Non-price effects of mergers
Competition Law Journal · 2019
DOI: 10.4337/clj.2019.02.03 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Competition Law Journal, 2019. Verfasst von Peter Wantoch und 3 weiteren Autor:innen. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY 3.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) assesses both the price and the non-price effects of mergers. The relative importance of each depends on the process of rivalry between the merging firms and their competitors. Dynamic non-price effects, for instance on innovation, are potentially important, as the CMA found in the ICE/Trayport merger, which was prohibited. Non-price parameters such as quality, range and service are also important and are considered in particular when mergers occur in markets where price competition is limited, for example public services such as hospitals and regulated markets such as pharmacies.
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APA
Wantoch, P., Ferrari, R., Bamford, J., & Duarte, M. J. (2019). Non-price effects of mergers. Competition Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.4337/clj.2019.02.03
Vancouver
Wantoch P, Ferrari R, Bamford J, Duarte MJ. Non-price effects of mergers. Competition Law Journal. 2019. doi:10.4337/clj.2019.02.03
BibTeX
@article{Wantoch2019,
author = {Wantoch, Peter and Ferrari, Riccardo and Bamford, Joel and Duarte, Maria João},
title = {Non-price effects of mergers},
journal = {Competition Law Journal},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.4337/clj.2019.02.03}
}
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