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State recognition as a bargaining chip: limits and objections

José Rogelio Gutiérrez Álvarez

Cambridge International Law Journal · 01.06.2026 · 15 (1) · 77-98

DOI: 10.4337/cilj.2026.01.04 ↗

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Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Cambridge International Law Journal, erschienen am 01.06.2026. Verfasst von José Rogelio Gutiérrez Álvarez. Die Arbeit nennt 129 Literaturangaben.

AbstractBibliografische AngabenZitierenVerwandte Studien

Abstract (Originalsprache)

The ‘trading’ of recognition of States and governments for self-serving purposes is a centuries-old diplomatic practice. This article argues that such practice stands at odds with the function fulfilled by recognition in the international legal system. Furthermore, conditioning the recognition of a State or government on the surrender of natural resources, territory or a State’s freedom to conduct its external relations may run against the principle of non-intervention and the right of peoples to self-determination. These concerns are especially acute in scenarios where a stronger State threatens a weaker one with derecognition. By contrast, it is argued that a different legal assessment would be merited when recognition is used as a bargaining tool for the protection of human rights or the resolution of international conflicts.

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APA

Álvarez, J. R. G. (2026). State recognition as a bargaining chip: limits and objections. Cambridge International Law Journal, 15(1), 77-98. https://doi.org/10.4337/cilj.2026.01.04

Vancouver

Álvarez JRG. State recognition as a bargaining chip: limits and objections. Cambridge International Law Journal. 2026;15(1):77-98. doi:10.4337/cilj.2026.01.04

BibTeX
@article{lvarez2026,
  author = {Álvarez, José Rogelio Gutiérrez},
  title = {State recognition as a bargaining chip: limits and objections},
  journal = {Cambridge International Law Journal},
  year = {2026},
  volume = {15},
  number = {1},
  pages = {77--98},
  doi = {10.4337/cilj.2026.01.04}
}
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