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Crossref

Knock-Knock: Black-Box, Platform-Agnostic DRAM Address-Mapping Reverse Engineering

Antoine Plin, Lorenzo Casalino, Thomas Rokicki, Ruben Salvador

Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference · 03.02.2026

DOI: 10.46586/uasc.2026.007 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference, online erschienen am 03.02.2026. Verfasst von Antoine Plin und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) employ undocumented linear address-scrambling functions to obfuscate DRAM addressing, which complicates DRAM-aware performance optimizations and hinders proactive security analysis of DRAM-based attacks; most notably, Rowhammer. Although previous work tackled the issue of reversing physical-to-DRAM mapping, existing heuristic-based reverse-engineering approaches are partial, costly, and impractical for comprehensive recovery. This paper establishes a rigorous theoretical foundation and provides efficient practical algorithms for black-box, complete physical-to-DRAM address-mapping recovery. We first formulate the reverse-engineering problem within a linear algebraic model over the finite field GF(2). We characterize the timing fingerprints of row-buffer conflicts, proving a relationship between a bank addressing matrix and an empirically constructed matrix of physical addresses. Based on this characterization, we develop an efficient, noise-robust, and fully platform-agnostic algorithm to recover the full bank-mask basis in polynomial time, a significant improvement over the exponential search from previous works. We further generalize our model to complex row mappings, introducing new hardware-based hypotheses that enable the automatic recovery of a row basis instead of previous human-guided contributions. Evaluations across embedded and server-class architectures confirm our method's effectiveness, successfully reconstructing known mappings and uncovering previously unknown scrambling functions. Our method provides a 99% recall and accuracy on all tested platforms. Most notably, Knoc-Knock runs in under a few minutes, even on systems with more than 500GB of DRAM, showcasing the scalability of our method. Our approach provides an automated, principled pathway to accurate DRAM reverse engineering.

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APA

Plin, A., Casalino, L., Rokicki, T., & Salvador, R. (2026). Knock-Knock: Black-Box, Platform-Agnostic DRAM Address-Mapping Reverse Engineering. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2026.007

Vancouver

Plin A, Casalino L, Rokicki T, Salvador R. Knock-Knock: Black-Box, Platform-Agnostic DRAM Address-Mapping Reverse Engineering. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. 2026. doi:10.46586/uasc.2026.007

BibTeX
@article{Plin2026,
  author = {Plin, Antoine and Casalino, Lorenzo and Rokicki, Thomas and Salvador, Ruben},
  title = {Knock-Knock: Black-Box, Platform-Agnostic DRAM Address-Mapping Reverse Engineering},
  journal = {Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference},
  year = {2026},
  doi = {10.46586/uasc.2026.007}
}
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