Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation
eScholarship (California Digital Library) · 18.06.2025
DOI: 10.48448/yz2c-n039 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift eScholarship (California Digital Library), erschienen am 18.06.2025. Verfasst von Cognitive Science Society 2025 und 4 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
People often rely more on their prior beliefs than the presented evidence when evaluating arguments. We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this phenomenon. We hypothesise that when individuals encounter an argument that is congruent with their beliefs, it activates related information in memory. For belief-congruent arguments, people should therefore be more likely to both correctly recognise previously encountered information and incorrectly recognise new information as previously seen. To test this, we first investigated the effect of participants' beliefs about political claims on their evaluation of corresponding arguments that varied in quality. We then employed a surprise memory test to assess participants’ recognition memory for these arguments. While we replicated the finding that prior beliefs drive argument evaluations, prior beliefs did not affect memory performance for all arguments in the same way. Our results indicate that individuals may use prior beliefs to aid memory only when the memory task is difficult.
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APA
2025, C. S. S., Deans-Browne, C., Echterbeck, C., Roth, P., & Singmann, H. (2025). Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation. eScholarship (California Digital Library). https://doi.org/10.48448/yz2c-n039
Vancouver
2025 CSS, Deans-Browne C, Echterbeck C, Roth P, Singmann H. Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation. eScholarship (California Digital Library). 2025. doi:10.48448/yz2c-n039
BibTeX
@article{2025,
author = {2025, Cognitive Science Society and Deans-Browne, Calvin and Echterbeck, Caro and Roth, Pia and Singmann, Henrik},
title = {Differential Memory for Belief-Congruent versus Belief-Incongruent Arguments Cannot Explain Belief-Driven Argument Evaluation},
journal = {eScholarship (California Digital Library)},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.48448/yz2c-n039}
}
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