MacIntyre, morálny záväzok a relacionalita
Filosofický časopis · 2026-06 · 74 (2) · 267-277
DOI: 10.46854/fc.2026.2r.267 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Filosofický časopis, 2026-06. Verfasst von Martina Nebošková.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
Alasdair MacIntyre’s theory provides various reasons why we should care for people with intellectual disabilities. The emergence of a moral commitment to care is, however, conditioned by the participation of these persons in a network of relationships of giving and receiving. This is justified either through their representatives or by appealing to shared human nature, with neither approach providing a satisfactory solution. In the article, I propose an alternative justification in the form of the integration of the relationist perspective of care ethics, which understands relationships as ontologically primary and normatively binding. The presented approach goes beyond the limitations of MacIntyre’s concept and provides a more robust normative framework for justifying the obligation to care, not only towards people with intellectual disabilities, but also towards people in general.
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APA
Nebošková, M. (2026). MacIntyre, morálny záväzok a relacionalita. Filosofický časopis, 74(2), 267-277. https://doi.org/10.46854/fc.2026.2r.267
Vancouver
Nebošková M. MacIntyre, morálny záväzok a relacionalita. Filosofický časopis. 2026;74(2):267-277. doi:10.46854/fc.2026.2r.267
BibTeX
@article{Nebokov2026,
author = {Nebošková, Martina},
title = {MacIntyre, morálny záväzok a relacionalita},
journal = {Filosofický časopis},
year = {2026},
volume = {74},
number = {2},
pages = {267--277},
doi = {10.46854/fc.2026.2r.267}
}
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