Evolution of egalitarian punishment
Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science · 2011
DOI: 10.5178/lebs.2011.14 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 2011. Verfasst von Kohei Tamura und 2 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 3-mal zitiert (Crossref).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Punishment has been deemed as a key to solve the puzzle of the evolution of cooperation. Recent studies have suggested that altruistic punishment may be motivated by preference for social equality (egalitarian punishment). Here we construct individual-based models to investigate the effectiveness of egalitarian punishment in promoting cooperation. Based on computational experiments, we first show that egalitarian punishment is as effective as classic punishment, which directly observes others' strategies, in a meta-population model. We then use a scale-free network model to show that egalitarian punishment can be effective even when heterogeneity in the number of interactions among individuals is incorporated. Finally, we show that generosity in punishment can affect co-evolution of egalitarian punishment and cooperation.
Zitieren
APA
Tamura, K., Morita, R. C., & Ihara, Y. (2011). Evolution of egalitarian punishment. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science. https://doi.org/10.5178/lebs.2011.14
Vancouver
Tamura K, Morita RC, Ihara Y. Evolution of egalitarian punishment. Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science. 2011. doi:10.5178/lebs.2011.14
BibTeX
@article{Tamura2011,
author = {Tamura, Kohei and Morita, Rieko C and Ihara, Yasuo},
title = {Evolution of egalitarian punishment},
journal = {Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.5178/lebs.2011.14}
}
EUVIMED