Ekonomska efikasnost u postupcima javnih nabavki: normativna odstupanja i institucionalne posledice
Eudaimonia · 29.03.2026 · 9 (2) · 87-109
DOI: 10.51204/ivrs_25205a ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Eudaimonia, online erschienen am 29.03.2026. Verfasst von Sofija Todorović.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The paper examines the impact of shifting public procurement decision-making from the legal framework into the realm of political discretion on the integrity and efficiency of the system in the Republic of Serbia. While the framework largely mirrors EU standards, frequent use of lex specialis laws and interstate agreements bypasses competition and transparency. Through theoretical lenses – allocative efficiency, institutional economics, and public choice – and case studies of EXPO 2027 and the Belgrade-Subotica railway, the paper shows how political priorities override legal rules. Such deviations reduce economic benefits, erode trust, weaken oversight, and restrict equal market access. When procurement becomes an instrument of narrow interests without accountability, it loses its role as a neutral mechanism for allocating resources. The conclusion emphasizes that preserving the rule of law in public procurement is not a mere administrative formality, but a democratic imperative with far-reaching economic and institutional consequences.
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APA
Todorović, S. (2026). Ekonomska efikasnost u postupcima javnih nabavki: normativna odstupanja i institucionalne posledice. Eudaimonia, 9(2), 87-109. https://doi.org/10.51204/ivrs_25205a
Vancouver
Todorović S. Ekonomska efikasnost u postupcima javnih nabavki: normativna odstupanja i institucionalne posledice. Eudaimonia. 2026;9(2):87-109. doi:10.51204/ivrs_25205a
BibTeX
@article{Todorovi2026,
author = {Todorović, Sofija},
title = {Ekonomska efikasnost u postupcima javnih nabavki: normativna odstupanja i institucionalne posledice},
journal = {Eudaimonia},
year = {2026},
volume = {9},
number = {2},
pages = {87--109},
doi = {10.51204/ivrs_25205a}
}
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