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Poster: Systematic Evaluation of Automated Tools for Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection in Cryptographic Libraries

Antoine Geimer, Mathéo Vergnolle, Frédéric Recoules, Lesly-Ann Daniel, Sébastien Bardin, Clémentine Maurice

Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference · 2025

DOI: 10.46586/uasc.2025.201 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference, 2025. Verfasst von Antoine Geimer und 5 weiteren Autor:innen.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

To protect cryptographic implementations from side-channel vulnerabilities, developers must adopt constant-time programming practices. As these can be error-prone, many side-channel detection tools have been proposed. Despite this, such vulnerabilities are still manually found in cryptographic libraries. While a recent paper by Jancar et al. shows that developers rarely perform side-channel detection, it is unclear if existing detection tools could have found these vulnerabilities in the first place. To answer this question we surveyed the literature to build a classification of 34 side-channel detection frameworks. The classification we offer compares multiple criteria, including the methods used, the scalability of the analysis or the threat model considered. We then built a unified common benchmark of representative cryptographic operations on a selection of 5 promising detection tools. This benchmark allows us to better compare the capabilities of each tool, and the scalability of their analysis. Additionally, we offer a classification of recently published side-channel vulnerabilities. We then test each of the selected tools on benchmarks reproducing a subset of these vulnerabilities as well as the context in which they appear. We find that existing tools can struggle to find vulnerabilities for a variety of reasons, mainly the lack of support for SIMD instructions, implicit flows, and internal secret generation. Based on our findings, we develop a set of recommendations for the research community and cryptographic library developers, with the goal to improve the effectiveness of side-channel detection tools. In addition, we present preliminary results on the impact of compiler optimizations on constant-time source code. Our results bring nuance to the claim that newer compiler versions introduce more vulnerabilities and details new examples where complex interactions between optimizations can introduce secret-dependent branches.

Zitieren

APA

Geimer, A., Vergnolle, M., Recoules, F., Daniel, L., Bardin, S., & Maurice, C. (2025). Poster: Systematic Evaluation of Automated Tools for Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection in Cryptographic Libraries. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2025.201

Vancouver

Geimer A, Vergnolle M, Recoules F, Daniel L, Bardin S, Maurice C. Poster: Systematic Evaluation of Automated Tools for Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection in Cryptographic Libraries. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. 2025. doi:10.46586/uasc.2025.201

BibTeX
@article{Geimer2025,
  author = {Geimer, Antoine and Vergnolle, Mathéo and Recoules, Frédéric and Daniel, Lesly-Ann and Bardin, Sébastien and Maurice, Clémentine},
  title = {Poster: Systematic Evaluation of Automated Tools for Side-Channel Vulnerability Detection in Cryptographic Libraries},
  journal = {Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference},
  year = {2025},
  doi = {10.46586/uasc.2025.201}
}
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