Dual-Layer RSA–Paillier Encryption: Design and Evaluation Against Wiener Attacks
Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research · 06.06.2026 · 16 (3) · 36505-36513
DOI: 10.48084/etasr.18671 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research, online erschienen am 06.06.2026. Verfasst von Dian Rachmawati und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit nennt 27 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Standard RSA encryption is vulnerable to Wiener's continued fraction attack when the private exponent is small, and its deterministic nature limits semantic security. This paper proposes a dual-layer encryption framework that combines RSA with the Paillier probabilistic cryptosystem to address these limitations. The scheme independently encrypts each plaintext under both RSA and Paillier using separate key pairs, transmits the ciphertext pair, and accepts the message only when both decrypted values agree. Because RSA relies on the Integer Factorization Problem (IFP) whereas Paillier relies on the Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA), the two layers provide orthogonal security guarantees: breaking the dual-layer scheme requires compromising both the IFP-based RSA layer and the DCRA-based Paillier layer. A formal adversarial model with a reduction-based security analysis demonstrates that the scheme achieves Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-CPA) semantic security by inheritance from Paillier, but not Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA2). It also provides improved resilience against Wiener's attack, chosen-ciphertext exploits, and side-channel leakage compared with standalone RSA. Experimental evaluation using a Python implementation with key sizes of 1,024–4,096 bits shows that dual-layer encryption with a 2,048-bit modulus completes in approximately 98.19 ms, decryption in 125.04 ms, and the ciphertext expansion factor is 3× relative to RSA alone. Comparative analysis against RSA-only, RSA–Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (RSA–OAEP), Paillier-only, and recent hybrid frameworks demonstrates that the proposed scheme provides a practical security--performance trade-off suitable for high-assurance applications where resilience against key-recovery attacks is a primary requirement.
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APA
Rachmawati, D., Lydia, M. S., Budiman, M. A., & Rahmat, R. F. (2026). Dual-Layer RSA–Paillier Encryption: Design and Evaluation Against Wiener Attacks. Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research, 16(3), 36505-36513. https://doi.org/10.48084/etasr.18671
Vancouver
Rachmawati D, Lydia MS, Budiman MA, Rahmat RF. Dual-Layer RSA–Paillier Encryption: Design and Evaluation Against Wiener Attacks. Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research. 2026;16(3):36505-36513. doi:10.48084/etasr.18671
BibTeX
@article{Rachmawati2026,
author = {Rachmawati, Dian and Lydia, Maya Silvi and Budiman, Mohammad Andri and Rahmat, Romi Fadillah},
title = {Dual-Layer RSA–Paillier Encryption: Design and Evaluation Against Wiener Attacks},
journal = {Engineering, Technology & Applied Science Research},
year = {2026},
volume = {16},
number = {3},
pages = {36505--36513},
doi = {10.48084/etasr.18671}
}
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