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RESILIENSI DEMOKRASI FUNGSI EKUILIBRIUM, DISTRIBUSI INFORMAL, DAN EFEK SUNK COST DALAM MEKANISME PEMILIHAN LANGSUNG

Yuris Fahrul

Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia · 21.05.2026 · 7 (2) · 261-277

DOI: 10.46874/6zfkc133 ↗

Kurz gefasst

Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia, online erschienen am 21.05.2026. Verfasst von Yuris Fahrul. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Debates on local democracy in Indonesia are often framed through normative criticism of high political costs. This article seeks to reexamine that perspective through a functional realist analysis. Electoral inefficiency is understood as a vital balancing mechanism for maintaining national stability while reshaping transactional political practices. Drawing on classical moral economy theory and recent empirical findings, this study examines the flow of campaign logistics from candidates as a form of informal redistribution that fills gaps in grassroots public services. Building on theories of oligarchy and party cartelization, the article argues that direct elections compel strategic actors to undertake massive capital investments, thereby reinforcing the sunk-cost fallacy in political decision-making. Actors burdened by astronomical political costs become materially tied to preserving state sovereignty in order to secure their political positions. Elections are further understood as a dramaturgical ritual that reinforces social cohesion, reflected in Indonesia’s improving Fragile States Index (FSI) scores. This thesis is inversely illustrated through the deviant case of the Noken System in Papua, where the absence of mass direct elections has contributed to prolonged vertical conflict. This study concludes that direct elections continue to function as an effective social safety valve for maintaining national integration.

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APA

Fahrul, Y. (2026). RESILIENSI DEMOKRASI FUNGSI EKUILIBRIUM, DISTRIBUSI INFORMAL, DAN EFEK SUNK COST DALAM MEKANISME PEMILIHAN LANGSUNG. Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia, 7(2), 261-277. https://doi.org/10.46874/6zfkc133

Vancouver

Fahrul Y. RESILIENSI DEMOKRASI FUNGSI EKUILIBRIUM, DISTRIBUSI INFORMAL, DAN EFEK SUNK COST DALAM MEKANISME PEMILIHAN LANGSUNG. Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia. 2026;7(2):261-277. doi:10.46874/6zfkc133

BibTeX
@article{Fahrul2026,
  author = {Fahrul, Yuris},
  title = {RESILIENSI DEMOKRASI FUNGSI EKUILIBRIUM, DISTRIBUSI INFORMAL, DAN EFEK SUNK COST DALAM MEKANISME PEMILIHAN LANGSUNG},
  journal = {Electoral Governance Jurnal Tata Kelola Pemilu Indonesia},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {7},
  number = {2},
  pages = {261--277},
  doi = {10.46874/6zfkc133}
}
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