Escape the Presentism–Eternalism Dilemma: Towards A Common-Sense A-Theory
Philosophers' Imprint · 05.11.2026 · 26
DOI: 10.3998/phimp.8658 ↗Kurz gefasst
Fachartikel in der Zeitschrift Philosophers' Imprint, online erschienen am 05.11.2026. Verfasst von Alexander Jackson. Die Arbeit nennt 42 Literaturangaben. Der Volltext ist frei zugänglich (Open Access, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).
Abstract (Originalsprache)
I propose a novel A-theory that attractively articulates our common-sense, pre-relativistic conception of time. This A-theory posits fundamental facts about how things were at a specific past times. It treats time’s passing by positing fundamental facts like: four hours passed from 8am today until noon. It allows fundamental cross-temporal relationships. I show that the presentism–eternalism dilemma does not embarrass the proposed A-theory. There are two notions of existence in play: existence at a time and ‘∃-existence’. Neither features in the fundamental facts. I define them up in a way that vindicates the claims of common sense. Past objects count as metaphysically ‘gone’, but there are fundamental facts about how they were. My account rejects presentism and eternalism (properly defined). I defend other aspects of the proposal elsewhere.
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APA
Jackson, A. (2026). Escape the Presentism–Eternalism Dilemma: Towards A Common-Sense A-Theory. Philosophers' Imprint, 26(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.8658
Vancouver
Jackson A. Escape the Presentism–Eternalism Dilemma: Towards A Common-Sense A-Theory. Philosophers' Imprint. 2026;26(0). doi:10.3998/phimp.8658
BibTeX
@article{Jackson2026,
author = {Jackson, Alexander},
title = {Escape the Presentism–Eternalism Dilemma: Towards A Common-Sense A-Theory},
journal = {Philosophers' Imprint},
year = {2026},
volume = {26},
number = {0},
doi = {10.3998/phimp.8658}
}
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