The IMPACT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON CEO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY
Global Journal of Accounting and Finance · 12.06.2026 · 7 (1)
DOI: 10.47177/h69rh490 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Global Journal of Accounting and Finance, online erschienen am 12.06.2026. Verfasst von Dishant Pandya und 1 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
In this paper, we examine the effect of the 2003 mandated change in board composition on CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. Following the scandals of Enron and other companies, AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ required all companies listed on their exchanges to have a majority of independent directors on the board. Agency theory argues that outside directors will demand more stringent pay-for-performance incentives that better align CEO compensation packages with the interests of shareholders. The goal of this mandate was to strengthen corporate governance measures employed by publicly traded firms. Using changes in total compensation with respect to change in shareholder wealth as a proxy for CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, we find that pay-for-performance sensitivity increased in the long run following the mandated change to independent boards. This result holds even after controlling for differences in sizes of two groups as well as new pay disclosure requirements.
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APA
Pandya, D., & Deventer, I. V. (2026). The IMPACT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON CEO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY. Global Journal of Accounting and Finance, 7(1). https://doi.org/10.47177/h69rh490
Vancouver
Pandya D, Deventer IV. The IMPACT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON CEO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY. Global Journal of Accounting and Finance. 2026;7(1). doi:10.47177/h69rh490
BibTeX
@article{Pandya2026,
author = {Pandya, Dishant and Deventer, Ian Van},
title = {The IMPACT OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS ON CEO PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY},
journal = {Global Journal of Accounting and Finance},
year = {2026},
volume = {7},
number = {1},
doi = {10.47177/h69rh490}
}
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