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State-Issued Stablecoins and Financial Stability: Regulatory Fragmentation and Risks for the U.S. Banking System

Andrea Caresana

Risk Management Magazine · 2026-04 · 21 (1) · 74-86

DOI: 10.47473/2020rmm0167 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Risk Management Magazine, 2026-04. Verfasst von Andrea Caresana. Die Arbeit nennt 90 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Recent US stablecoin legislation has introduced a significant shift in American monetary federalism by permitting state-issued stablecoins under a federal exemption regime. This article examines whether state-level experimentation in digital currencies enhances financial innovation or risks reintroducing the monetary fragmentation that characterized the pre–Civil War banking system. Focusing on Wyoming’s state stablecoin initiative and North Dakota’s institutionally oriented Roughrider coin, the analysis highlights how divergent technological architectures, governance models, and regulatory frameworks reflect competing policy objectives within the same federal system. Drawing historical parallels with the Free Banking Era and the National Banking Acts of the nineteenth century, the paper argues that the absence of mandatory interoperability standards and uniform federal oversight may undermine the efficiency gains promised by digital payment technologies. From a law-and-economics perspective, the article evaluates the trade-offs between regulatory competition, market discipline, and systemic risk, emphasizing the potential for regulatory arbitrage and liquidity fragmentation. While state experimentation may function as a laboratory for innovation, the paper concludes that sustained coexistence of heterogeneous state stablecoins without coordination mechanisms is likely to generate inefficiencies and financial stability concerns, ultimately reviving pressures for federal harmonization of the US digital monetary system.

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APA

Caresana, A. (2026). State-Issued Stablecoins and Financial Stability: Regulatory Fragmentation and Risks for the U.S. Banking System. Risk Management Magazine, 21(1), 74-86. https://doi.org/10.47473/2020rmm0167

Vancouver

Caresana A. State-Issued Stablecoins and Financial Stability: Regulatory Fragmentation and Risks for the U.S. Banking System. Risk Management Magazine. 2026;21(1):74-86. doi:10.47473/2020rmm0167

BibTeX
@article{Caresana2026,
  author = {Caresana, Andrea},
  title = {State-Issued Stablecoins and Financial Stability: Regulatory Fragmentation and Risks for the U.S. Banking System},
  journal = {Risk Management Magazine},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {21},
  number = {1},
  pages = {74--86},
  doi = {10.47473/2020rmm0167}
}
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