Objective bat phenomenology
Animal Sentience · 22.11.2024 · 9 (35)
DOI: 10.51291/2377-7478.1864 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Animal Sentience, online erschienen am 22.11.2024. Verfasst von Thomas Nagel. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Our discussions prompted Donald Griffin to campaign for the recognition of animal consciousness as a subject for scientific investigation. Ristau shows how much has since been discovered about the experiences of bats and other creatures, by Griffin and others, in spite of the limits to full knowledge imposed by our biological differences. But Ristau seriously misrepresents me as holding that we can know nothing about what it is like to be a bat, whereas these results are precisely of the kind I envisioned in proposing an “objective phenomenology.”
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APA
Nagel, T. (2024). Objective bat phenomenology. Animal Sentience, 9(35). https://doi.org/10.51291/2377-7478.1864
Vancouver
Nagel T. Objective bat phenomenology. Animal Sentience. 2024;9(35). doi:10.51291/2377-7478.1864
BibTeX
@article{Nagel2024,
author = {Nagel, Thomas},
title = {Objective bat phenomenology},
journal = {Animal Sentience},
year = {2024},
volume = {9},
number = {35},
doi = {10.51291/2377-7478.1864}
}
EUVIMED