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Escape into the Transmedia Multiverse

Rhea Kruse

M/C Journal · 16.03.2026 · 29 (1)

DOI: 10.5204/mcj.3237 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift M/C Journal, online erschienen am 16.03.2026. Verfasst von Rhea Kruse. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).

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Abstract (Originalsprache)

Introduction

Romance, glamour, carefree hedonism: The golden age of capitalist individualism is upon us—or, at least, that is the impression one might have when engaging with the hit TV shows, films, novels, and music albums of recent times. Meanwhile, the social-ecological implications of capitalism that are confronting our societies more violently than ever (Malm; Moore “Capitalocene I”; Moore “Capitalocene II”) are nowhere to be found in the overwhelming majority of popular works, whether it be Amazon’s The Summer I Turned Pretty (2022-), Will Gluck’s Anyone But You (2023), or Taylor Swift’s The Life of a Showgirl (2025). If dominant popular culture from the Global North were faithful to reality, much of it would be set against the backdrop of omnipresent environmental disturbance. And yet, with notable exceptions such as Andrew Stanton’s WALL-E (2008) or Netflix’s Don’t Look Up (2021), mainstream entertainment media has tended to neglect the climate crisis, relegating the topic to niche genres like climate fiction and contributing to a false impression that ecological collapse and climate injustice are safely beyond the horizon (e.g., Ghosh; Giaccardi, Rogers, and Rosenthal; Schneider-Mayerson et al.). Can this lack be explained, as some scholars do, by invoking the unfathomability of global climate breakdown and the difficulty of representing it in fictional form (e.g., Ghosh; Morton), or are there other factors at play? This article argues that the latter is true by considering the capitalist context in which hegemonic cultural production is embedded, the privatisation of entertainment media, and its alignment with capitalist interests (Adorno; Adorno and Horkheimer; Brunkhorst). I contend that the legitimising function assigned to contemporary media cultures—their role in perpetuating the capitalist myth of boundless economic growth—has contributed heavily to their omission of themes of ecological decline and terrestrial uninhabitability. The concept of a ‘transmedia multiverse’ is developed here as a tool for thinking with and about this eerie absence. I suggest that the pop-cultural repression of climate change has given rise to coherent, immersive alternative universes. ‘Multiverse’, in this sense, describes the manner in which diverse cultural productions collectively imagine a global capitalism without ecological externalities. In turn, this escapist world-building produces an unsettling tension: While uncannily familiar, the ‘climate-crisis-less’ worlds represented in popular media diverge increasingly from reality as ecosystems move towards collapse. Such a ‘multiverse of disavowal’ not only encourages collective inaction; it is also symptomatic of an Anglo-Eurocentric and anthropocentric mode of cultural production that fails wholly to consider the experiences of (non)-human populations already implicated in plural climate catastrophes. Climate Change as Cultural Void The idea of a ‘multiverse of disavowal’—that is, pop culture’s alternative worlds that block out the environmental implications of real-world capitalism—builds on the observation that the climate crisis is strangely absent from dominant contemporary media. While this failure of popular culture to sufficiently address climate change has so far received limited scholarly attention, it has been commented on by cultural producers themselves. Most notably, in The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable, Indian writer Amitav Ghosh argues convincingly that culture in general and literary fiction in particular are ill-equipped to grapple with climate change (6–7, 9). He suggests that the topic has been excluded, despite its extreme urgency, from “serious fiction” due to the difficulty of translating perceptions of climate change “into the medium of … imaginative life” (Ghosh 6), pointing out the incompatibility of established literary conventions with a phenomenon as all-encompassing as global climate breakdown (Ghosh 7, 9). In Ghosh’s view, then, the climate crisis, unlike political and humanitarian crises of the past, has not been reflected in fiction because its very nature resists representation, and because it pushes the cultural imaginary to its limits: “the climate crisis is also a crisis of culture, and thus of the imagination” (9). In a similar vein, American philosopher Timothy Morton identifies a troubling mismatch between human psychology and the temporal and spatial vastness of climate change. They classify climate change as a ‘hyperobject’, that is, an object that is “massively distributed in time and space relative to humans” (1). In other words, hyperobjects like the climate crisis are relatively inconceivable precisely because they are nonlocal and drastically exceed human time scales (Morton 1). Though it is possible for humans to witness the climate crisis in its small-scale manifestations, such as localised extreme weather events, the complex, planetary-scale feedback loops initiated by anthropogenic carbon dioxide accumulation in the Earth’s atmosphere simply elude individual perception (Morton 1; Rodewald 812). As Ghosh describes, this incomprehensibility of climate change is then mirrored in public discourse and cultural production. One potential counterargument to the ‘unrepresentability’ thesis forwarded by Ghosh and Morton is the existence of climate fiction (cli-fi). The genre has similarities with science fiction, but focusses more exclusively on themes of climate change and climate justice, both addressing present developments and imagining climate futures. Thematically and stylistically diverse, cli-fi poems, novels, and short stories range from bleak, dystopian predictions of climate apocalypses to optimistic solarpunk and articulations of ecological utopias (Ballard, Roche, and Welsh; Cole; Hennessy, Cothren, and Matthews; Houser; Mączyńska; Malpas; Šosterič “Unlikely Heroines of Climate Fiction”; Šosterič “Wellbeing for Whom?”; Schneider-Mayerson; Trexler and Johns-Putra; Verardi). Although the genre is relatively marginal in the overall cultural landscape, it includes widely read works such as T.C. Boyle’s A Friend of the Earth, Octavia E. Butler’s Parable of the Sower, and Richard Powers’s The Overstory, and has proved especially popular among young readers already concerned about global warming (Schneider-Mayerson 478–9). Cli-fi is one of several examples demonstrating that it is very much possible to engage productively with the climate crisis through fictional forms. Why, then, have so many widely received works of dominant popular culture failed to do so (e.g., Giaccardi, Rogers, and Rosenthal; Schneider-Mayerson et al.)? Take, for instance, Netflix’s most popular original productions in recent years, which cover a wide variety of genres ranging from (period) dramas, true crime, sci-fi, and horror to apocalyptic thrillers and action comedies (Tudum “Most Popular Movies”; Tudum “Most Popular Non-English Shows”; Tudum “Most Popular Shows”): Films such as Red Notice (2021), Carry-On (2024), Leave the World Behind (2023), and The Gray Man (2022), as well as TV shows like Squid Game (2021-), The Queen’s Gambit (2020), Adolescence (2025), and Bridgerton (2020-) hardly reference climate change explicitly, even though some of them certainly address social justice issues or explore dystopian themes. This argument also extends to reality TV, a medium that ostensibly offers a much more immediate representation of reality than fictional formats. Popular shows available on Netflix, including Love Is Blind (2020-), Selling Sunset (2019-), or Temptation Island (2001-2019, 2024-) (Tudum “13 Reality Shows”), revolve around relationship drama, high-end LA real estate, and vacations to tropical paradise while making little mention of the frequent climate catastrophes that are exerting pressure on property markets and tropical islands alike. The concept of the multiverse, which I will return to later, may help us think about these strange divergences between the worlds represented in popular culture and the warming world that we inhabit. For now, I want to suggest that, aside from the challenge of representing global climate breakdown in fiction posited by Ghosh and Morton, the embeddedness of cultural production in a capitalist system has also contributed significantly to the unsettling absence of the climate crisis in popular culture: the intimate relationship between culture and economy prevents dominant cultural forms from exposing and critiquing fully the not-so-hidden underbelly of global capitalism. Popular culture participates instead in the large-scale promotion and naturalisation of capitalism, thereby trivialising its disastrous effects. More precisely, hegemonic cultural production obscures the fact that global capitalism is the driving force behind the climate crisis, responsible for the relentless exploitation and commodification of natural landscapes, the development of the fossil economy, and the resulting drastic increase in carbon emissions in recent decades (Malm; Malm and Hornborg; Moore “Capitalocene I”; Moore “Capitalocene II”). As the American sociologist Jason W. Moore notes, capitalism relies on “Cheap Natures” and the “ceaseless transformation of Earth systems at every scale”, wherein the cost of production is fully externalised (“Capitalocene I” 600, 606), that is, offloaded onto non-human nature (Işıkara 45–46). The observation that culture legitimises and reproduces capitalism is not new. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, members of the Frankfurt School’s first generation of critical theorists, first popularised the idea that cultural production necessarily emerges out of specific economic structures and acts as a reinforcement mechanism for capitalism. In their seminal 1944 work Dialectic of Enlightenment, they identify a hegemonic mass culture governed entirely by the laws of capitalist monopolism. Their notion of ‘culture industry’ describes the manner in which the internal logics of capitalist ideology and a capitalist mode of production have been translated into the cultural sphere. Culture as commodity, culture as advertisement—a notion later also taken up by Guy Debord (Behrens 9). Entertainment media that seem at first glance innovative and unique always only regurgitate the same content with slight variations; “the machine is rotating on the spot” (Adorno and Horkheimer 106). Deviations and potential challenges to the capitalist dogma are immediately excluded from mainstream culture, and all entertainment must align with the interests of powerful actors and corporations such as Warner Brothers and Metro Goldwyn Mayer (Adorno and Horkheimer 97). The aim of culture-as-commodity, then, is to maximise profits for the ruling class and to naturalise and stabilise the political and economic status quo. A top-down enforcement of conformity, the culture industry impedes the autonomy and critical thinking that a democracy requires (Adorno; Adorno and Horkheimer; Behrens; Brunkhorst). The validity and currency of Adorno and Horkheimer’s analysis are the subject of ongoing scholarly debate and contested particularly strongly by those who insist on culture’s subversive and democratising potentials (Behrens 7–8). Influential figures within media and cultural studies, such as Roland Barthes and Stuart Hall, highlight the active, autonomous role of media audiences (Schiller 101–102); Henry Jenkins speaks of media consumption as a “participatory culture” (3). Other scholars, however, argue for the continued relevance of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic, even going so far as to suggest that the totalising culture industry they diagnose is only now fully materialising (Behrens 7, 9; Brunkhorst 226). Considering the disturbing disconnect between our global polycrisis (Winkler and Jotzo 1213) and the entertainment repertoire of Netflix, Disney+, and the like, the culture industry thesis certainly has some merit. Following Adorno and Horkheimer, I contend that the way in which contemporary pop-cultural media construct “a specific point of view” (Boillat 6) and “present in a specific manner the world as a world” (Boillat 5) is influenced substantially by the ecocidal, capitalist-monopolist system in which they are embroiled. This system, in turn, is heavily invested in manufacturing consent in order to secure its continued legitimacy. In other words, I build on the assumption that the privatisation of media occurring at a global scale (Brunkhorst 238) affects the content of said media and facilitates a media-cultural suppression of the current, catastrophic state of climate change. But the climate crisis is not merely absent. A large part of popular culture also actively idealises and promotes consumerism and capitalist individualism while concealing the impact of capitalism on societies and ecologies around the globe. The culture industry fosters in its audience the view that the capitalist world is the best of all worlds (Behrens 19). Ghosh writes: “culture generates desires—for vehicles and appliances, for certain kinds of gardens and dwellings—that are among the principal drivers of the carbon economy” (9­–10). Popular culture thus embodies and consolidates the capitalist imaginary, yet simultaneously keeps consumers from recognising the destructive nature of its growth paradigm. The following section argues that the multiverse presents an appropriate framework for conceptualising this nexus of capitalism, cultural production, and the climate crisis—or the pop-cultural repression thereof. Multiverse of Disavowal If Adorno and Horkheimer are to be believed, the culture industry has reigned supreme ever since the beginning of the twentieth century, continuously feeding the masses superficial satisfaction in order to tranquilise them and nip potential resistance to the prevailing economic conditions in the bud. Yet, in this present moment of global polycrisis (Winkler and Jotzo 1213)—the unprecedented convergences of wars, tech-feudalism, fascism, and ecological decline—, it appears especially urgent to return to the culture industry thesis. After all, hegemonic cultural production stands in the way of what is needed now more than ever: active and informed citizens critical of current developments. The culture industry inhibits such political awareness by instilling in its audience a “false consciousness” (Behrens 19), characterised by the inability to perceive the growing incongruence between reality and the worlds contained in filmic and other media. On this, Adorno and Horkheimer write: the whole world is passed through the filter of the culture industry. The familiar experience of the moviegoer, who perceives the street outside as a continuation of the film he has just left, because the film seeks strictly to reproduce the world of everyday perception, has become the guideline of production. The more densely and completely its techniques duplicate empirical objects, the more easily it creates the illusion that the world outside is a seamless extension of the one which has been revealed in the cinema. (Adorno and Horkheimer 99) It seems that indulging in this illusion harbours significant risks, especially when the “outside world”, as it is violently restructured by the climate crisis (IPCC), is increasingly detached from the universes represented in popular media. With French media theorist Jean Baudrillard, one might argue that hegemonic media cultures are now mostly isolated from reality yet still purport to represent it. Pop-cultural media do not bear upon a real referent, as this would entail an acknowledgment of the global climate crisis; instead, they construct a self-referential, hermetic “hyperreality” (Baudrillard 22) in which the infinite continuation of capitalist society and a stable capitalist economy appear natural and self-evident. “Everywhere we live in a universe strangely similar to the original—things are doubled by their own scenario” (Baudrillard 11): following Baudrillard’s Simulacra and Simulation, contemporary cultural productions may be conceptualised as uncannily familiar simulations of capitalist normalcy, which disguise the fact that, in the real world, the pervasive social and ecological consequences of capitalism preclude any true sense of normalcy and stability. In what follows, I suggest using the notion of ‘multiverse’ to get at this “short circuit of reality” (Baudrillard 27), this quasi-schizophrenic split between real-world ecological disaster and seemingly oblivious pop-cultural media. The multiverse is not a new concept in media and film studies. The term may describe, for instance, the narrative organisation of those films and TV series that integrate two or more alternative universes into their diegesis, such as Alain Resnais’s Last Year at Marienbad (1961) or David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive (2001) (Boillat 6, 11, 36; Wille, Andreasen, and Wille 254). Influenced by Jenkins’s notion of “transmedia storytelling” (20), ‘multiverse’ is also used to characterise stories that are developed beyond a single work across a variety of different media, sometimes involving the participation of fan communities. Examples include the Matrix franchise as well as the DC Universe (DCU) and Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) (Boillat 13; Jenkins 20–1; Schiller 97; Taylor 131, 134; Wille, Andreasen, and Wille 251, 253, 258). In contrast to these definitions, I employ the term ‘transmedia multiverse’ to denote the way in which diverse forms of pop-cultural media co-produce alternative universes that offer a panacea to climate anxiety and invite apolitical escapism. Though different cultural productions naturally vary in content and form, and though their diegeses are distinct from one another, the universes they collectively construct are not fragmented but coherent and cohesive in their disavowal of the climate crisis and their insistence on a capitalist society free of ecological injustice. The pop culture multiverse—understood here as a proliferation of Baudrillardian simulations—allows consumers to indulge in a consistent illusion of normalcy and the belief that capitalism is compatible with long-term social-ecological stability. At an affective level, the usefulness of the transmedia multiverse is evident: in its non-representation of the climate crisis, it offers a pleasant alternative to an unpleasant truth. It is easy to dismiss reality and lend oneself to multiversal illusions of capitalist normalcy because what they promise—the continued existence of economic and social stability and the individualistic lifestyle that middle- and upper-class Northerners have grown accustomed to—is tempting. Popular culture offers a coping mechanism for climate anxiety by engaging “modes of concealment that prevent ... people from recognizing the realities of their plight” (Ghosh 11); the problem being that this blindness cultivated by the culture industry (Verblendungszusammenhang) (Behrens 29; Brunkhorst 226) produces a state of collective acquiescence as cultural production fails to convey the urgency of the current moment. To the extent that contemporary cultural production “arouses a feeling of well-being that the world is precisely in that order suggested by the culture industry” (Adorno 18), it works to inhibit productive engagement with the climate crisis. But the stakes are higher than that: The comfort and familiarity that the “multiverse of disavowal” offers may also be inimical to consumers’ solidarity with those most strongly affected by the climate crisis—those who cannot afford to indulge in escapism. As environmental sociologist Kari Norgaard observes, wilful ignorance and a constructed sense of safety can prevent privileged demographics of the Global North from acting on their ethical responsibility towards populations who are already forced to confront the violent realities of climate catastrophes (81–2). In particular, Anglo-Eurocentric media cultures veil the disproportionate impact of climate change on Southern and racialised communities. The sanitised versions of capitalism proffered by the hegemonic pop-cultural imaginary obscure how climate injustices driven by capitalist production have unfolded along the lines of colonial exploitation, extractivism, and dispossession, heavily burdening formerly colonised communities and countries of the Global South as well as Indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities in the Global North (IPCC; Norgaard 81–3; Sultana 119­–20). Geographer Laura Pulido reminds us that the capitalist accumulation of power and profit operates through the production of a “landscape of differential value”. She writes that, “just as the spatial fix is fundamental to capitalism, so too is human difference” (Pulido). Inasmuch as the escapist multiverse of pop culture represents a narrow, privileged, Anglo-Eurocentric experience of capitalism, it works to block out capitalism’s oppressive racial logics and glaring social-ecological injustices. The multiverse’s neglect of those bearing the brunt of climate change also extends to non-human species. In this way, the climate crisis has brought into view the profound anthropocentrism of contemporary media landscapes. When they appear in popular culture, non-humans are often represented in a biased or anthropomorphising manner (Ford and Hammerton). By contrast, cultural productions such as popular films and other scripted entertainment seldom take a genuine interest in the adverse effects of global capitalism and ecological devastation on non-human populations, such as habitat loss, extinction, and biodiversity decline (e.g., Giaccardi, Roger, and Rosenthal; Schneider-Mayerson et al.). In choosing not to represent climate breakdown, popular culture reflects a human failure to take responsibility for ongoing ecocides and approach non-human kin as equals. If, as Anna Tsing and Donna Haraway argue, the only way forward in times of crisis is to care for “assemblages of entangled ways of life” (Tsing 4) and develop strategies for “multispecies flourishing” (Haraway 2), cultural production must learn to attend to the lives and deaths of non-human beings experiencing the extreme environmental pressures of climate change. Only by integrating marginalised human and non-human perspectives may popular culture then contribute to the development of empathetic and effective responses to social-ecological breakdown.

Conclusion

As it stands, hegemonic pop culture overwhelmingly acts in the service of global capitalism. But does this foreclose the future possibility of redirecting the transmedia multiverse towards anti-capitalist purposes and successfully redressing the cultural void of the climate crisis? For instance, if multiversal world-building were utilised to witness the realities of climate change and play through different scenarios of climate futures, it could well provide a positive impetus for new pathways of climate action and global climate solidarity—and perhaps even begin to tackle the seemingly impossible task, identified by Mark Fisher, to “imagine a coherent alternative to [capitalism]” (2). It is Haraway who calls us to “stay ... with the trouble” by “learning to be truly present” (1): this is a collective attitude culture could foster if, instead of offering up simulations of capitalist normalcy to escape into, it encouraged audiences to engage in earnest with the climate crisis. 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APA

Kruse, R. (2026). Escape into the Transmedia Multiverse. M/C Journal, 29(1). https://doi.org/10.5204/mcj.3237

Vancouver

Kruse R. Escape into the Transmedia Multiverse. M/C Journal. 2026;29(1). doi:10.5204/mcj.3237

BibTeX
@article{Kruse2026,
  author = {Kruse, Rhea},
  title = {Escape into the Transmedia Multiverse},
  journal = {M/C Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {29},
  number = {1},
  doi = {10.5204/mcj.3237}
}
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