How Lobbying Rewrote Land Value Capture in Mexico City’s 2017 Constitution
Critical Planning · 2025
DOI: 10.5070/cp8.39926 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Critical Planning, 2025. Verfasst von Andres Demetrio Gutierrez Flores. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This paper examines how lobbying redirected Land Value Capture (LVC) during Mexico City’s 2016 constitution-drafting process by acting at procedural margins and legislative stages. Using process tracing of drafts, committee reports, floor records, temporary provisions, and media, it reconstructs the sequence: the committee added LVC duties tied to areas of influence; early floor debate removed them; a late compromise adopted weaker mitigation language; a temporary article reset thresholds to existing regulatory limits; later, criteria were delegated to executive agencies. It also shows that the participatory phase expanded input but did not carry into bargaining, limiting citizen influence when decisions were made. The findings indicate agenda control by organized real estate interests that converted enforceable capture into mitigation and shifted the fiscal burden away from redistribution, with disproportionate impacts on renters and low-income districts at the urban fringe.
Zitieren
APA
Flores, A. D. G. (2025). How Lobbying Rewrote Land Value Capture in Mexico City’s 2017 Constitution. Critical Planning. https://doi.org/10.5070/cp8.39926
Vancouver
Flores ADG. How Lobbying Rewrote Land Value Capture in Mexico City’s 2017 Constitution. Critical Planning. 2025. doi:10.5070/cp8.39926
BibTeX
@article{Flores2025,
author = {Flores, Andres Demetrio Gutierrez},
title = {How Lobbying Rewrote Land Value Capture in Mexico City’s 2017 Constitution},
journal = {Critical Planning},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.5070/cp8.39926}
}
EUVIMED