How inclusive is the brainstem rule? Partiality beyond consensus
Animal Sentience · 28.10.2026 · 10 (38)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1962 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Animal Sentience, online erschienen am 28.10.2026. Verfasst von Charlotte Gauvry und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 2.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In his 2024 book, Jonathan Birch builds a precautionary framework for the borderlines of sentience, one that is meant to guide both theoretical reflection and practical action. One of the book’s great merits is its bottom-up approach, which presents itself as theoretically neutral regarding the (neuro-)physiological criteria required for sentience. Yet the singular place granted to midbrain-centric views (e.g., Merker, 2007; Panksepp, 2011; Solms, 2021) and to what Birch calls the “brainstem rule” (Chapter 11) raises questions. What justifies granting it such a central role? What are its practical and theoretical consequences?
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APA
Gauvry, C., & Boddenberg, N. (2026). How inclusive is the brainstem rule? Partiality beyond consensus. Animal Sentience, 10(38). https://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1962
Vancouver
Gauvry C, Boddenberg N. How inclusive is the brainstem rule? Partiality beyond consensus. Animal Sentience. 2026;10(38). doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1962
BibTeX
@article{Gauvry2026,
author = {Gauvry, Charlotte and Boddenberg, Nurida},
title = {How inclusive is the brainstem rule? Partiality beyond consensus},
journal = {Animal Sentience},
year = {2026},
volume = {10},
number = {38},
doi = {10.51291/2377-7478.1962}
}
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