CEO COMPENSATION AROUND SPINOFFS
Global Journal of Accounting and Finance · 12.06.2026 · 7 (1)
DOI: 10.47177/s4nzpb60 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Global Journal of Accounting and Finance, online erschienen am 12.06.2026. Verfasst von Qiongyao Zhang und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This study examines whether CEO compensation decreases in response to the reduction in firm size after a corporate spinoff. We find overall that CEO pay reduces after the spinoff, consistent with efficiency theory. However, the decrease is driven by the pay adjustment accompanying CEO turnover around the spinoff. New CEOs hired around the spinoff have little bargaining power regarding their compensation, and thus a decline in CEO compensation around these spinoff events is observed. The compensation of those CEOs who span the spinoff event does not decrease, consistent with the notion of CEO entrenchment.
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APA
Zhang, Q., & Huang, C. (2026). CEO COMPENSATION AROUND SPINOFFS. Global Journal of Accounting and Finance, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.47177/s4nzpb60
Vancouver
Zhang Q, Huang C. CEO COMPENSATION AROUND SPINOFFS. Global Journal of Accounting and Finance. 2026;7(1). doi:10.47177/s4nzpb60
BibTeX
@article{Zhang2026,
author = {Zhang, Qiongyao and Huang, Chenchen},
title = {CEO COMPENSATION AROUND SPINOFFS},
journal = {Global Journal of Accounting and Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
doi = {10.47177/s4nzpb60}
}
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