The morality of social conventions
Revus · 2026 · 59
DOI: 10.4000/171e6 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Revus, 2026. Verfasst von Andrei Marmor. Die Arbeit wurde bisher 1-mal zitiert (Crossref) und nennt 9 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-SA 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
The essay argues for a fairly sharp separation between social conventions and moral norms. It is sometimes thought that conventional norms, shaping the ways in which we do things, may have a moral dimension in and of themselves. Nobody thinks that all conventions are morally commendable, but some philosophers tend to think, perhaps increasingly so recently, that conventionality in and of itself has a moral dimension that weighs in favour of compliance even if the weight is sometimes light as a feather and easily over-ridden by conflicting moral considerations. I argue against this view. Conventional norms are always susceptible to a kind of “open question” argument: Whenever X is something that is required or expected by a convention, it would always make perfect sense to ask whether X is morally good or not; or whether it is morally good to X or not. Sometimes the answer would be “yes”, and sometimes clearly “no”. The argument for this sharp separation view, as I call it, is based on the essential features of conventional norms and their functions in our social lives. But along the way I hope to show that the sharp separation view is also morally important to keep in mind.
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APA
Marmor, A. (2026). The morality of social conventions. Revus, 59. https://doi.org/10.4000/171e6
Vancouver
Marmor A. The morality of social conventions. Revus. 2026;59. doi:10.4000/171e6
BibTeX
@article{Marmor2026,
author = {Marmor, Andrei},
title = {The morality of social conventions},
journal = {Revus},
year = {2026},
volume = {59},
doi = {10.4000/171e6}
}
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