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Open Access · CC BY 3.0

Non-price effects of mergers

Peter Wantoch, Riccardo Ferrari, Joel Bamford, Maria João Duarte

Competition Law Journal · 2019

DOI: 10.4337/clj.2019.02.03 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Competition Law Journal, 2019. Verfasst von Peter Wantoch und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 3.0).

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) assesses both the price and the non-price effects of mergers. The relative importance of each depends on the process of rivalry between the merging firms and their competitors. Dynamic non-price effects, for instance on innovation, are potentially important, as the CMA found in the ICE/Trayport merger, which was prohibited. Non-price parameters such as quality, range and service are also important and are considered in particular when mergers occur in markets where price competition is limited, for example public services such as hospitals and regulated markets such as pharmacies.

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APA

Wantoch, P., Ferrari, R., Bamford, J., & Duarte, M. J. (2019). Non-price effects of mergers. Competition Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2019.02.03

Vancouver

Wantoch P, Ferrari R, Bamford J, Duarte MJ. Non-price effects of mergers. Competition Law Journal. 2019. doi:10.4337/clj.2019.02.03

BibTeX
@article{Wantoch2019,
  author = {Wantoch, Peter and Ferrari, Riccardo and Bamford, Joel and Duarte, Maria João},
  title = {Non-price effects of mergers},
  journal = {Competition Law Journal},
  year = {2019},
  doi = {10.4337/clj.2019.02.03}
}
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