phenomena that arose in response to weather and geologic hazards. From intensive empirical social computational work, we uncovered a great deal about why digital connectivity is essential before and during disaster events (Palen et al., Vision; Sarcevic et al.; Hughes and Palen, Public Information Officer; Starbird and Palen, Disaster Desk; Kogan et al.; Bica et al., Hurricane Risks). In those mostly unadulterated circumstances at social media’s dawn, we found that the social convergence that occurred online mimicked what happened physically onsite (Stallings and Quarantelli): people asked for help, offered help, gathered to witness the event, and then, after these initialising interactions, sometimes worked together in improvisational ways to assist (Wachtendorf and Kendra). Initial basic informational exchange then gave rise to more complex, coordinated online work often between people who did not know one another (Kreps and Bosworth). In this way, social media platforms were incubators for innovative forms of collective action (Fritz and Mathewson), with “digital volunteers” warning and mobilising potential victims of disasters with timely information (Kaufhold). These socio-behavioural phenomena progressed across stages. Activities by members of the public drove early social media use, with formal emergency response joining later in response to this grassroots activity. Informal Responders Eyewitness Reporting. The first and most simple form of social media engagement were and continue to be reporting activities. Those who are proximate to a hazard provide eyewitness reports about flood levels, fire locations, traffic jams, power availability and so on. With social media originating around the same time smart phones became widely adopted in 2007, the mobility of social media applications combined with smart phone cameras led to dramatic change in collective behaviour (Palen and Hughes). Eyewitness reporting coupled with visual media became popularly referred to as citizen journalism (Vis), with the idea that citizens-as-sensors were a new way forward in early disaster response (Goodchild; Ottinger). The Convergence of Online Onlookers. Initial status reports were and continue to be the material around which observers then converge. The posts themselves, especially when accompanied by a hashtagged disaster term, created an online “site” for convergence within the vast information space of Twitter (Hughes et al., Site-Seeing). One opportunity for innovation was that the “data” produced by on-the-ground reporters could be collated for use by responders. Crucially, reports were automatically timestamped, meaning that the stream of reports could be tracked accurately in time. Crowdworkers, working quickly, manually collated reports, simulating what many hoped computational solutions could eventually do (Crowley and Chan; Ludwig et al., Crowdsourcing). However, because data came in the form of posts that relied on Twitter’s platform, software solutions were difficult to make a reality because they depended on the corporation’s platform configurations and policies that changed with some regularity. Another form of participation that arose from the influx of disaster reports references Sontag’s concerns about the photographic gaze upon the pain of others (Sontag): that of the “curious onlookers” who converged onto social media posts that depicted the devastation of disasters. Though this ability to bear witness contributed to monetary donations and, crucially, converted some observers into digital helpers, the reports could also enable exploitation, including in the form of “disaster tourism” and exploitation (Crawford and Finn; Elicessor). Fortunately, the worst forms of exploitation took some time to take hold in problematic ways, but as more people adopted social media and the scope of public interest extended beyond the local geographies of disasters, the possibility for exploitation of private information rose. People might publicly post addresses and phone numbers in desperate pleas for help, leaving them open for targeting. Today, disinforming tendencies indicate that exploitation of all kinds is possible (Starbird et al., Disinformation; Diamond et al.), which must inform how future civic computing solutions for disaster response might work. The Innovation of Online Help. However, in those early days, helpers who saw social media posts fly by were drawn to answer any array of questions: What roads were still open? Where could supplies be found? Who could assist in evacuating a family without a car? Often answers required rapid problem-solving with others who had supplemental information to be pieced together, such as making matches between requests for and offers of help. Remote helpers also acted as intermediaries who cast wide nets for gathering information. These behaviours became popularly known as distributed problem-solving that enabled the idealistic goal of collective intelligence (Meier). The idea was that people from any location could potentially assist. Those at a distance were suited to be collators of information that could be found by searching the Web, studying maps or making phone calls: a reliable Internet connection, electricity, and a quiet place to work were often missing for those proximate to a disaster (Crowley and Chan). During the 2009 Red River Flooding event, and long before the advent of pervasive bots that masquerade as humans today, a remote helper translated continuous river level data to publish as automated tweets—an idea that was highly innovative for the time (Starbird et al., Chatter). The Rise of the Digital Humanitarian. Some who understood the power of online help formed groups to specialise skill sets. This is known as self-organising (Comfort), and is common in the physical arena of disaster, and was expedited by Twitter in the digital arena (Reuter et al., Volunteers). Some self-organised groups evolved to the point of incorporating and creating brand identities that the formal response could interact with. The 2010 Haiti Earthquake marked the presence of organised digital volunteering, whose members were also known as digital humanitarians (Meier), and to a lesser but still notable extent, crisis tweeters and voluntweeters (Starbird and Palen, Voluntweeters), because of their dependence on Twitter for gathering and sharing intel. Their impact was palpable. Medical workers tweeted about medical needs on the ground and actively sought to coordinate with each other (Sarcevic et al.). Digital volunteers populated previously incomplete base maps provided by OpenStreetMap (Shaney et al.), an open geospatial database that professional humanitarian responders could use for navigation especially in parts of the world that are / were undermapped. This particular form of data became known as volunteered geographic information (VGI) (Haklay) and was the impetus for the incorporation of the Humanitarian OpenStreetMap Team (HOT) (Soden and Palen). Other specialisations emerged. Volunteers who eventually seeded the volunteer organisations of Humanity Road and the Standby Task Force (SBTF) (Norris) attempted to help Haitians, including, for example, by amassing donations to buy minutes for their mobile phones, which also required collating those phone numbers through trusted contacts. Some of the network of people with financially supported phones in turn became trusted reporters of on-the-ground information. Though the toolsets extended beyond Twitter to include other social media and open data platforms (Shanley et al.), Twitter was essential in soliciting volunteers and donations, and communicating broadly the impact of their work (Reuter; Starbird and Palen, Disaster Desk). Organised helpers took their experiences from the Haiti earthquake response to develop mission statements, establish policies, practices, and divisions of labour, and to create training and onboarding programs to assist with subsequent disasters around the world. They sought to work with local formal response efforts to be tasked with specific information-based work (Starbird and Palen, Voluntweeters). The US Forest Service took these emerging forms of online work a step further: its employees established VOSTs in 2011—Virtual Operations Support Teams—which could be assembled when large wildfires begin (St. Denis and Palen; Silver et al.). However, the US Forest Service sought experienced wildfire responders who volunteered to act as intermediaries between fire fighters active on the ground and the attending social media audience. In this way, VOSTs represented the first step in the incorporation of the digital humanitarianism that was happening in the public sphere into the professional world of emergency response and has also been trialled in other parts of the world, where its use seems to have endured beyond the initial US case (Fathi et al.). The Evolution of Practice in Digital Assistance. The practice of digital volunteerism needed several cycles of disasters to develop as social media opportunities and harms were being discovered. Hazards had different information demands as well, and the nature of what to expect online changed as more people signed onto Twitter. For example, a first-generation tenet of digital volunteerism was to amplify tweets that asked for help. To amplify was to retweet until messages got the attention of people on the ground, or of the formal response. The other point of the amplification of tweets was to assure that messages did not get lost in a long stream of tweets before notice could be taken. Eventually, it became clear that not only was amplification too passive a way to help, it could also be harmful. Over-amplified messages would saturate the information space even after going out of date. Even more importantly, amplification was pushing some messaging higher in priority as a matter of luck, which became problematic for emergency responders who felt pressure to allocate resources differently from what they thought best (Burns and Shanley). Critiques of the idealised hopes of social media arose as well, in tandem with innovation. Scholars questioned assumptions about how well Twitter posts could represent reality, directing concerns about how much machine learning innovations and journalism should rely on its streams as a source (Crawford and Finn; Lewis and Molyneux). Those who can post do post, and the absence of information might be as telling as its presence. Emergency responders shared this concern and adapted social media integration into their practice in their own ways. Amplification was eventually replaced by the collation and tracking of messages, which was the tipping point for more sophisticated and coordinated forms of help. This is where the Twitter timestamp became essential for determining when a message originated and what actions might have been taken in the time since. The appearance of posts in sequential order was therefore essential to coordinated, self-organising disaster response work across helpers for some objective measure of new and old information (Norris). Twitter posts provided the material, but digital humanitarian teams used other tools to collaboratively track incoming information and team chat solutions to coordinate in real-time. Once Twitter introduced algorithmic preferences to reorder how posts were presented to different users, confidence in content tracking and the felicity of the coordinated work took a nosedive (Norris). Observing the disaster through the window of Twitter degraded informationally, but no other platform could sufficiently take its place. Though those working in the emergency response social media space grew to understand the limitations of its ability to represent a disaster event “accurately” across the geography it affected, having an unreliable stream of what was known to be partial data was all the worse. Suddenly, corporate algorithmic decisions made it very hard to insert human discernment into the calculus about what constituted a picture of the disaster. In personal communications with Twitter executives in 2015, it was clear that they did not appreciate the critical dependence digital humanitarians had on the sequential delivery of posts, assuming that API calls could compensate for the change, here again failing to realise that even free API access was a barrier to use among low-resourced volunteers. The place of Twitter as part of a growing disaster infrastructure (Finn) was a low priority, and the atemporality and invisible mechanisms of amplification of posts effectively scrambled any existing signal. The early effects of “enshittification” (Doctorow) were sorely felt. Another evolution of practice came about when the volunteer digital humanitarians attempted to respond the world over. They realised that a core, experienced team needed to be in place to launch an effective digital response, but that onboarding new and local volunteers who could sustain the effort around the clock and employ localised knowledge was essential. Though the idea of a flexible organisation was a good one, it was hard to put into practice. New volunteers needed to be constantly trained, and people working across time zones often had difficulty with temporal coordination (Norris et al.). In addition, each disaster brought new waves of helper-onlookers who were limited by local knowledge. Research conducted in the aftermath of the 2012 Hurricane Sandy and the 2015 Nepal Earthquakes showed that locals made an effort to follow and help locals (Kogan et al.); they also tweeted photos that provided original logistical content such as information about road passage and shelter status (Bica et al.). Those helpers at a distance, however, in particular with the much later Nepal Earthquake, retweeted dramatic photos of injured victims and heavy destruction, sometimes even from other, past earthquakes in other locations (Bica et al.). Though their efforts might have increased donations world-wide, the visuals called to mind concerns about exploitation (Sontag), fair representation (Crawford and Finn), and how those curated visuals affected our very experience of disaster (Finn). The Formal Response In early disaster events, emergency management by and large was not attuned to the sudden influx of Twitter activity. Eventually, however, in many countries, the responsibility of social media engagement largely fell to public information officers. In speaking to emergency management audiences in those early days, reactions to the inevitable social media wave varied. Some were aware of the impending boom but wondered how to engage with it. Problematically, government workers in many countries (e.g., Ludwig et al., Haystack) were prohibited from having applications like Twitter on their work-provided devices, which was a significant hurdle initially for participation. Others felt that public participation was dangerous. The reckoning with the radical change in crisis communications was palpable. In addition, substantial attention was paid to the matter of the veracity of posts: were the statements true? Could sources be trusted? Though these were legitimate concerns even in those early days when information disorder could be managed manually, this hyperfocus on truth led to trepidation from emergency managers about interacting with Twitter at all (Palen and Anderson). Adaptation to the inevitable—that people were and would continue to turn to social media during disasters—was the first lesson, and the formal response cautiously came around as public demand grew and as information was being shared peer-to-peer without involvement by emergency management. Other concerns about danger to the public that formal responders raised were also instructive. If public information officers were to publicly inquire over Twitter about, for example, flooding threat or road damage, this could inadvertently compel people to go to areas that would put them at risk. Attending to online calls for help could mean improperly prioritising resources. Liability became a driving legal and policy concern both for emergency managers as well as the “Good Samaritans” who volunteered to help (Burns and Shanley; Robson). Given that “harvesting” of data (Castillo) from reports created problems for emergency response (Zade et al.), formal responders engaged in their own innovations to incorporate Twitter into their work. Recall the VOST initiative, which employed fire responders as trusted volunteers to relay distilled content back to incident command. Other solutions included making sure that formal readouts included Twitter as a place for announcements. When announcements could not be publicly made, information officers would quietly monitor social media posts and intercede to mitigate erroneous information. This way, good information from unofficial sources remained available, even though emergency responders could not officially comment on it. They cleverly engendered a protective role of the information space while also minding social media policies in place at the time (personal communication). Eventually, emergency management did find official and stable ways to engage. In the 2012 Hurricane Sandy event that struck the US eastern seaboard including New York City, about 70% of police and fire departments in the region posted on their Facebook accounts and nearly all using their standing Websites, indicating that having a stable “front door” onto the Internet was important to them. Engagement on Twitter was far less, at 10-20% having active accounts during that event (Hughes et al.). The simple matter of having limited staff to manage the herculean task limited social media engagement. We suspect that the low number of departments using Twitter combined with the high number of the same departments using other media came about because @FDNY (the Fire Department of New York) did a strong job of representing all. Even though the disaster was well beyond the scope of New York City, the steady participation of a few strong Twitter accounts from emergency response supported the rest. As time went on, emergency managers around the world showed an understanding that Twitter-enabled listening was important (Denef et al.). Indeed, as more emergency representatives came online, they attracted many followers. Weather forecasters became notable trusted authoritative sources around whom people would gather during hurricanes and floods (Bica et al., Hurricane Risks). It was clear that, in the vast world of Twitter, being able to find authoritative voices was important to members of the public: they would rely on unofficial sources if those were the only active voices, but they clustered around official voices when possible. Eventually, local emergency management groups came to strongly rely on Twitter as well as other social media platforms to message constituents. New significant problems then emerged. First, the volume of Twitter activity was so vast that they needed help with listening and sorting. Multiple research efforts tried to help with this (Anderson et al., Architectural; Anderson et al., Scalable; Gupta et al.; Ludwig et al., Haystack), but the exponential growth of social media activity and the technical changes corporations made to their platforms made it difficult for tools to sit atop these shifting commercial products. In addition, after emergency responders had devoted limited resources to building up a steady audience of constituents to whom they could reliably communicate out, the same algorithmic changes to Twitter that affected participation by informal responders meant that messages from the formal responders were often hidden. This became a major problem for emergency managers. What’s more, it was a major indicator of just how much emergency management came to depend on social media tools to communicate to constituents rapidly, flexibly, and interactively. They had come a long way from those initial years of reticence. The power of targeted crisis communication was finally realised—but was problematically at the mercy of corporate whims whose platforms served many purposes. The Dissolution of Reliable Crisis Communication The eroding reliability of crisis communication over Twitter was not helped by the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020, at which time concerns about public health gave way to new levels of controversy. Though public health crises are considered natural hazard disasters, the hazardous agent of the COVID-19 virus was embodied in people and therefore anthropomorphised. In comparison to a hazard like a hurricane—a shared experience of an exogenous agent from which all must retreat—this world-wide viral hazard engendered mistrust between people. Social media activity in the absence of sufficient early knowledge about how to truly protect oneself focussed on “flattening the curve” of how many people would be affected; interpersonal judgement arose around how protectively or not people behaved. Differing opinions about how nation-states should respond to the pandemic rendered the response highly political. Furthermore, the world-wide experience of lockdowns meant that social media communications by and large were inflected with pandemic concerns no matter what other topics they might have also been about. The world of Twitter was consumed by crisis communications of a kind that stood apart from the classic warning- and help-based messaging we had seen during geological and weather hazards. In addition, anti-vaccine advocates repurposed pandemic-related messages to cause unfounded fear among marginalised populations about receiving COVID-19 vaccines, reaching its height in 2021 when vaccines became widely available (Diamond et al.; Palen et al., Fertile Ground). Furthermore, it is important to note that Donald Trump during the first year of the pandemic had a Twitter follower base that was unmatched by anyone worldwide (88m)—followers who ardently retweeted his frequent messages (an average of 33 tweets per day), leading to an outsized international informational footprint that made finding signal impossibly difficult even with sophisticated search functionality (Palen et al., Medium). The once manageable public square was gone, and crisis communications were deeply entangled in a range of other issues, and often highly disordered. When Twitter was acquired by tech billionaire Elon Musk a year later in 2022, all access to APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) was soon removed, and important internal groups that strove to limit dangerous and offensive content were eliminated. Musk eventually renamed the platform X, setting the path for making this highly popular microblogging platform his own personal political propaganda machine. People left in droves. Others, now further unbridled behaviourally, disregarded any remaining attempts at maintaining the civic nature of the public sphere. With few other places that possessed a critical mass (Markus) of listeners, emergency managers stayed on X in an attempt to communicate outward to constituents, but their reach was dramatically limited. The disaster infrastructure (Finn) that had grown to include Twitter, and that so many relied on, as imperfect as it was in its early days, was no more. Few alternative solutions appear to have arisen in its place, with Watch Duty, a non-profit application-based platform dedicated to wildfire watch in the US American West, serving as an exception. It is notable that many of the approaches of Watch Duty echo the best of what we might now see as the golden era of early social media behaviours by informal and formal emergency response. Public Media Are Essential to the Future of Emergency Response It is important to understand that the infrastructure we grew to depend on was effectively experimental. Twitter was one of the earliest training grounds for microblogging. It was built because it could be, with an underspecified set of features that allowed for human interaction to shape its use, at least initially. It became a one-stop shop for all topics: it was all-purpose, not purpose-built. In terms of crisis response, this does have an advantage at least initially. It had the benefit of being a place with a critical mass of users. People were already there, chatting about other topics, and could switch to crisis communications should they arise, creating what Hermida described as a “nervous system for the planet” (117). Even occasional users knew they could go there and probably find the information they needed in disaster situations. It was expected that information that might appear elsewhere on broadcast media, or elsewhere online, would likely eventually traverse through Twitter. Even if one person was not a user, a neighbour or family member would be. This seemed sufficient for a saturation spread of information in disaster response. In this way, the all-purpose quality of the space was useful—until the geographical and population reach became too vast, at which point it began to buckle under its own weight even before more nefarious behaviours took over. Corporate interests finished it off, with algorithmic priorities (Doctorow) rendering Twitter less useful for disaster response, including for emergency managers who were no longer certain they were reaching their constituents, and for the digital humanitarians for whom sequentially timestamped data were the grist for their mill. Their work was troubled by this change. The Musk takeover finished it off, though emergency managers still use X in an attempt to push communications out. The digital volunteer humanitarian effort is largely quiet, except for the carefully managed versions of it offered by Watch Duty for wildfire hazards. It remains to be seen how emergency response will reorganise its digital communications. Though Twitter had its critics early on, the loss of it has revealed valuable characteristics for the future of public media. Twitter’s commitment to supplying robust APIs for a long time without significant fees allowed software engineers to help emergency response to pull posts fairly efficiently, though the constantly changing platform introduced a great deal of instability in letting non-commercial solutions grow. Twitter allowed academics to study the activities of people online as they were developing new information behaviours (Castillo), acting as watchdogs who could sound the alarm when troublesome activity was arising (Starbird et al., Boston). Now, few social media applications offer this level of API support. Social media platforms that exist are, technically speaking, places of public gathering but whose activities are not truly visible to anyone other than the corporate interests that enable them. This loss of crisis communication is tragic, and the disordered information ecosystem that we are now living with is a disaster all its own. The Way Forward: Interactive Public Media in Emergency Management The absence of reliable infrastructure for digital public communications shows just how essential it has become. We have learned that peer-to-peer and informal-to-formal communication is expected, and that members of the public want to and will help, if only we can protect the information ecosystem in which these exchanges can happen. No longer does the public wait for crisis communication only from authoritative sources; they expect the benefits of engaged interaction between members of the public and the formal response. In addition, though it was volunteerism that paved the way for innovative new forms of information behaviours, we must promote new forms of disaster informational work to professional positions. The lesson is not to rely so strongly on volunteers, but rather to attend to what creative solutions they enabled in their desire to help. It also has become painfully clear that we cannot depend on corporate solutions that need to monetise communications and limit perceived liability. Nonprofit public media that are purpose-built for emergency response seems to be a more predictable route to go, though how these are managed and the degree to which trust can be engendered by either non-government or government-led organisations will vary around the world. Interactive public media need to be imagined and housed in local government contexts that also mind the need for international agreements, as natural hazards do not obey human-made boundaries. For these reasons, solutions around the world will differ. Ideally, the “best of” of such implementations that enable safe, secure, and reliable interactions between the informal and formal responses can be shared, perhaps through trusted international partnerships of emergency management. Careful design and deployment are necessary to ensure that a critical mass of people attend to these sources to make them viable. Equally problematic is over-warning constituents if an all-incidents approach is taken in the design: the practice of high-density warnings in South Korea is a lesson in oversaturating audiences. Solutions will also need to offer stable data representations so that computational solutions built on top of them are themselves stable. It is clear that solutions cannot come from a few Silicon Valley technocrats whose ill-directed ideations are the basis on which crisis communications infrastructure has been built in response to fast-moving technological development. I would argue that the biggest lesson of all is that it is time for the expertise of emergency management to itself lead this cause, drawing upon its expert practice, and on the valuable lessons learned from the early experimental days of Twitter. 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Zitieren

APA

Palen, L. (2026). What the Rise and Fall of Twitter Revealed about Collective Behaviour in Natural Hazards Disaster Response. M/C Journal, 29(2). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3246

Vancouver

Palen L. What the Rise and Fall of Twitter Revealed about Collective Behaviour in Natural Hazards Disaster Response. M/C Journal. 2026;29(2). doi:10.5204/mcj.3246

BibTeX
@article{Palen2026,
  author = {Palen, Leysia},
  title = {What the Rise and Fall of Twitter Revealed about Collective Behaviour in Natural Hazards Disaster Response},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {2},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3246}
}
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