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Crossref

Poster: Entropy-Coupled CLFLUSH for Secure Cache Flushing Against Timing-Based Attacks

Samiksha Verma, Virendra Singh

Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference · 2026

DOI: 10.46586/uasc.2026.201 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference, 2026. Verfasst von Samiksha Verma und 1 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Modern cache flush instructions, such as CLFLUSH, are essential for coherence and persistence but introduce deterministic timing behavior exploitable in attacks like Flush+Reload. We present Entropy-Coupled CLFLUSH (E-Flush), a secure redesign that integrates hardware entropy into the flush pipeline to randomize its latency and traversal order. By coupling each flush invocation with a unique entropy token, E-Flush eliminates observable timing patterns without affecting architectural correctness. Formal analysis proves zero timing leakage, and cycle-accurate simulation demonstrates less than 2.5% performance overhead. E-Flush thus provides a low-cost, backward-compatible defense against flush-based microarchitectural side channels.

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APA

Verma, S., & Singh, V. (2026). Poster: Entropy-Coupled CLFLUSH for Secure Cache Flushing Against Timing-Based Attacks. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2026.201

Vancouver

Verma S, Singh V. Poster: Entropy-Coupled CLFLUSH for Secure Cache Flushing Against Timing-Based Attacks. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. 2026. doi:10.46586/uasc.2026.201

BibTeX
@article{Verma2026,
  author = {Verma, Samiksha and Singh, Virendra},
  title = {Poster: Entropy-Coupled CLFLUSH for Secure Cache Flushing Against Timing-Based Attacks},
  journal = {Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.46586/uasc.2026.201}
}
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