Weaponized Interdependence or Shared Resilience? Rethinking Undersea Cable Security in a Fragmenting Order
Balsillie Papers · 28.04.2026 · 9 (3)
DOI: 10.51644/bap93 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Balsillie Papers, online erschienen am 28.04.2026. Verfasst von Brendon J. Cannon.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Undersea communication cables have historically operated within an interconnected global system characterized by cooperative redundancy and routing agreements, despite episodic geopolitical contestation. Intensifying great power rivalry, however, is driving efforts to reroute cables, exclude vendors and build “trusted corridors.” Drawing on recent incidents and policy initiatives, this paper argues that emerging bifurcation threatens to weaken resilience by reducing redundancy, narrowing routing options and increasing incentives for disruption. While verified sabotage remains limited, securitization discourse is reshaping network design in ways that may prove counterproductive. The paper concludes with pragmatic policy options — including minilateral coordination and a scalable regional seas approach — to strengthen cable security while preserving interconnection.
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APA
Cannon, B. J. (2026). Weaponized Interdependence or Shared Resilience? Rethinking Undersea Cable Security in a Fragmenting Order. Balsillie Papers, 9(3). https://doi.org/10.51644/bap93
Vancouver
Cannon BJ. Weaponized Interdependence or Shared Resilience? Rethinking Undersea Cable Security in a Fragmenting Order. Balsillie Papers. 2026;9(3). doi:10.51644/bap93
BibTeX
@article{Cannon2026,
author = {Cannon, Brendon J.},
title = {Weaponized Interdependence or Shared Resilience? Rethinking Undersea Cable Security in a Fragmenting Order},
journal = {Balsillie Papers},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {3},
doi = {10.51644/bap93}
}
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