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WiP: Flush-based Cache Attacks on Modern / Multi-Socket x86 systems

Guillaume DIDIER, Augustin Lucas, Thomas Rokicki

Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference · 2026

DOI: 10.46586/uasc.2026.302 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference, 2026. Verfasst von Guillaume DIDIER und 2 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Flush-based cache attacks have been extensively studied and leveraged, yet their behavior on today's complex x86 platforms is not fully understood. Notably, as cache and memory latency depend on the physical layout of cores, caches, and NUMA nodes, system topology increasingly influences the latencies underlying such attacks. We thus investigate the impact of this growing complexity on the effectiveness of flush-based attacks. We present a large-scale, topology-aware study of Flush+Reload and Flush+Flush across 36 Intel and AMD, single- and multi-socket systems, with server and client CPUs. We show topology-induced contributions dominate the latency variations. In particular, NUMA contribution on multi-socket systems makes topology-unaware attacks unreliable. Our topology-aware calibration accounts for topological parameters like attacker/victim cores, memory NUMA node, and target address, improving error rates and attack viability. We demonstrate Flush+Flush works on AMD targets, and is often more accurate than Flush+Reload on modern x86 platforms. Finally, we introduce Load/Flush+Reload, a covert-channel comparing invalid to shared loads, with double the true capacity than Flush+Reload/Flush+Flush. Our results show that topology awareness is required for dependable cache attacks on recent platforms, and provide practical guidance for attackers and defenders.

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APA

DIDIER, G., Lucas, A., & Rokicki, T. (2026). WiP: Flush-based Cache Attacks on Modern / Multi-Socket x86 systems. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2026.302

Vancouver

DIDIER G, Lucas A, Rokicki T. WiP: Flush-based Cache Attacks on Modern / Multi-Socket x86 systems. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. 2026. doi:10.46586/uasc.2026.302

BibTeX
@article{DIDIER2026,
  author = {DIDIER, Guillaume and Lucas, Augustin and Rokicki, Thomas},
  title = {WiP: Flush-based Cache Attacks on Modern / Multi-Socket x86 systems},
  journal = {Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.46586/uasc.2026.302}
}
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