Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation
Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference · 2025
DOI: 10.46586/uasc.2025.103 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference, 2025. Verfasst von Daan Vanoverloop und 6 weiteren Autor:innen.
Abstract (Originalsprache)
This talk overviews our recent work on TLBlur, a novel approach that leverages compiler instrumentation and the recent AEX-Notify hardware extension in modern, off-the-shelf Intel SGX processors to limit the bandwidth of controlled-channel attacks at acceptable performance overhead. We also discuss ongoing efforts to reduce instrumentation costs through binary layout optimizations.
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APA
Vanoverloop, D., Sánchez, A., Bullynck, V., Toffalini, F., Piessens, F., Payer, M., & Bulck, J. V. (2025). Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. https://doi.org/10.46586/uasc.2025.103
Vancouver
Vanoverloop D, Sánchez A, Bullynck V, Toffalini F, Piessens F, Payer M, et al. Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation. Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference. 2025. doi:10.46586/uasc.2025.103
BibTeX
@article{Vanoverloop2025,
author = {Vanoverloop, Daan and Sánchez, Andrés and Bullynck, Victor and Toffalini, Flavio and Piessens, Frank and Payer, Mathias and Bulck, Jo Van},
title = {Talk: Blurring Enclave Page Accesses in Space and Time with Compile-Time Instrumentation},
journal = {Proceedings of the Microarchitecture Security Conference},
year = {2025},
doi = {10.46586/uasc.2025.103}
}
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